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Abstract 
Essays on Institutions in Developing Economies 
by 
Xiao Yu Wang 
Submitted to the Department of Economics 
on ~Iay 15, 2013, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
The primary goal of this thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of how institutional structure 
responds and evolves in equilibrium, particularly in the idiosyncratic and dynamic settings of 
developing economies. I use methods from market design to study these questions. The first 
chapter characterizes the equilibrium response of informal insurance relationships to changes in the 
formal sector, when risk-averse agents may choose what risk to bear in addition to how to share a 
given risk. The second chapter studies informal insurance relationships in a setting with one-sided 
moral hazard, and shows how the tradeoff between incentive and insurance provision shapes the 
composition and nature of informal relationships. The third chapter focuses on a more general 
setting, where the standard price mechanism fails or is not available, and provides an explanation 
for why the stable mechanism used in its place works well in practice, despite appearing to be easily 
manipulable. 
In the first chapter, I develop a theory of endogenous matching between heterogeneously risk-
averse individuals who, once matched, choose both the riskiness of the income stream they face 
(ex ante risk management) as well as how to share that risk (ex post risk management). I find 
a clean condition on the fundamentals of the model for unique positive-assortative and negative-
assortative matching in risk attitudes. From this, I derive an intuitive falsifiability condition, 
discuss support for the theory in existing empirical work, and propose an experimental design to 
test the theory. Finally, I demonstrate the policy importance of understanding informal insurance 
as the risk-sharing achieved within the equilibrium network of partnerships, rather than within a 
single, isolated partnership. A hypothetical policy which reduces aggregate risk is a strict Pareto 
improvement if the matching is unchanged, but can be seen to harm the most risk-averse individuals 
and to exacerbate inequality when the endogenous network response is taken into account: the 
least risk-averse individuals abandon their roles as informal insurers in favor of entrepreneurial 
partnerships. This results in an increase in the risk borne by the most risk-averse agents, who must 
now match with each other on low-return investments. 
The aim of my second chapter is to understand the impact of optimal provision of both risk 
and incentives on the choice of contracting partners. I study a risky setting where heterogeneously 
risk-averse employers and employees must match to be productive. They face a standard one-sided 
moral hazard problem: mean output increases in the noncontractible input of the employee. Better 
insurance comes at the cost of weaker incentives, and this tradeoff differs across partnerships of 
different risk compositions. I show that this heterogeneous tradeoff determines the equilibrium 
matching pattern, and focus on environments in which assortative matching is the unique equi-
librium. This endogenous matching framework enables a concrete and rigorous analysis of the 
interaction between formal and informal insurance. In particular, I show that the introduction of 
formal insurance crowds out informal insurance, and may leave those individuals acting as informal 
2 
insurers in the status quo strictly worse off.
My third chapter is motivated by the observation that mechanisms which implement stable
matchings often work well in practice, even in environments where individuals could gain by using
simple strategies to game the mechanism. Why might individuals refrain from strategic manip-
ulation, even when the complexity cost of manipulation is low? I study a two-sided, one-to-one
matching problem with no side transfers, where utility is interdependent in the following intu-
itive sense: an individual's utility from a match depends not only on her preference ranking of her
assigned partner, but also on that partner's ranking of her. I show that, in a world of complete infor-
mation and linear interdependence, a unique stable matching emerges, and is attained by a modified
Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algoritln. As a result, a stable rule supports truthtelling as an
equilibrium strategy. Hence, these results offer a new intuition for why stable matching mechanisms
seem to work well in practice, despite their theoretic manipulability: individuals may value being
liked.
Thesis Supervisor: Abhijit V. Banerjee
Title: Ford International Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Townsend
Title: Elizabeth & James Killian Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Endogenous Insurance and Informal
Relationships
1.1 Introduction
The distinctive features of institutions and contract structures arising in the unique environments
of developing economies have inspired a vast body of research. Informal insurance alone has re-
ceived a great deal of attention.1 The poor, especially the rural poor, persistently report risk as a
serious problem (Alderman and Paxson (1992), Townsend (1994), Morduch (1995), Dercon (1996),
Fafchamps (2008)). There is widespread consensus that people in developing countries live in more
hazardous environments (in terms of climate, disease, and landscape, for example), and thus inher-
ently face more risk (Dercon (1996), Fafchamps (2008)). Furthermore, they live close to minimal
subsistence levels. This makes them particularly vulnerable to the risks they face, since even small
negative shocks could have disastrous consequences.
In addition to experiencing high levels of risk and vulnerability, the poor in developing economies
often lack recourse to formal insurance and credit institutions. Consequently, they incorporate risk
'For background and institutional details, see the classic papers of Alderman and Paxson (1992) and Morduch
(1995), and the recent discussions provided by Dercon (2004) and Fafchamps (2008). Addressing the question of
how well informal insurance works in practice is the seminal paper by Townsend (1994), with further papers on
empirical tests of risk-sharing in a wide variety of settings by Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Fafchamps and Lund
(2003), Mazzocco and Saini (2012), among many others. A further class of papers seeks theoretical explanations
for the observed limitations of informal insurance. One prominent explanation is limited commitment, explored in a
dynamic setting by Ligon et. al. (2002), and as a natural bound on group size by Genicot and Ray (2003), Bloch et.
al. (2008). In addition, a still-growing theoretical and empirical body of literature studies risk-sharing networks-both
how they form as well as how the nature of equilibrium risk-sharing corresponds to network structures (see, e.g.,
Bramoulle and Kranton (2007), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), Ambrus et al. (2013)).
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management into their relationships with each other in a variety of creative ways. Rosenzweig and
Stark (1989) show that daughters are often strategically married to households in distant villages
with highly dissimilar agroclimates, so as to minimize the correlation between farming incomes. The
authors show that the motivation for doing this is indeed insurance; households exposed to more
income risk are more likely to invest in longer-distance marriage arrangements. Rosenzweig (1988)
argues more generally that the formation of kinship networks between heterogeneously risk-averse
individuals is motivated by insurance. Ligon et al. (2002) and Kocherlakota (1996), among many
others, analyze a pure risk-sharing relationship between two heterogeneously risk-averse households
who perfectly observe each other's income. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) study agricultural
contracting in medieval Tuscany, and find evidence that heterogeneously risk-averse tenant farmers
and landlords strategically formed sharecropping relationships based on differing risk attitudes,
motivated by risk management concerns.
This paper enriches our understanding of informal insurance by developing and studying a
theory of endogenous relationship formation between heterogeneously risk-averse individuals in
risky environments, where these individuals may implement ex ante and ex post risk management
strategies with each other in the absence of formal insurance and credit markets 2 . The strength
of informal insurance is thus how well-insured a population of risk-averse individuals is when they
must rely only on interactions with each other to manage risk. The existing risk-sharing literature
has focused largely on analyzing the insurance agreement reached by a single group of individuals,
isolated outside of the equilibrium network. This provides insight into what behaviors to expect
if a given group of individuals is matched, but does not provide insight into what groups could
actually coexist in the first place.
Because of the lack of formal institutions and the subsequent dependence on interpersonal
relationships, taking individual heterogeneity and the equilibrium network seriously is essential for
our understanding of the developing world. For example, I show that accounting for a policy's
induced network response, as well as its effect on the flexibility of the network to respond in the
first place, may substantially alter assessment of welfare impacts. Indeed, Eeckhout and Munshi
(2010) study chit funds 3 in Chennai, and show that members of funds are matched strategically.
2This terminology derives from Morduch (1995), who also refers to ex ante risk management as "income-
smoothing", and ex post risk management as "consumption-smoothing". Intuitively, an individual choosing the
riskiness of the action she takes is managing risk ex ante, while an individual choosing how to smooth the riskiness
of an action she has taken is managing risk ex post. In this paper, I use the ex ante and ex post terminology.
3Chit funds are informal financial institutions which emerge in the absence of formal credit, where groups of
subscribers combine funds and bid for the pool of money.
9
Moreover, members swifly re-sorted in response to an unexpected exogenous policy which imposed
a cap on the bids they were allowed to place for the pot of money in their fund. The results of this
paper enable policymakers to account precisely for this type of endogenous network response when
designing regulations and programs.
The setting I study has the following key elements. First, a population of risk-averse individuals
with CARA utility lacks access to formal insurance and credit institutions. Individuals belong to
one of two groups, and members must partner up across groups in order to be productive.4 For
example, in an agricultural village, some individuals own land but would prefer not to farm it
themselves, while other, landless individuals have both the willingness and the skill to farm. No
crops can be grown if landowners do not employ farmers. Alternatively, in a microentrepreneurship
setting, some individuals might have skill A, while others have skill B, and a successful business
venture requires the combination of both skills.
I introduce two key types of heterogeneity: heterogeneity of preferences, and heterogeneity of
technology. Specifically, individuals vary in their degree of risk aversion, and can choose from an
assortment of risky projects which vary in their riskiness-a riskier project has a higher expected
return, but also a higher variance of return.5 Individuals know each other's risk attitudes, as well
as what projects are available.
Since formal institutions are absent, individuals must rely on agreements with each other to
manage the risks they face. A matched pair of individuals jointly chooses one project, and commits
ex ante to a return-contingent sharing rule. The risk composition of the pair determines both ex
ante risk management, that is, the riskiness of the income stream the pair chooses, as well as ex
post risk management, that is, the sharing rule describing the split of each realized return. Hence,
informal insurance motivations influence the projects and contracts chosen in equilibrium, as well
as the composition of partnerships ostensibly formed to produce output.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold: first, I show that this model of nontransfer-
able utility has a transferable utility representation, and I use this representation to find conditions
on the fundamentals of the modeling environment for unique assortative matching, which are in-
4 In fact, I show that this model nests a model in which individuals choose their own productive opportunities,
and match to pool their incomes (see Appendix 2 for the proof). However, this version of the model (with joint
productivity) is more tractable and natural for a study of partner choice. Moreover, because it nests the first model,
it applies to scenarios in which agents do not literally work together, such as two farmers who grow their own crops
but partner up to share risk.
5 In this model, I abstract from moral hazard, in order to focus on the impact of the heterogeneous trade-off in
ex ante and ex post risk management strategies across partnerships of different risk compositions on equilibrium
matching. I model moral hazard explicitly in Wang (2012b).
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dependent of the distributions of risk types in the economy. Equilibrium matching is driven by the
interplay between ex ante and ex post risk management strategies for a given partnership, where
this interplay differs across partnerships of different risk compositions. I show that the fundamental
of the model which determines this interplay is the marginal variance cost of taking up a riskier
project-a riskier project has a higher mean but also a higher variance of return. The marginal
variance cost describes the increase in variance incurred when moving from a project with some
mean return to a project with a slightly higher mean return. A sufficient condition for unique
negative-assortative matching in risk attitudes (that is, the ith least risk-averse person is matched
with the ith most risk-averse person) is convexity of the marginal variance cost function, while con-
cavity is sufficient for unique positive-assortative matching (that is, the ith least risk-averse person
is matched with the ith least risk-averse person).
Because the marginal variance cost function of risky projects may be challenging to observe in
the data, particularly in non-laboratory settings, I derive a simple condition to test the theory which
relies only on plausibly-collectible data, such as risk attitudes (for instance, elicited using gamble
choices as in Binswanger (1980) or Attanasio et al. (2012), or estimated as in Ligon et al. (2002)),
network links, and some proxy of mean incomes. Specifically, I show that convexity of the marginal
variance cost function is equivalent to the concavity of the mean returns of equilibrium projects
in the representative risk tolerance of matched pairs. Analogously, concavity of the marginal
variance cost function is equivalent to the convexity of the mean returns of equilibrium projects
in the representative risk tolerance of matched pairs. Hence, given data on risk attitudes, linkages
between individuals, and mean incomes, the representative risk tolerance can be calculated for each
matched pair, and the behavior of mean incomes in this risk tolerance can be tested for convexity
or concavity. I also propose an experimental design to test the theory directly.
Finally, I show that this theory has significant policy implications: a policy may trigger an
endogenous network response, and we need a coherent and tractable model of endogeneity in order
to account for this in our welfare analysis. For example, a policymaker may wish to stabilize the
prices of the riskiest crops in an environment where increases in the mean returns of a crop portfolio
come at an extremely steep marginal variance cost, and this trade-off is particularly onerous for
crop portfolios with high mean profitability. Crop price stabilization is typically motivated by a
desire to reduce the substantial risk burden of risk-averse farmers, and to encourage farmers to grow
crops with higher mean profitability. This kind of policy is very common in developing countries
around the world; for instance, Chile uses a variable import tariff to maintain a price band around
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wheat ("2012 National Trade Estimate Report: Foreign Trade Barriers" (2011)).
I show that such a risk-reduction policy, which decreases the variance of the riskiest projects in
particular, is a Pareto improvement if status quo partnerships are assumed to stay fixed. However,
accounting for the endogenous network response shows that such a policy may cause particular
harm to the most risk-averse agents: the least risk-averse agents abandon their roles as "informal
insurers" of the most risk-averse in favor of "entrepreneurial" pursuits with other less risk-averse
agents. This forces the most risk-averse agents to pair with each other, leaving them strictly worse
off. Importantly, inequality is exacerbated: partnerships of the least risk-averse individuals are
able to take advantage of the reduced risk and take up highly profitable projects, while the most
risk-averse individuals, having only weak ability to manage risk together ex post, rely heavily on ex
ante risk management, and subsequently select projects with especially low mean returns.
This work unites the literature on institutions in risky environments lacking formal insurance
and credit markets with the literature on endogenous matching. A small body of literature has
studied endogenous informal insurance relationships. Li et al. (2012) present a model of endoge-
nous matching between heterogeneously risk-averse people in which both positive- and negative-
assortative matching arise in equilibrium, and the certainty-equivalent is transferable within the
household. However, in their model, agents bear an explicit utility cost of choosing a project with
a certain mean and variance, where this utility cost function is increasing in the mean chosen
and decreasing in the variance chosen. The central role of this element in the theory causes the
main result to imply that the distributions of risk types drive equilibrium matching. By contrast,
my results are distribution-free, and offer an alternative intuition for the key determinants of the
equilibrium match. In addition, Li et al. do not discuss falsifiability of their model, or empirical
applications of their results. I derive a testable condition from my main theoretical result, and
show how it can be used in practice to address policy questions, and to guide empirical work in
informal insurance.
Legros and Newman (2007) develop techniques to characterize stable matchings in nontransfer-
able utility settings by generalizing the Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Becker (1974) supermodu-
larity and submodularity conditions for matching under transferable utility. Under nontransferable
utility, the indirect utility of each member of the first group given a partnership with each member
of the second group can be calculated, fixing the second member's level of expected utility at some
level v. Then, this indirect utility expression, which depends on both members' types and v, is
analyzed for supermodularity and submodularity in risk types.
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Legros and Newman also demonstrate an application of their method to a specific matching
problem under nontransferable utility, that is, the problem of forming partnerships to share an
exogenous risk. More specifically, heterogeneously risk-averse individuals (divided into two groups,
"men" and "women") choose their partners endogenously. All matched pairs face the same exoge-
nous risk (an individual receives either low or high income, where the probability of the low income
shock is fixed and is identical for all individuals), but a matched pair is able to commit ex ante to a
sharing rule contingent on the pooled income realization. In other words, people are able to choose
how to share a given risk, but not the risk itself. They show that their generalized decreasing
differences condition holds in this setting, and therefore that negative-assortative matching in risk
types must be the unique equilibrium matching pattern.
Chiappori and Reny (2006) show that this result continues to hold when the exogenous risk faced
by partnerships is more general than a risky income stream with binary return. More specifically,
they assume that each individual is endowed with some random income stream, and that the income
streams of all men are independent from and exchangeable with all income streams of women. This
ensures that all women look essentially identical to all men in terms of income, and vice versa, so
that the only heterogeneity driving the matching equilibrium is in risk aversion.
Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) also studies this model. He shows that this problem of endogenous
matching to share an exogenous risk has a transferable utility representation iff individuals have
ISHARA preferences6 . Because the conditions for assortative matching in transferable utility set-
tings are the standard supermodularity/submodularity conditions from Shapley and Shubik (1971),
he is able to apply these standard conditions to show that negative-assortative matching is the
unique equilibrium matching pattern in this model when agents have ISHARA preferences.
This paper develops and explores a model of endogenous matching between heterogenously risk-
averse individuals who are able to manage risk ex ante as well as ex post. That is, a partnership
is both able to choose what risk to face, as well as how to share that risk. The direct theoretical
innovation is to understand how the equilibrium structure of informal risk-sharing partnerships
changes when both types of risk management strategies are available. The main result provides
conditions under which negative-assortative matching arises as the unique equilibrium, and when
positive-assortative matching arises as the unique equilibrium.
6 To do this, he uses the Mazzocco (2007) result that the preferences of expected utility maximizers are exactly
aggregable iff they are ISHARA (harmonic absolute risk aversion with identical shape parameters). (Mazzocco (2007)
was in circulation as a manuscript in 2004.)
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There are two important consequences of identifying an environment in which both extremal
types of matching patterns can arise, and understanding the differences in the environments which
lead to one matching pattern versus the other. In a recent experiment, Attanasio et al. (2012)
take a rigorous experimental approach to the question of endogenous risk-sharing group formation.
The key elements of the environment are limited commitment, project choice, and a sharing rule
fixed at equal division. They find that individuals who are linked in kinship or friendship are
more likely to form risk-sharing groups with each other than with strangers, most likely because of
better quality information about risk attitudes as well as trust. Furthermore, they find that risk-
sharing groups composed of individuals linked by a family or friendship tie are positively-assorted in
risk attitude. This empirical observation of positive-assortative matching contrasts strikingly with
the negative-assortative match predicted by the models of Legros and Newman, Schulhofer-Wohl,
and Chiappori and Reny. Additionally, these results suggest that family and friendship ties are
important for identifying the pool of potential partners for a given individual (because an individual
is unlikely to know the risk attitude of, or to trust a stranger), but the choice of partner from this
pool for the purpose of insurance is primarily determined by risk attitudes.
This paper provides a clear economic intuition for the unique emergence of each of the two
extremal matching patterns. In addition, the falsifiability condition I derive allows empiricists to
test the environment of interest for the applicability of the theory. If the model cannot be rejected,
then the theory provides an understanding of the environment and sheds light on the design of
the empirical study. For example, the results in this paper can be used to assess the validity of
the assumption of homogeneous risk attitudes in a household 7 , which is fairly standard in work on
empirical tests of risk-sharing, where data is often at the household level.
Furthermore, this framework enables the kinds of policy analysis discussed earlier (risk-reduction
policy such as price stabilization, or the introduction of informal insurance), because it demonstrates
precisely how the network of relationships in the status quo may shift from one composition to
another, in response to changes in the environment. Hence, this paper contributes an understanding
of the features of the environment which are essential for equilibrium relationship formation, in
addition to the network response.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the institution of
sharecropping in Aurepalle, to fix the ideas of the model in a real world setting. Following this,
7 Homogeneity of risk attitudes in a matched pair is equivalent to positive-assortative matching when the distrib-
ution of risk types in each group is the same.
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I set up the model, state and discuss the main results, provide support for the theory in existing
literature, and discuss key elements of the model. I then show that a policy which decreases
aggregate risk unambiguously improves welfare when status quo relationships are assumed to remain
unchanged, but may in fact increase the individual risk borne by the most risk-averse agents and
decrease aggregate welfare, once the endogenous network response is taken into account. In Section
6, I describe an experiment to test the theory. Finally, I conclude. All technical details are relegated
to the Appendices.
1.2 Background
The well-studied institution of sharecropping in Aurepalle, a village in Southern India which was
among those sampled in the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) dataset, provides a strong empirical context to fix the ideas of this model. Sharecropping
is the practice of a farmer living on and cropping a plot belonging to a landowner, where the farmer
pays rent as a share of realized profits (rather than as a fixed amount), and continues to be dominant
in parts of the world today, e.g. rice farming in Madagascar (Bellemare (2009)) and Bangladesh
(Akanda et al. (2008)).
Townsend and Mueller (1998) conduct a detailed survey of sharecropping relationships in Au-
repalle. The modal type of arrangement in their sample is a landowner who hires a group of tenant
farmers to work the land collectively, where the landlord actively participates in the farming process.
The paper explicitly notes that there are many standard single-tenancy arrangements which were
not sampled; however, the authors felt that the collective tenancy group was a reasonable approxi-
mation to the single-tenancy case. There is also strong evidence that risk concerns played a major
role in the sharecropping relationship, as evidenced by implicit and explicit risk contingencies in
the contracts. 8
Notably, the paper finds that the ex post information sets of landlords and their tenants, along
dimensions including realized harvest output, inputs, and reasons for crop failure, were found to
coincide almost exactly. Communication and monitoring were found to be frequent and of high
quality. Hence, although the abstraction away from moral hazard serves the purpose of focusing
on the trade-off between use of ex ante and ex post insurance strategies, the model with this
8For more detail on and further examples of the influence of risk concerns on relationship formation, as well as the
documented importance of risk attitudes in building risk-sharing relationships, please refer to the final Appendix.
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assumption is still a close fit for empirically observed relationships. 9
There is plenty of evidence that these landowners and farmers are risk-averse, and heterogeneous
in their risk aversion. In a recent paper, Mazzocco and Saini (2012) develop a novel test and
strongly reject a null hypothesis of homogeneous risk preferences in the ICRISAT dataset, for a
very general class of preferences. Kurosaki (1990) finds evidence of substantial heterogeneity in risk
aversion among ICRISAT landowners and farmers; furthermore, he does not find much evidence of
heterogeneity in time preferences. Antle (1987) estimates the absolute Arrow-Pratt degrees of risk
aversion for landowners and farmers in the Aurepalle data, and finds a mean risk aversion of 3.3
with a standard deviation of 2.6.
In addition to heterogeneity in risk attitude, individuals can choose to grow a variety of crops,
where there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the riskiness of crop profitability. The riskiness
of crop income derives from two sources, yield risk and price risk, where the yields and prices of
different crops follow different probability distributions. Yield risk, for example, results in part from
stochastic environmental factors, such as rainfall. Different crops react differently to idiosyncratic
rainfall and soil conditions. Price risk results from farmers' inability to forecast what the world
crop prices will be at the beginning of the growing season-this affects farmer's planting decisions.
In Aurepalle, farmers' crop portfolios largely consist of some combination of castor, pearl millet,
cotton, pigeonpea, sorghum, chickpea, and paddy, and landowners and farmers who are heteroge-
neous in their risk aversion are observed to choose different portfolios of crops, portfolios of land
plots, inputs, and farming methods (Townsend (1994), Lamb (2002)).
That the institution of sharecropping emerged in this environment has been the subject of much
research. The literature has devoted substantial attention to understanding the feature of the share
contract. In a well-known paper, Stiglitzl0 in 1974 suggested that risk-averse landlords and tenant
farmers adapt the incentive contracts of their employment relationships to accommodate their desire
for risk protection, as a consequence of missing formal insurance. Townsend and Mueller (1998)
explore the empirical relevance of a wide variety of ideas from the theory of mechanism design,
such as monitoring and costly state verification. However, the question of which landlords match
with which farmers, and why, is not well understood.
9 Again, I model moral hazard explicitly in Wang (2012b). Moral hazard has interesting implications which are
essentially orthogonal to the key economic insight of this paper, which focuses on how the heterogeneous tradeoff of
risk management strategies across different risk partnerships influences the equilibrium matching pattern.
"'Other papers which discussed similar ideas but differed in approach include Cheung (1968), Bardhan and Srini-
vasan (1971), and Rao (1971).
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For further examples of informal insurance relationships, the importance of risk attitudes in
building risk-sharing relationships, heterogeneity in risk attitudes, and heterogeneity in technology,
please see the last Appendix.
1.3 The Model
In this section, I introduce a framework designed to analyze the equilibrium composition of partner-
ships between heterogeneously risk-averse people in a risky environment, where each partnership
chooses which risky income stream they face as well as how they share that income.
The framework consists of the following elements:
The population of agents: the economy is populated by two groups of agents, G1 and G2,
where IG11 = |G21 = Z, Z a finite, positive integer. All agents have CARA utility u(x) = --e rx,
and are identical in every respect except for their Arrow-Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion r
(and their group membership). 1 Assume that members r1 of G1 are distinct in some unmodeled
way from members r2 of G2 (e.g. they differ in the type of capital they own, in time constraints,
status, sex, etc.).
There are no distributional assumptions on the risk types in the economy.
The risky environment: a spectrum of risky projects p > 0 is available in the economy,
where the returns R, of project p are described by:
R, = p + p, ep - N(0, V(p))
Hence, R, ~ N(p, V(p)), where V(p) describes the "variance cost" of a project with mean
return p.
The function V(p) has the following properties:
1. V(0) = 0 and V(p) > 0 for p > 0 (the unprofitable project is safe, and variance must be
positive).
"Of course, in reality, types are multidimensional, and matching decisions are not exclusively based on risk atti-
tudes. It is worth noting that the model can account for this. For example, individuals linked by kinship or friendship
ties are more likely to know each other's risk types, and are more likely to trust each other, or be able to monitor
and discipline each other. Hence, kinship and friendship ties would enter into this theory in the following way: an
individual would first identify a pool of feasible risk-sharing partners, where this pool would be shaped by kinship and
friendship ties, due to good information and commitment properties. Individuals would then choose their risk-sharing
partners from these pools. This choice would be driven by risk attitudes, which is the focus of this model.
Thus, this theory can be thought of as addressing the stage of matching that occurs after pools of feasible partners
have been identified.
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2. V'(0) = 0, V'(p) > 0 for p > 0 (riskier projects have higher mean, but also higher variance). 12
3. V"(p) > 013.
Any project p requires the partnership of two agents, one from G1 and one from G214 . For
example, a landlord must contribute land, and a farmer, expertise, in order for any crop to grow.
Once matched, a pair (ri, r 2) jointly selects a project. Assume that staying unmatched is disastrous
for any agent, that is, an unmatched agent receives utility -oo5. All projects are equally available
to each possible pair, an agent can be involved in at most one project, and there are no "project
externalities". That is, one pair's project choice does not affect availability or returns of any other
pair's project.
There are no moral hazard considerations in this model. Please refer to Wang (2012b) for an
explicit treatment of moral hazard in an endogenous matching problem.
Information and commitment: there is no information problem. All agents know each
other's risk types and the risky environment (there is no disagreement about which risky projects
are available, for example).
A given matched pair (rl, r2) observes the realized output of their partnership, and is able
to commit ex ante to a return-contingent sharing rule s(Ryl2), where R1 , 12 is the realized return
of (ri, r 2 )'s joint project P12. More precisely, s(R12) specifies the income r 2 receives when the
realized return is RyP , where s : R -+ R (there are no limited liability assumptions). In order to be
feasible, the income r 1 receives must be less than or equal to R 12 - s(R,,2). Since all agents have
monotonically increasing utility, ri's share will be equal to R 12 - s(Rya2).
Thus, an agent r1 who is matched to r 2 under some sharing rule s(Ry12) receives expected utility
E{-e-r(12s(12 ))p12], while the agent r2 receives expected utility E-e-r25(RP12)|pI12).
1 2The assumption that V'(p) > 0 is without loss of generality-we could begin by considering the entire space of
project returns N(p, V(p)), where V(p) is unconstrained. Then, any agent with concave utility would choose the
project with lower variance, between two projects with the same mean. Tracing out the set of projects that agents
would actually undertake leads us to V'(p) > 0.3 The assumption V"(p) > 0 is to ensure global concavity of an agent r's expected utility in p and hence an interior
solution for project choice.
1 4The fact that group size is bounded can be justified by, for example, costly state verification considerations. (For
example, see Townsend and Mueller (1998) for a discussion of costly state verification and informal insurance in the
Indian village of Aurepalle.) More generally, there is a sharp modeling tradeoff between allowing for a richer action
space and allowing for richer group formation. Specifying that the group is of size two enables endogenous project
choice and contract choice in each partnership.
i5 See Appendix 2 for a proof that the framework with joint project choice and infinite disutility from being
unmatched is equivalent to the framework where each partner individually chooses a project and the returns are
pooled, and individual rationality is a constraint that must be satisfied.
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The equilibrium1 6 : An equilibrium is:
1. A match function l(ri) = r 2 , where t(-) assigns each r1 to at most one agent r2 , and distinct
people have distinct partners.
Moreover, the matching pattern described by t(-) must be stable. That is, it must satisfy
two properties:
(a) No blocks: no agent is able to propose an available project and a feasible sharing rule to
an agent to whom she is not matched under L, such that both agents are happier when
matched with each other in this proposed arrangement than they are with the partners
assigned by pL.
(b) Individual rationality: each agent must receive a higher expected utility from being in
the match t(-) than from remaining unmatched.
2. A set of sharing rules and project choices, one sharing rule and project for each matched pair,
such that no pair could choose a different sharing rule and/or a different project which leaves
both partners weakly better off, and at least one partner strictly better off. In other words,
the sharing rule and project chosen by a matched pair must be optimal for that pair.
Matching patterns: It will be helpful to introduce some matching terminology. Suppose the
people in G1 and in G2 are ordered from least to most risk-averse: {r , r, ..., r}}, j E {1, 2}. Then
"positive-assortative matching" (PAM) refers to the case where the ith least risk-averse person in
G1 is matched with the ith least risk-averse person in G2: p4(r) = ri?, i E {1, ..., Z}. On the other
hand, "negative-assortative matching" (NAM) refers to the case where the ith least risk-averse
person in G1 is matched with the ith most risk-averse person in G2: p(r) = r 1 , i E {1, ... , Z}.
To say that the unique equilibrium matching pattern is PAM, for example, is to mean that the only
pt which can be stable under optimal within-pair sharing rules and projects is the match function
which assigns agents to each other positive-assortatively in risk attitudes.
A more detailed discussion of the elements of the framework follows the statement of results
(with technical details relegated to the Appendix). I discuss the joint selection of a project by a
partnership, the assumption of normally-distributed returns, the focus on partnerships rather than
larger groups, and two-sided versus one-sided matching.
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"Existence is assured by Kaneko (1982).
1.4 Results
The heterogeneity of risk-aversion in agents makes this a model of matching under nontransferable
utility. That is, the amount of utility an agent with preferences u(x) = -e-'1x (and hence risk type
ri) receives from consuming one unit of output x differs from the amount of utility an agent with
preferences u(x) = -er2X (and hence risk type r2) receives from consuming one unit of output x.
Thus, we cannot directly apply the Shapley and Shubik (1962) result on sufficient conditions for
assortative matching in transferable utility games. 17
However, if a transferable utility representation for the model can be identified, then the Shapley
and Shubik conditions for assortative matching can be applied. It will be helpful to review briefly
their environment and result. Consider a population consisting of two groups of risk-neutral work-
ers, where all workers have utility u(c) = c. Let a1 denote the ability of workers in one group, and
a2 denote the ability of workers in the other group. The production function is given by f(ai, a 2 ),
which can be thought of as: "the size of the pie generated by matched workers a1 and a2 ". Then,
d 2 f > 0 is a sufficient condition for unique positive-assortative matching, and < 0 is adalda2  < 0 is
sufficient condition for unique negative-assortative matching.
My approach here will be to identify the function in this model which is analogous to the Shapley
and Shubik production function f(ai, a 2 ). In Proposition 1 below, I prove that expected utility is
transferable in this model-instead of thinking about moving "ex post" units of output between
agents, we should instead think about moving "ex ante" units of expected utility. I show that the
sum of the certainty-equivalents CE(ri, r2 ) of a given matched pair (ri, r 2 ) is the analogy to the
joint output production function in the transferable utility problem. The sum of the certainty-
equivalents of a matched pair is "the size of the expected utility pie generated by matched agents
r1 and r 2 ", and sufficient conditions for positive-assortative and negative-assortative matching
correspond to conditions for the supermodularity and submodularity of CE(ri, r2) in r1, r2.
More technically, expected utility is transferable in this model because the expected utility
Pareto possibility frontier for a pair (ri, r 2 ) is a line with slope -1 under some monotonic transfor-
mation.
Proposition 1 Expected utility is transferable in this model.
The proof is in Appendix 3.
17 Legros and Newman (2007) provide a detailed and thoughtful discussion of the challenges and real world appli-
cations of solving for the equilibrium matching pattern when utility is not transferable.
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Thus, conditions for the supermodularity and submodularity of CE(ri, r 2 ) in ri, r 2 are sufficient
conditions for unique PAM and NAM, respectively 18 . Finding these conditions requires character-
izing the sum of certainty-equivalents generated by a matched pair. I sketch the important steps
here (again, details can be found in Appendix 3).
To understand which individuals match in equilibrium and which project and sharing rule each
of these equilibrium partnerships chooses, it is necessary first to understand the project and sharing
rule chosen by a given matched pair (ri, r 2 ). Suppose r1 and r 2 had already selected a project p.
Then, conditional on r1 ensuring r2 some level of expected utility -e-", the optimal sharing rule
solves:
max E I-e-i le -s(R4)]g I aJ
s(E () e
E e_-r28(Rp)p] ;> _e-oV
Solving this program yields the following form for the optimal sharing rule:
2
rl r1 1 rr2 V
s*(Rp) = - Rp - - P + -2 2V(p) +-
ri + r 2  ri + r 2  2 (r + r2) r 2
Note that the sharing rule is linear 19 , and the less risk-averse member of the partnership faces
an income stream which is more highly dependent on realized project return.
Given the optimal sharing rule, and v, we can solve for the project a pair would choose. For
any v, the pair agrees on project choice, since r 2 is ensured a fixed level of expected utility and is
therefore indifferent over all projects. Hence, r 1 simply chooses the project that would make her
the happiest, conditional on her having to ensure r 2 expected utility -e-'. Furthermore, the pair
agrees on the same project, independent of the "split of utility", v2 0
Define a function M(p), which describes the marginal variance cost of a small increase in mean
"Note that an alternative approach to characterizing sufficient conditions for assortative matching in models of
nontransferable utility can be found in Legros and Newman (2007). Consider any four types ti,t' E G1,t 2 ,t' E G2
in the economy, where ti > t'i and t2 > t2. If, whenever agent t' is indifferent between ensuring agent t 2 expected
utility v and ensuring agent V6 expected utility u, agent ti strictly prefers (strictly dislikes) ensuring agent t 2 expected
utility v to ensuring agent t' expected utility u, then positive-assortative (negative-assortative) matching is the unique
equilibrium.
These conditions are intuitive and an elegant generalization of the Shapley and Shubik result, but are often
algebraically messy to use. The transferable expected utility approach proves to be much cleaner.
"Clearly, under moral hazard, incentive provision would also enter into the sharing rule-a more risk-averse indi-
vidual is willing to pay a higher premium for insurance, but is also more expensive to incentivize. In Wang (2012a),
I identify a framework of matching under one-sided moral hazard in which the equilibrium sharing rule is piecewise
linear, and thus cleanly separates insurance and incentive provision.
20Wilson (1968) showed that, as a consequence of CARA utility, any pair acts as a syndicate and "agrees" on
project choice.
21
return from level p. That is:
M(p) = V'(p)
Then a partnership chooses a project by equating the marginal cost of increased variance with
the marginal benefit of increased mean, weighted by their risk attitudes:
M(p*) = 2 + r2) <
ri r 2
p*= M_1 2(r1 + r 2)
L rr2J
Define the representative risk tolerance of a matched pair (ri, r 2):
H(ri,r2 ) = 1+-
r 1  r 2
r 1 - r 2
r 1r 2
That is, we can think of a matched pair (ri, r 2 ) acting as a single agent with CARA utility with
risk tolerance H(ri, r 2 ). The expression for optimal project choice shows that a matched pair will
choose
p= M- [2f5(r1,r 2)
Since risk tolerance is the reciprocal of absolute risk aversion, we can also define the represen-
tative risk aversion of the matched pair:
H(ri, r 2)1
H(ri, r2)
ri, r2
r1 + r2
Now that we have characterized the project p*(ri, r2 ) and sharing rule s(Rpp*(ri, r 2 ), v) chosen
by a matched pair (ri, r2), we can characterize the partnership's sum of certainty-equivalents:
CE(ri, r 2 ) = p*(ri, r 2 ) - rir2 V(p*(ri, r 2 ))2(r1 + r 2 )
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That is:
CE (H(ri, r2 )) = 1 [2ft(ri, r 2 )] - 2 -V (M-1 [2f5(ri,r 2 )])2fI(ri ,r2)
This expression provides both concrete and conceptual insight. Conceptually, we see that a
matched pair can be thought of as a single CARA individual with risk tolerance H whose equilibrium
welfare is captured by CE(H). This is because both individuals in a matched pair want to generate
as large of an "expected utility pie" together as possible, regardless of the endogenously-determined
split. Hence, the sum of certainty-equivalents for a given pair is a reasonable way to think about
the welfare of that partnership, and of the individuals matched within it.
Concretely, we can see that more risk tolerant (higher H) matched pairs choose riskier (higher
p) projects. In addition, the adverse impact of variance on CE (H) is smaller for higher H-that
is, the size of the expected utility pie of a matched pair with representative risk tolerance H is less
negatively-affected by the variance of a risky project for higher levels of risk tolerance.
It remains only to identify conditions on CE(ri, r2 ) for its supermodularity and its submodu-
larity in ri, r 2 . Observe that:
d2CE(ri,r2 ) dE d2 N d2CE dh dN
dr1 dr2  d H dr1dr2  dH 2 dr1 dr2
1 d2CE
r2r2 dH 2
Hence, CE(ri, r 2 ) will be supermodular (submodular) in ri, r2 if and only if CE(H) is convex
(concave) in risk tolerance H.
This leads to the main matching result on the fundamentals of the model.
Proposition 2 1. A sufficient condition for PAM to be the unique equilibrium matching pattern
is M"(p) < 0 for p > 0 (the marginal variance cost function is concave).
2. A sufficient condition for NAM to be the unique equilibrium matching pattern is M"(p) > 0
for p > 0 (the marginal variance cost function is convex).
3. A sufficient condition for any matching pattern to be sustainable as an equilibrium is M"(p) =
0 for p > 0 (the marginal variance cost function is linear).
(Technical details of the proof can be found in Appendix 4.)
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Note that this result shows that the equilibrium matching pattern is independent of the distri-
butions of risk types in the economy, which makes its application very flexible.2 '
What is the intuition behind the matching result? We know from the literature the intuition
behind negative-assortative matching when agents lack income-smoothing tools-in that case, it is
the least risk-averse guy in G1 who is "willing to place the highest bid" for the most risk-averse agent
in a2. This is because the least risk-averse agent is the most willing to provide insurance, while
at the same time the most risk-averse agent has the highest willingness to pay for good insurance.
This "bidding" turns out to have a monotonic property, in that once the least risk-averse agent
in G1 and the most risk-averse agent in G2 are matched and are "removed from the pool", the
least risk-averse of the remaining agents in GI is then matched with the most risk-averse of the
remaining agents in G2, and so on.
My result shows that accounting for the interaction of income-smoothing with consumption-
smoothing leads to the emergence of both extremal matching patterns. Loosely, a risk-averse
individual prefers a partner unlike herself for consumption-smoothing purposes (a "gains from
trade" matching motivation), but prefers a partner like herself for income-smoothing purposes (a
"similarity of perspective" matching motivation). In a model with both consumption- and income-
smoothing, playing the role of informal insurer isn't as straightforward for the less risk-averse
agents-the consumption-smoothing that a less risk-averse agent offers to a more risk-averse partner
comes at a cost. Namely, the insurance that a less risk-averse agent provides within the relationship
affects the choice of income stream-if the less risk-averse agent did not have to bear most of the
consumption risk, she would have preferred to choose a riskier income stream with higher mean
return.
When the marginal variance cost is increasing in expected return, and increasing more rapidly
for higher levels of expected returns, the benefit of playing the role of informal insurer dominates
the costs for the less risk-averse agents, because optimal consumption-smoothing does not come
at much of a cost-it does not really involve a sacrifice in the choice of income stream, since the
less risk-averse agents also prefer to stick to safer projects. In this environment, there is little
friction between consumption-smoothing and income-smoothing for all agents across all partner
types, and thus the "gains from trade" consumption-smoothing motivation dominates, resulting in
2
'These sufficient conditions could be weakened slightly by introducing slight dependence on the distributions of
risk types, only through the supports: the concavity, convexity, and linearity of M(-) need only to hold on the domain
[max(ri) + max(r2)' min(rl) + min(r2)J, and not on R+
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unique negative-assortative matching.
However, when the marginal variance cost is increasing in expected return, but increasing more
slowly for higher levels of expected returns, the role of informal insurer becomes less appealing
for a less risk-averse agent. Now, when the less risk-averse agent shoulders most of the risk in a
relationship with a more risk-averse agent, she must make a sacrifice in the choice of income stream-
were she to be slightly more insured herself, she would start a project with a much higher expected
return, since marginal variance cost is concave in expected returns. This highlights a natural
and important constraint of informal insurance which is typically not emphasized: each risk-averse
individual can share risk only with other risk-averse individuals. Hence, in this environment, the less
risk-averse agents experience friction between consumption-smoothing and income-smoothing when
partnered with more risk-averse agents, and this friction diminishes when they pair up with fellow
less risk-averse agents instead. This causes the less risk-averse agents to choose entrepreneurial
pursuits with other less risk-averse agents, over informal insurance relationships with more risk-
averse agents, and unique positive-assortative matching results.
Finally, when the marginal variance cost is increasing linearly in expected return, the total sum
of certainty-equivalents is the same across all possible matching patterns. Partnerships of different
risk compositions do generate different pair-specific certainty-equivalents, but all risk types in GI
have the same strength of preference between any two individuals in G2 (and vice versa). Hence,
any matching pattern is sustainable as an equilibrium.
It is worth asking what happens in the model when the income-smoothing channel is shut
down, and what happens when the consumption-smoothing channel is shut down. Shutting down
the income-smoothing channel effectively corresponds with the Chiappori and Reny (2006) and the
Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) settings, so it is reassuring that in this setting, in the absence of project
choice, negative-assortative matching arises as the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, when instead
the consumption-smoothing channel is shut down (by holding the division of output fixed at a
constant across all possible pairs), the unique equilibrium matching pattern is positive-assortative.
(See Appendices 5 and 6 for details.)
Can this theory be falsified empirically? An obvious challenge of directly checking the concavity
or the convexity of the marginal variance cost function according to the condition identified in
Proposition 2 is that we may not observe the variance cost function in the data. For instance,
one obstacle is that even a bad estimator of the variance of a project requires more than one
observation of its returns, and good dynamic data, especially in developing countries, is difficult to
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gather. However, other elements of the model are more conducive to data collection. For example,
existing papers have collected data on the risk types of individuals, the linkages between these
individuals, and some proxy of mean income, e.g. a household's realized income (in the absence of
any other information about the distribution of returns, and for a large sample of households, this
will be a reasonable proxy for the mean).
The following two results will be helpful for more concretely linking the intuition of the matching
equilibrium to the data.
Proposition 3 The mean return of optimal project choice p* (rl, r2) if (ri, r2) are matched is su-
permodular (jf 2 > 0) in r1 , r2 if M"(p) < 0, and is submodular ( r2 < 0) in r1 ,r 2 iff
M"(p) > 0.
Proposition 4 The mean return of optimal project choice p*(rl, r2) for a pair (r1, r2) is convex in
representative risk tolerance $(r1, r 2 ) iff M"(p) < 0, and is concave in H(ri, r 2 ) iff M"(p) > 0.
(Recall that $(r1,r 2 ) = + I.)
ri r2
(See Appendix 4 for the proofs.)
In words, the first corollary tells us that the sufficient condition for unique positive-assortative
matching corresponds exactly to the supermodularity of the mean return of a matched pair's optimal
choice of project in the risk types of the matched pair, while the sufficient condition for unique
negative-assortative matching corresponds exactly to the submodularity of the mean return of a
matched pair's optimal choice of project in the risk types of the pair.
However, we cannot directly test for this relationship, because we only observe equilibrium
projects.
To be more clear about this, consider the following example. Suppose G1 = {rA, rA, rf} and
G 2 = {frB, r , rI}, where rAB < r ', < rB1 , 2 r5fw ee 1  r 2  Kr 3
Then, suppose the underlying marginal variance cost function is such that M"(p) < 0. Propo-
sition 1 says that this means we observe agents positively-assorting along risk attitudes. But we
do not observe the marginal variance cost function M(p), or the variance function V(p). We only
observe mean project returns in equilibrium, p(rA, r ), p(rA, r'), and p(rA, rB), as well as the risk
types of agents in GI and G2, and the positive-assortative linkages between G1 and G2.
If we could show supermodularity of the mean of optimal joint project choice of a matched pair
in rP, rf, then this would be evidence supportive of the theory. But we do not observe p(rf, rj)
for i 5 j-that is, we do not observe the projects that individuals who are unmatched in equilibrium
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would have chosen had they been forced to match. So, we cannot use this result to see test whether
or not the data supports the theory.
Fortunately, Proposition 3 implies Proposition 4, which is testable with data we are likely
to have. We can use our observed matchings (r 4 , rf), (r , rg), and (r', ry) to calculate the
representative risk tolerance H, H N(rf, f) for each matched pair. Then, we can regress pi
p(rP, f) on a constant, as well as 53 and H (to use a crude polynomial approximation). If
the regression shows that pi is convex in H, that is, the coefficient on H is positive, then this
is evidence supportive of the theory, since we have established the following: (a) individuals are
matched positive-assortatively in risk attitudes in the data, and (b) the mean returns of equilibrium
projects are convex in the representative risk tolerance of the matched pairs. 22 We know from the
theory that (b) is equivalent to the original matching condition of concavity of the marginal variance
cost function M"(p) < 0.
Hence, it is clear that there are concrete, observable differences between environments in which
PAM arises as the unique matching equilibrium, and environments in which NAM arises as the
unique matching equilibrium. The falsifiability condition is constructed by exploiting these dif-
ferences. Loosely, equilibrium project choice varies less and representative risk types are more
clustered in environments where NAM arises than in environments where PAM arises.
Finally, can we say anything about efficiency?
Proposition 5 The equilibrium maximizes the sum of certainty-equivalents, and is Pareto efficient.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium maximizes total mean project returns (conditional on a matched
pair choosing its project optimally).
Both of these propositions follow straightforwardly from the conditions for positive- and negative-
assortative matching.
Since the sum of certainty-equivalents is a social welfare function, and the equilibrium maximizes
this sum, it must be Pareto efficient. Intuitively, if an agent could be made better off without making
his partner worse off via a change in sharing rule or project choice, then that sharing rule or project
choice was not optimal in the first place and thus not an equilibrium. If an agent could be made
22 In some sense, this condition is necessary but not entirely sufficient. What we really want is to confirm convexity
or concavity of the marginal variance cost function over the entire interval between the lowest possible partnership
risk tolerance and the highest possible partnership risk tolerance. Instead, we observe only points within this interval,
corresponding to the risk tolerances of matched pairs. However, for a large enough population, this is a reasonable
approximation.
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better off without making anyone worse off by switching partners, then that switch would have
occurred and the original assignment would have violated the first stability criterion.
However, while the sum of certainty-equivalents of individuals within a pair is a reasonable way
of thinking about the welfare of those individuals and that partnership, the unweighted sum of
certainty-equivalents across all pairs is not the right way of thinking about aggregate welfare in
this economy. To understand various reasons for this, first recall the expression for the certainty-
equivalent of a matched pair with representative risk tolerance H:
1CE(H) = p - - V(p)2H
Note that at every possible project p, the certainty-equivalent of a pair with higher risk tolerance
H will be larger than a less risk-tolerant pair. This is precisely because a less risk-tolerant individual
dislikes risk more-she requires a smaller amount with certainty to receive the same expected utility
she does from facing a risky project p. This implies that if the population consisted of two pairs, one
more risk tolerant than the other, and a social planner cared about the sum of certainty-equivalents
across pairs but could only allow one pair to start a project (leaving the other pair to receive -U
in the absence of a project), then the social planner would always choose to give the project to the
more risk tolerant pair. But this is unsatisfying, as there is no inherent social value in doing this.
That is, there is no reason it should be viewed as worse from society's perspective to give a project
to an individual who requires a smaller amount to be indifferent between receiving that certain
amount and facing the project, versus an individual who requires a larger amount. Moreover, in
this model, transfers aross pairs are not allowed, so an unweighted sum across pairs relates pairs
to each other in an artificial way.
Hence, a superior approach to policy evaluation in this setting is to ask whether a policy
generates a Pareto improvement. Alternatively, the use of a Rawlsian social welfare function would
also be appropriate, as the welfare of the most risk-averse agents is a natural priority in this setting.
The second proposition tells us that, in a given environment, any movement of the matching
pattern away from the equilibrium results in a decrease in total expected project returns, as long
as a matched pair chooses its project optimally.
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1.4.1 Support in the Literature
Is there support for this theory in existing empirical work? The data from the experiment of
Attanasio et al. (20T2) and the sharecropping data from Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) suggest
that the answer is yes. (In Section 5, I describe the ideal experiment to test this theory.)
Attanasio et al. (2012) run a unique experiment with 70 Colombian communities. They elicit
risk attitudes by privately offering subjects a choice of gambles in the first round, which vary in
riskiness (higher mean projects come at the cost of higher variance). In addition, they gather
data on pre-existing kinship and friendship networks. Kinship and friendship ties matter for two
important reasons: first, individuals are likely to know the risk attitudes of family and friends, and
unlikely to know the risk attitudes of strangers. Second, individuals are likely to trust family and
friends over strangers (renegers cannot be detected in this experiment).
Individuals are able to choose what gamble they face, but the sharing rule for each risk-sharing
group is fixed at equal division. In other words, individuals are able to manage risk ex ante, but
not ex post.
Attanasio et al. study a simplified model of their experimental setting to identify theoretical
predictions: individuals have CARA utility and have either low or high risk aversion (type is
binary). In addition, they match pairwise and can choose which risky project to undertake, but
the sharing rule is fixed at equal division. Finally, they can be either familiar or unfamiliar with
each other, where familiar individuals know each other's risk types and can perfectly commit to
each other. Attanasio et al. show that familiar individuals should match positive-assortatively in
risk attitude: people with high risk aversion partner with each other, and people with low risk
aversion partner with each other. This is verified by the experiment, where family and friends are
observed to group together with greater likelihood, and conditional on this, to assort positively in
risk attitudes
The model in this paper enables us to understand these experimental results in a more general
context. For example, the half-half split of project returns in the model is key to the proof of the
positive-assortative matching result in Attanasio et al. (2012), not because of the equality, but
because no constant transfer is permitted. This means that utility is completely nontransferable,
and outside options are not endogenously determined. The model would be very different if the form
of the sharing rule were s(R,) = 1Ry + b, where individuals can choose b. My results show that it is
precisely the trade-off between income-smoothing and consumption-smoothing across pairs which
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is essential for the equilibrium match. In particular, positive-assortative matching arises uniquely
when the consumption-smoothing channel is shut down (see Appendix 6 for details).
I seek support in the data from the Attanasio et al. experiment in the following manner. I focus
on the subset of individuals reporting at least one family/friendship tie with their matched group
members, since these "familiar" individuals know each other's risk attitudes and are able to commit
to a return-contingent sharing rule, and these are key features of my model. Note that family and
friendship ties can be incorporated into the framework of this paper by thinking about such ties
as entering the matching process in a "period 0" stage, where individuals first identify pools of
feasible risk-sharing partners. Family and friends tend to fall into this pool for informational and
commitment reasons. Then, the choice of partner from this pool is driven by risk attitudes, and is
determined by the forces described in this paper.
The choice of gambles is described below23 . Each gamble had a low payoff and a high payoff
(units are Colombian pesos), where the probability of each payoff was . across all gambles24
Riskier gambles had lower low payoffs but higher high payoffs. The paper provides the ranges of
risk aversion corresponding to each gamble choice; I list the lower bound of each range25 :
Gamble Mean Variance Risk Aversion
1 3000 0 [7.49, oo)
2 4200 2,250,000 [1.73,7.49)
3 4800 5,760,000 [0.81, 1.73)
4 5400 12,960,000 [0.46, 0.81)
5 6000 25,000,000 [0,0.46)
Thus, it is possible to characterize (approximately) the variance function V(p), which describes
2 3 The standard deviations reported in the table in Attanasio et. al. (2012) are the experimental standard deviations,
and not the analytical standard deviations based off the equally likely low and high payoffs of each gamble. The
discrepancy results from altruism on the part of the experimenters, who were found to have a tendency to give
the subject the high payoff even when the subject lost the gamble. Here, I consider the analytical variance, since
Attanasio et. al. state that subjects were unaware of the bias in probabilities during their private, one-on-one risk
elicitation rounds. Hence, subjects should have thought they were facing the analytical variance.
2 4The distribution of these gamble returns is clearly not normal. This analysis is merely meant to be supportive
of the theoretical results.
251 chose the lower bound primarily because the risk type interval corresponding with the safest gamble is [7.49, oo),
and choosing any other point in that large interval seems particularly arbitrary.
Additionally, the lower bound of the interval corresponding to the fifth gamble is 0; I approximate this with 0.0005.
I drop the sixth and riskiest gamble, because the fifth and sixth gambles have the same mean, but the sixth gamble
has higher variance. Thus, only risk-loving individuals should choose the sixth gamble, and in my model, I consider
only risk-averse people. About 15% of people chose the risk-loving gamble in the risk type elicitation round.
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the variance of a project with mean p. Convexity or concavity of the marginal variance cost function
does not determine equilibrium matching here, since the shutdown of the consumption-smoothing
channel ensures positive-assortative matching, but it will influence the mean returns of projects
chosen by matched pairs in equilibrium.
Hence, I take the following steps. The observation of positive-assortative matching among
familiar individuals is the first point of support, since this is also what is predicted by the more
general theory. Second, I seek confirmation that members of matched groups chose similar projects.
Third, I solve for the closest power function approximation of V(p). Finally, I test the data to see if
the behavior of the mean returns of equilibrium projects in risk tolerance aligns with the behavior
predicted by the theory.
The second point is easily verified: members of matched groups did indeed choose similar
projects. The mean difference in second-round gamble choice within groups of familiar individuals
is 0, and the modal difference is also 0.
The closest power function approximation of the variance function is V(p) = (p - 3000)2.1. We
know from the theory that this implies the mean returns of the projects chosen in equilibrium should
be slightly concave in risk tolerance. More specifically, if it were the case that V(p) = (p - 3000)2,
the mean returns would be predicted to be linear in risk tolerance. If the variance function is more
convex than a quadratic function, the mean returns should be concave in risk tolerance, while if
the variance function is less convex, the mean returns should be convex. Since the power of the
function is 2.1 and not 2, the observed mean returns should be "slightly" concave in risk tolerance.
I regress the mean returns of the projects chosen on risk tolerance and squared risk tolerance.
A positive coefficient #3 would indicate convexity, while a negative #3 would indicate concavity 26 :
Pi =,31+ 2 -) + /33 -) + iTi ri
The OLS estimates are reported in Table 1:
2 6There are more precise ways to examine data for convexity or concavity (e.g. local linear regression or nonpara-
metric methods). The purpose here is not to develop the optimal econometric technique for convexity-testing, but
rather to describe an approach to the problem and demonstrate its implementability by executing the approach in a
simple, intuitive way. Here, this is done by approximating V(p) with a polynomial.
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Table 1: Testina for Concavitv of Mean Project Returns in Risk Tolerance
ReIressor OLS Estimates
Sq. risk toierance
(-60.73)
Risk tolerance 239**
(275)
Cc nstant 5169.13***
(180.91)
No s: s table repo.s the OL3 est mates 'rc a regress on :f rean prcje:* +:u-s on s:.ared risi tolerance
,sk tcr4ance, and a cons:an: Data 'rcm Atta-as oet e (2012'
s nif: a*: -1 ; 'sign 'can* at 5% "'sign 'icant at 1%
In line with the theoretical prediction, we see that mean project returns are concave in the rate
of risk aversion, and indeed they are even slightly concave (close to linear). Moreover, individuals
with a higher risk tolerance (less risk-averse individuals) choose riskier (higher mean) gambles.
Hence, the theory finds preliminary support in these experimental results: positive-assortative
matching in risk attitudes is observed among individuals who know each other's risk attitudes and
are therefore able to trust and commit, and who are only able to choose what risk to share, not
how to share a given risk. Furthermore, individuals who choose to match select similarly risky
gambles, and the mean returns of the chosen gambles are slightly concave in risk tolerance. This is
as predicted by the theory, since the variance function is approximately V(p) (p - 3000)'.1, just
a bit more convex than the quadratic threshold.
A second paper which offers empirical support for this theory is Ackerberg and Botticini (2002).
They provide evidence of endogenous matching between landowners and sharecroppers in medieval
Tuscany, motivated by risk concerns. They assume that landowners exogenously owned crops of
varying riskiness (the safe crop of cereal, the risky crop of vines, and mixtures of the two), and
studied the matching of tenants with differing risk attitudes to different landowners/crop plots. That
is, they assume that individuals were able to manage risk ex post, but were restricted in their ability
to manage risk ex ante. In their data, they observe that fixed-rent (residual claimancy) contracts
were associated with the safer crop of cereal, while share contracts were associated with the riskier
crop of vines. In addition, they observe that less risk-averse agents were matched to cereals, while
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more risk-averse agents were matched to vines. They then provide empirical support for their
endogenous matching conjecture that less risk-averse agents worked under fixed-rent contracts for
more risk-averse landlords who owned the safer crop of cereal, while more risk-averse agents worked
under share contracts for less risk-averse landlords who owned the riskier crop of vines.
But the data also shows that the types of crops cultivated differed starkly across two regions of
Tuscany they studied: San Gimignano and Pescia. The following table shows the number of pure
vine plots, pure cereal plots, and mixed plots cultivated in Pescia and in San Gimignano:
Pescia San G.
# plots # plots
Vines (risky) 47 6
Mixed 4 127
Cereals (safe) 178 17
The difference in the equilibrium crop mix is striking. In particular, "mixed" is not a third
crop in and of itself, but a mixture of the risky crop of vines and the safer crop of cereals (likely
differing mixtures, but the degree of mixing is not recorded). Hence, it is puzzling why, even though
vines and cereals were available to be grown in both areas, the land plots of San Gimignano were
overwhelmingly mixtures, while mixtures were almost entirely absent in Pescia. How does this
setting fit into the framework of this paper?
The theory suggests that the agroclimactic differences between Pescia and San Gimignano may
be important. These two regions are located fairly close together (about 100 km apart), and are
both Tuscan regions, so they shared the same governance and were unlikely to differ in norms.
However, Pescia experiences higher mean rainfall than San Gimignano (Dalla Marta et al. (2010)).
A primary reason higher mean crops have higher variance of yield is that they are more sensitive
to rainfall-given a high and steady amount of rainfall, the crops can yield a substantial harvest,
but any shortage will lead to blight. Safer crops can produce a positive yield even with low levels
of rainfall, but added rainfall is unlikely to increase this yield significantly.
Hence, crops which were less sensitive to rain (such as cereals and legumes) may have had
similar distributions of yields in both Pescia and San Gimignano, while crops which were more
sensitive to rain (such as vines and olives) were likely to have had higher variance of yield in San
Gimignano than in Pescia. In the language of this model, the marginal variance cost function of
crops with mean p in San Gimignano was likely to have been convex in p (M"(p) > 0), while the
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marginal variance cost function of crops with mean p in Pescia was likely to have been concave in
p (M"(p) < 0).
Thus, while the equilibrium choice of crop portfolio in both regions seems to have encompassed
the spectrum between cereal crops and vines and excluded crops such as legumes and olives, the
theory suggests that landowners and farmers in Pescia matched positive-assortatively and chose
the endpoints of this spectrum (pure cereals and pure vines), while landowners and farmers in San
Gimignano matched negative-assortatively and chose the middle points of this spectrum (mixtures
of crops and vines). These are in fact the cropping patterns we observe in the data.
1.4.2 Discussion of the Model
The specification that agents jointly start a project and hence never wish to remain unmatched may
seem restrictive, but in fact nests the following framework. Suppose each agent chooses her own
risky income stream. Subsequently, risk-sharing partnerships are formed, and a matched pair pools
their realized incomes and splits the pooled amount according to some agreed-upon sharing rule.
An equilibrium matching must satisfy both the stability requirement, and an individual-rationality
(IR) requirement: the expected utility any agent receives in her partnership must exceed her utility
from being alone.
I show rigorously that my model nests this framework in Appendix 2. The idea behind the
equivalence is the following: in this framework where individuals choose their own risky income
streams, the autarkic sharing rule is always an option for a matched pair. Hence, IR is always
satisfied-two individuals can always match and agree to a sharing rule of the form, "Each per-
son keeps her own realized income." There are no explicit costs to matching, so no one remains
unmatched.
Furthermore, since a pair of agents pools their realized incomes, couples are essentially choosing
their preferred pooled income stream when they match in equilibrium (if income streams are inde-
pendent, this is simply the convolution of individual income distributions). But this is equivalent
to couples explicitly jointly choosing a risky project from some spectrum, and assuming that no
agent stays unmatched. This latter specification is much more natural for an analysis of income-
smoothing, consumption-smoothing, and endogenous matching.
In this model, I also assume that returns are normally-distributed. The normal distribution
has a "representational convenience", in that it has the feature that the only nonzero cumulants2 7
27 Recall that the cumulant-generating function is the log of the moment-generating function. The first and second
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are the mean and the variance. A natural concern is that this "representational convenience" is
driving the result.
I solve a generalization of the model under the assumption that returns follow an arbitrary
symmetric distribution, and show that normality is not driving the result. The normal distribution
does generate unusual tractability: the mean-variance characterization yields a natural parameter-
ization of the risky project space, so that the function V(p) captures entirely the "cost" of gains in
expected return in terms of variance, since there are no higher order cumulants. But consideration
of a generalized model shows that the key underlying determinant of equilibrium matching is still
a cost-benefit trade-off across the spectrum of risky projects, where this trade-off is simply less
concise than it was before: the "cost" of gains in expected return is now captured by the sum of all
the higher order cumulants, not just the variance. But the sum of all the higher-order cumulants
essentially acts as a "generalized variance" in this context-the sufficient condition for matching is
still a parametric condition which can be calculated. Thus, there is no loss in economic insight by
specifically assuming normally-distributed returns. Please refer to Appendix 1 for more details and
results for the generalized model.
A third piece of the model is the restriction to groups of size two. Costly state verification pro-
vides an empirical justification for a bound on group size. However, the assumption of partnerships
is important for the theory. It is indeed a restriction, but there is a very sharp modeling trade-off
between richness of action space and richness of network formation. Focusing on a network of pairs
allows me to optimize over the whole space of sharing rules and projects, so I can analyze how
the trade-off between income-smoothing and consumption-smoothing within a pair influences the
composition of the equilibrium network. This would not be possible if I allowed for arbitrary kinds
of match formation.
A final piece of the model is the two-sidedness of the matching problem. Why not one-
sided matching? The primary reason for this is technical: under one-sided matching, "negative-
assortative" and "positive-assortative" no longer uniquely identify matching patterns. That is,
when there are two distinct groups of agents, e.g. G1 = {1, 2, 3} and G2 = {3, 4, 5}, the positive-
assortative matching is clearly (1, 3), (2,4), (3, 5). However, if there were only one group of agents,
G = {1, 2, 3, , 4, 5}, then (1, 3), (2, 3), (4, 5) is also a positive-assortative matching pattern. More-
over, theoretically there may be problems with existence in one-sided matching problems. These
reasons are economically superficial-it is clear that the assumption of two-sided matching is merely
cumulants of any distribution are the mean and the variance.
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for convenience, and does not affect the insights of the theory.
1.5 Policy
In this section, I show how to use the theory to analyze the aggregate and distributional welfare
impacts of a hypothetical policy. The natural social welfare function in this setting is the total sum
of certainty-equivalents (see the discussion at the end of the Results section).
Using the theory concretely requires consideration of a few practical issues. For example, the
potential for the two groups in a population to be of different sizes (e.g. there may be more tenant
farmers than landowners) is addressed in the following subsection.
1.5.1 Differently-sized groups
The assumption of equally-sized groups is unlikely to hold in real-world settings. In the benchmark
model, it is a convenient and relatively harmless assumption to make, because the goal was to
understand the theoretical impact of the scope of income-smoothing and consumption-smoothing
informal insurance strategies within a partnership on the risk composition of equilibrium partner-
ships, and this insight does not depend on group size.
However, if we want to use this framework to evaluate policies, we need to account for the
possibility of differently-sized groups, as this could conceivably affect, among other things, the
magnitude of the policy impact. To consider an extreme example, if one group consists only of a
single person, while the other group consists of some large number of people, then the individual in
the first group may change partners in response to the policy, but most people will be unaffected.
Therefore, to realistically think about policy, we need to understand what would happen in this
model if the two groups were of different sizes.
Lemma 7 If |Gil < |G2| (1Q1| > |G2|) the most risk-averse excess agents of G2 (G1) will be
unmatched. The remaining agents are matched according to the main result (Proposition 2).
A proof is provided in Appendix 7.
Hence, we see that if there are more tenant farmers than landlords, for example, the most
risk-averse tenant farmers will be unmatched, and we can use the conditions from Proposition 2 to
think about the endogenous matching between the remaining farmers and landlords.
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1.5.2 Crop price stabilization and formal insurance
Price stabilization, particularly of crops, is frequently proposed by governments as a tool for al-
leviating the substantial risk burden shouldered by the poor (Knudsen and Nash (1990), Minot
(2010)). Farmers face a large amount of yield and price risk. Crop price stabilization should there-
fore reduce the income risk of farmers, and should particularly benefit the most risk-averse, poorest
agents (Dawe (2001)).
A key contribution of my framework is to illuminate the importance of accounting for the
endogenous informal risk-sharing network response when analyzing the costs and benefits of such
a policy, a point that, to my knowledge, has not yet been made precise in the literature.
How should crop price stabilization be modeled here? Some crops have higher price risk than
others. In particular, one channel leading to differences in price risk is differences in yield risk.
When yield is more uncertain (because the crop is more sensitive to weather shocks and growing
conditions), the world price is more uncertain and expectations about what that price will be at
the start of the growing season are correspondingly noisier. On the other hand, when a crop is very
robust to weather shocks and growing conditions, so that yield fluctuates very little, the world price
also fluctuates less, and expectations about that price are much sharper at the start of the growing
season. Hence, in this exercise, we can think of risky crops as having high mean and variance of
yield, and noisy expectations about price, while safe crops have low mean and variance of yield,
and sharp expectations about price.
Now, consider a setting where higher mean crops come at an incredibly high cost of price
and yield risk. In particular, the marginal variance cost is convex in mean returns. Suppose the
government wishes to encourage producers to grow higher mean crops, and implements a variable
tariff that sets a price band around the prices of the riskiest (highest mean) crops. This policy
causes aggregate risk to fall, since V(p) is weakly smaller for all p > 0, and decreases the variance
V(p) by a larger amount for higher p crops.
It will be helpful to employ a simple functional form characterization to analyze this effect.
Specifically, suppose that in the status quo, the profits of a crop with mean p followed this
distribution: 7rp ~ N(p, pN1 ). Following the stabilization policy, the distribution of profits is
7rp, ~N(p, pN2 ), where Ni > N2 : that is, V(p) fell for each p, and became less convex.
We know from Proposition 2 that if R, ~ N(p, pN), the unique equilibrium matching pattern is
NAM if N > 2 and the unique equilibrium matching pattern is PAM if N E (1, 2). Hence, suppose
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N1 > 2, and consider a price stabilization policy which reduces the convexity of variance so that
N2 E (1, 2).
Note that using the power function as a functional form for V(p) has one small drawback.
We want to analyze a policy that reduces the variance of every project (reduces the riskiness
of an environment), and particularly reduces the variance of the riskiest projects, which makes
"decreasing N" a natural choice for representing this policy. However, when N falls, the variance of
the projects p E (0, 1) actually increases. To focus on our policy analysis, it is most straightforward
to simply assume that the population of risk types in G1 and G2 is such that no possible pair ever
wishes to undertake a project p E (0, 1). So, assume:
T1 +T 2  N1
T1r 2  2
where T1 is the most risk-averse agent in G1, and T2 is the most risk-averse agent in G2. This is
simply for convenience, and places no substantive restrictions on the intuition or the policy analysis,
especially as my matching results are distribution-free. Now, decreasing N unambiguously reduces
the riskiness of the project environment and captures our policy experiment.
There are two effects of altering the shape of V(p): first, there is a pure effect from decreasing
the riskiness of an environment (which causes any matched pair to select a higher p project), and
second, there is the endogenous network response resulting from it, which then further affects
welfare.
We know the expression for a partnership's sum of certainty-equivalents:
CE(ri, r 2 ) = p*(ri, r2 ) - 1- rir2 V(p*(ri, r2 ))2 rl + r2
= 7I-1 2(r1 + r 2 )\ 1 r1 r2 V (V 1 (2(r1 + r 2 )
rir2  2 r + r 2  ri r 2  /j
In this example, we consider V(p) = pN, so:
1 12(r1+ r 2 ) NiCE(ri, r 2 )= 1 L N+r]N N r 1 r 2
We know from Proposition 2 that if Ni > 2 falls to N2 E (1, 2), the unique equilibrium matching
pattern switches from negative-assortative to positive-assortative.
First suppose that a policy decreases N, so that the variance of every project p > 1 is reduced,
and the variance of higher mean projects is particularly reduced, but that partnerships remain
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unchanged.
Lemma 8 A policy which reduces the variance of every available project is a strict Pareto improve-
ment if the composition of partnerships is unaffected.
The proof is intuitive and very general: suppose that the Z matched partnerships in the sta-
tus quo undertook projects pi, ... , pz. Following the introduction of a policy which decreases the
variance of every project, each partnership has the opportunity to stay on its original project, or
to switch projects. If a partnership retains its original project, it is strictly better off, since the
project has the same mean, but a lower variance, and all individuals are risk-averse and thus dislike
variance. If a partnership switches to a different project, then by revealed preference, it must be
even better off facing the new project than facing the old project with decreased variance. But this
means that each partnership is strictly better off.
Now, suppose we account for the potential endogenous re-formation of partnerships triggered
by the policy. A numeric example clearly illustrates the mechanism by which this policy could
negatively affect welfare, purely through the channel of endogeneity.
Suppose Gi = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and G2 = {2, 4, 6, 8}. I want to focus on the welfare effect of the
policy deriving from the endogenous change in equilibrium matching, and shut down the effect
deriving from a change in the curvature of V(p). A natural way to do this is to consider a small but
discrete change in N, from a value of N under which NAM is the unique equilibrium, to a value of
N under which PAM is the unique equilibrium.
For example, let N1 = 2.1 and N2 = 1.9. So, the levels of the function change very little, but
the marginal variance cost is convex pre-policy and concave post-policy, which we know will shift
the unique equilibrium match from NAM to the other extreme.
Equilibrium project choice then experiences the following change: the red line is before the
policy, and the blue line is after the policy:
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Equilibrium Project Choice Pre- and Post-Policy
ES1.2
1
E
0.6
0.4
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
The certainty-equivalent for each matched pair experiences the following change:
Equililrum Pairwise Expected Utility Pre- and Post-Policy
0.t.
0.7
--- Post
0.6-
0.6
0.3
0.2
1 15 2 25 3 3.5 4
Clearly, this risk-reduction policy is not a Pareto improvement. In fact, the policy causes much
dispersion and inequality in joint expected utilities post-policy, where the most risk-averse agents
partnered with each other are by far the worst off.
However, we might also want to know what happens to individual utilities. Such analysis is
challenging in a model of endogenous matching, as the vector of equilibrium individual expected
utilities is not unique (please refer to the discussion in the Results section). The natural approach
is then to apply relevant selection criteria and focus on the equilibrium vector which survives such
selection.
Because risk reduction policies are generally intended to target the most risk-averse people,
let us study the vector of equilibrium expected utilities where the most risk-averse agent in group
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two 28 is best off-that is, the most risk-averse agent in group two has a higher utility in this vector
than any other possible vector of equilibrium expected utilities.
Comparing pre- and post-policy individual utilities of group one and group two:
Equilibrium Individual Utility of Agents in Group One
--- 
Pre
9 Post
risk aversion
Equilibrium Individual Utility of Agents in Group Two
2.5
risk aversion
We see that the more risk-averse agents in group one and group two are worse off after imple-
mentation of the policy, purely as a result of the endogenous network response: a price stabilization
policy which especially reduces the risk of higher mean yield crops, and is intended to reduce the
risk burden of the poor, may in fact exacerbate inequality and particularly harm the most risk-
averse agents, precisely because the policy causes the least risk-averse agents to abandon their roles
28Equivalently, group one.
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as informal insurers of the most risk-averse agents, in favor of entrepreneurial partnerships with
fellow less risk-averse agents.
In particular, the least risk-averse agents are better able to manage risk ex post when paired
with each other rather than with the more risk-averse agents whom they have to insure, and this
enables them to take advantage of the decreased aggregate risk and undertake the higher mean
projects (e.g. a new technology). On the other hand, the most risk-averse agents are much less
able to manage risk ex post when paired with each other rather than with their less risk-averse
informal insurers. This means that they must rely heavily on ex ante methods to manage risk, and
so they choose projects with especially low mean returns.
This intuition adds interestingly to a few existing results. Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) model
the introduction of formal insurance as a policy which reduces the riskiness of the environment.
They also find that such a policy may hurt the welfare of the most risk-averse agents. However,
their model of (non-endogenous) informal risk-sharing, which builds off Ligon, Thomas, Worrall
(2001), centers around limited commitment-two agents interacting repeatedly can only sustain
informal risk-sharing with the threat of cutting off all future ties for someone who reneges. This
particular type of punishment has the important implication that the value of future ties directly
trades off with equilibrium risk-sharing. So, anything that lowers the cost of autarky (remaining
alone and being informally uninsured) will decrease the level of informal insurance that can be
sustained. They then frame the introduction of formal insurance as a policy that would reduce the
cost of being in autarky, and subsequently argue that the level of informal insurance falls, which
may reduce aggregate welfare.
However, in this paper, commitment is taken to be perfect. Perfect commitment in Attanasio
and Rios-Rull (2000) would preclude the conclusion that the introduction of formal insurance could
hurt the most risk-averse agents, because lowering the cost of autarky matters only through the
punishment of cutting off future ties, which is no longer relevant. I show that, even under perfect
commitment, introducing formal insurance might still reduce the welfare of the most risk-averse
agents, because the composition of the informal risk-sharing network changes in response. In my
model, reducing the riskiness of the environment raises the value of autarky, but it also raises the
value of being in a relationship, and raises it heterogeneously across partnerships of different risk
compositions.
By contrast, Chiappori et al. (2011) estimate that the least risk-averse individuals are the ones
left worse off after the introduction of formal insurance. The informal argument is that the least
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risk-averse agents are displaced as informal insurers. However, this exactly illuminates the need
for a model of the equilibrium network of relationships-I show that the least risk-averse agents do
leave their roles as informal insurers, but only because they prefer to undertake entrepreneurial
pursuits instead. It would be interesting to see how the estimation changes after accounting for the
endogeneity of matching.
1.6 Testing the Theory: An Experiment
This model provides a natural setting for an experimental test of the theory. In this section, I
propose a basic experimental design to test the key predictions. First, I discuss subject and setting
choice. Next, I describe important elements of the setup. In particular, I describe how to elicit risk
type, and how to design different sets of gamble choices. Finally, I outline the empirical strategy
suggested by the testable conditions from Section 4.
1.6.1 Subject and Setting Choice
The theoretical framework is a good fit for an agricultural context. As discussed in the introduction
and background sections, farmers in a broad cross-section of regions are demonstrably risk-averse,
and heterogeneous in their risk aversion. Moreover, this heterogeneity in risk aversion translates
into a heterogeneity in equilibrium behavior; in particular, crop portfolios, spatial plot choices,
input and irrigation choices, and openness to innovative techniques vary by farm. Finally, there
are plenty of examples of the prevalence of collectivity in farming-farmers seeking advice from each
other, farmers entering risk-sharing agreements and self-help groups with each other, and most
directly, landowners employing farmers, for example as sharecroppers.
This suggests several advantages in selecting subjects from villages which are primarily agricul-
tural, and, correspondingly, recruiting subjects for whom farming is the primary occupation. This
is not because the experimental setup must require subjects to possess farming expertise, but rather
because the strong connection between their lives and the task of choosing amongst gambles with
differing yield distributions gives us a measure of confidence about the relevance and intuitiveness
of the experiment, and their subsequent comprehension of it.
Since matching pattern regressions will be run at the village level, it will be necessary to have
a reasonably large sample of villages to obtain power. Because the theoretical result is distribution
free, it is able to accommodate heterogeneity in risk type distributions across villages. Villages
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should be chosen which do not communicate with each other, to prevent information about the
experiment from spreading. Characteristics of the villages should be recorded, such as geographical
location, agroclimate, size, primary occupation, average income, and proximity to urban center.
Field officers should hold private interview sessions with randomly-chosen households in each
village to extend an invitation to send a member to participate in the experiment. As in Attanasio
et al. (2010), this should be done only a few days previous to the experiment, to minimize social
selection. Standard characteristics of each interviewed household, and of each adult member of
that household, should be collected, such as ethnicity and religion, physical characteristics of the
dwelling, occupations, income. If the primary occupation is agricultural, collect data on crops
grown, plot size, plot scattering, irrigation, fertilizer, and total harvest.
Additionally, kinship, friendship, neighbor, trust, and employment network data must be col-
lected from households. For example, each interviewed individual may be asked for the names of
her relatives, her friends, her neighbors, the people she trusts most, and the people with whom she
works.
1.6.2 Setup
Round 1: Risk Elicitation
The experiment will consist of two rounds. In the first round, the "risk type elicitation round",
each subject will meet privately with a field researcher, where she will be presented with a set
of gambles varying in riskiness and asked to choose one. (The design of this set of gambles is
discussed in detail in the subsection below, "Round 2: Joint Project Choice".) The gamble choice
will be explained pictorially in a manner that accounts for potential illiteracy and unfamiliarity
with probability, and comprehension will be tested. A selection of a gamble with higher mean and
variance will indicate a lower degree of risk aversion than a selection of a gamble with lower mean
and variance. Additionally, each subject will be asked to report what gamble they think the people
they reported trusting the most during the initial household interview would have chosen. This
allows us to get a sense of how accurately individuals perceive the risk aversion of those with whom
they are close.
After all risk types have been elicited2 9 , subjects will be gathered in the same room, where
2 9The Rabin (2000) critique does apply here, but many experiments elicit risk in the literature in this way, so by
revealed preference the payoff in economic insight seems to be worth it. Moreover, in this paper, if the environment is
such that the marginal variance cost function is globally convex or concave, then all we need from the risk elicitation
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each individual's gamble choice will be posted publicly, again in a manner that accommodates
illiteracy. (Subjects are not told initially that their first round gamble choices will be announced.)
The purpose of this announcement is to ensure connnon knowledge of everyone's risk types.
Between Rounds: Matching
Following the elicitation of risk types and the public posting of the gamble choices, subjects shall
be randomly divided into two equally-sized groups (if there is an odd number of people, then one
person shall remain umnatched). A researcher will then explain that they will be allowed to pair
up across groups, and that once paired, each pair will be offered the same set of gambles that they
faced in their private first rounds, where they will be allowed to choose a project jointly and commit
ex ante to a return-contingent sharing rule of the realized income by reporting their agreed-upon
rule to a researcher, who will enforce it. (Arguments can be made for or against the possible
dependence of the second round gamble choice on first round gamble outcomes if the set of gambles
is the same in both rounds, and as Attanasio et al. (2010) have set a precedent of reusing the first
round set, I leave discussion of this question to another forum).
After this explanation of the proceedings of the rest of the game, the subjects will be given half
an hour to establish partnerships (if an individual chooses to remain unmatched, she will receive 0
for sure because she will not be allowed to select a gamble. Since the supports of all gambles are
on the positive real line, nobody should choose to remain unmatched as long as there are partners
available).
Round 2: Joint Project Choice
Once partnerships have been established, researchers will visit each pair privately to take down
their joint project choice and the sharing rule they have agreed upon. Then, researchers will draw
a realization from each pair's project choice, and distribute funds according to the sharing rules
that were reported to them. This will mark the end of the experiment.
The key to the experimental test of the theory is the design of the set of gambles from which
matched pairs are asked to choose. Recall that the conditions for unique positive-assortative and
negative-assortative matching emerging from the model in Section 4 centered on the rate of cur-
vature of the mean-variance trade-off across the spectrum of available projects. In the model, the
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round is the ordinal risk attitudes.
trade-off between the desire to match with someone with a different risk type in order to smooth
a given risk in a mutually satisfying way, and the desire to match with someone with a similar
risk type in order to choose a mutually agreeable risk, is captured by this rate of curvature of the
mean-variance trade-off. When a slightly higher mean return corresponds with a drastically higher
variance of return, so that the difference in variance of a low mean return project and a high mean
return project is extremely stark, negative-assortative matching is more likely to result, since all
possible pairs prefer the safer, low mean return project. On the other hand, when a small in-
crease in mean return corresponds to a moderately higher increase in variance, positive-assortative
matching is more likely to result, since there is significant disagreement about preferred project:
less risk-averse people prefer riskier projects, while more risk-averse people prefer safer projects.
Hence, the theory suggests a clear intuition for designing sets of gamble choices: within a
given set, gambles should differ in mean and variance of return, with higher mean gambles having
correspondingly higher variances, and the shape of this mean-variance trade-off should differ across
different sets of gamble choices.
For example, a reasonable approach would be to design two types of gamble sets, each containing
five gambles. Villages in the sample would be randomly allocated into two groups, where villages in
the first group face the first set of gamble choices, and villages in the second group face the second
set of gamble choices. Indexing set by superscript i, and gamble by subscript j, the challenge
is to choose values for (p., Vi), the mean and variance of gamble j in set i, for i E {l, 2} and
j E {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
There are three significant feasibility constraints imposed by the realism of an experiment that
prevent us from directly applying the theoretical result to this design problem.
1. The return distributions of the gambles must have positive, bounded supports. It seems unwise
to extract money from an experimental subject by declaring that she received a "negative
realization", and it seems expensive to allow for the possibility of a realization of infinity.
The relevant implication is that we cannot offer gambles with distributions that are literally
distributed normally.
2. The set of gamble choices is discrete. The key idea in the theoretical model was not that a
continuum of projects existed literally, but rather that activity diversification (e.g. intercrop-
ping) enabled a spectrum of mean returns with corresponding variances that were higher for
higher means (an upper envelope).
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In the experiment, subjects are not allowed to create portfolios of projects; instead, they must
select a single gamble. This can be thought of as reflecting rigidities in activity diversification
(e.g. intercropping is not possible because of soil type), and limits a pair's ex ante risk
management ability. An individual r's desire to pair up with another individual r because
they share project preferences is dampened by the fact that first, their favorite project is
unlikely to be available in the small set of gamble choices, and second, because there is not a
wide range of choices, individuals of other risk types will cluster with r on project choice.
The relevant implication of this is that distinct pairs are no longer guaranteed to select distinct
projects. Instead, there will be "clustering" on each of the gamble choices; the degree of this
"clustering" depends on the distribution of risk types in the population and on the shape of
the mean-variance trade-off.
3. Limited liability holds in an experimental setting. In the theory, the return-contingent sharing
rule of a pair is completely unconstrained. In the experiment, this will not be the case. If for
example a gamble's realized return is 0, then each partner must receive 0.
This constraint is the most serious, because it inhibits the transferability of expected utility.
For example, if 0 is in the support of a gamble's return distribution, then partners cannot
agree to nonzero state-independent transfers. This restriction on the sharing rule limits the
pair's ex post risk management ability, and, importantly, limits different pairs differently
depending on risk type composition. A quite risk-averse individual r's desire to pair up with
a much less risk-averse individual r' << r is dampened by the fact that, because of limited
liability, r' may not be able to ensure her a return-independent transfer.
Hence, the pairwise sum of certainty-equivalents calculated in Section 2 holds only a bounded
range of divisions v of the expected utility pie, where these bounds depend on risk type and
therefore influence endogenous partner choice.
Because of these three limitations of the experimental environment, it is necessary to construct
an "experimental model" satisfying these constraints which captures the essence of the theory:
given a population of heterogeneously risk-averse agents, the risk relationship of the gambles to
each other in the available choice set determines whether positive-assortative or negative-assortative
matching results.
The idea is the following. Recall that the sum of N > 2 independent draws from a uni[a, b]
distribution approximates a normal distribution on the support [Na, Nb]. For example, if a = 0
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and b = 1, the convolution of the N densities is (figure taken from Grinstead and Snell (1997)):
n = 2
n = 4
n = 6
n =8
n= 10
I, i Ij 7 'I'q 1, ; 1 . , 1 1 iIj -I ii
This allows us to offer gambles whose returns are approximately normally-distributed on bounded,
positive supports, which enables feasible experimental payments and allows us to apply our under-
standing of the role played by the mean-variance trade-off from the theoretical results of Section
3.
Therefore, experimental subjects should be asked to choose from one of the following five gam-
bles:
1. Receive the sum of N independent draws from a distribution which yields x for sure. (This
is the safe choice.)
2. Receive the sum of N independent draws from a uni [a2 , b2] distribution, where:
a 2 < x <, b2
a 2 + b2
2
so that this gamble has a higher mean but also a higher variance than the safe choice.
3. Receive the sum of N independent draws from a uni [a3, b3 ] distribution, where:
a3 < a2
b3 > b2
a3 +N > a2+b2
2 2
48
4. Receive the sum of N independent draws from a uni[a4 , b4 ] distribution, where:
a 4  < a3
b4  > b3
a4 +b4 > a3 +b3
2 2
5. Receive the sum of N independent draws from a uni [a5, bs] distribution, where:
a5 < a4
b5 > b4
a6 +bs > a4+b
2 2
Each gamble has an approximately normal distribution on the support [Nak, Nbk], and gambles
with higher means also have higher variances. The values of a2 , a 3 , a4, a5 and b2 , b3 , b4 , b5 must be
chosen to shape the curvature of the mean-variance trade-off across gambles so that positive-
assortative matching is supported in one set, and negative-assortative matching is supported in the
other set.
It is useful to consider a concrete example of how these sets of gamble choices might be designed.
Let N = 10, so that a matched pair receives the realized sum of 10 independent draws from their
chosen gamble. The two sets of gamble choices are:
PAM NAM
: 10 10
[a2 , b2] : [9,13] [9,13]
[a3, b3] : [6,20] [7, 19]
[a4 , b4] : [4, 26] [4,26]
[as, bs] : [3,31] [0, 34]
The following figure shows the mean-variance trade-off across gambles for the PAM set and for
the NAM set:
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The mean-variance tradeoff for the PAM set and the NAM set
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It is worth noting the novelty of the design necessitated by the theory of endogenous risk-sharing
pair formation given both ex ante and ex post risk management. In Attanasio et al. (2010), for
example, all experimental subjects faced the same set of gambles, where gambles differed in mean
and variance. However, the risk-sharing rule was imposed to be an equal division. Fixing the sharing
rule at equal division has a variety of implications: importantly, positive-assortative matching will
always result, because the gains-from-trade channel is shut down. Additionally, an equal sharing
rule automatically satisfies limited liability. Therefore, any set of gamble choices with gambles
varying in riskiness can be chosen for this experiment.
Allowing for ex post risk management by endogenizing a risk-sharing group's sharing rule, in
addition to the endogenous choice of income stream, entails the precise design of different sets of
gamble choices. Since the effect of the trade-off between ex ante and ex post risk management on
equilibrium matching is best distilled with normally-distributed returns, one idea is to replicate
such a distribution in a feasible way by summing N independent draws from uniform distributions,
which differ in mean and variance.
1.6.3 Empirical Strategy
Recall from Proposition 4 that support for the theory in the data would be observation of at least
one of the following:
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1. People match positive-assortatively in risk attitudes, and the observed means of equilibrium
risky projects are convex in the representative risk tolerance of matched pairs.
2. People match negative-assortatively in risk attitudes, and the observed means of equilibrium
risky projects are concave in the representative risk tolerance of matched pairs.
The basic empirical strategy consists of 3 steps. First, given a dataset containing Z villages,
index a village by k. Then:
1. For each village k, characterize the equilibrium matching pattern (the correlation between
the probability that individual i is matched with individual j and their corresponding risk
types ri and rj). Is the equilibrium matching pattern the "correct" one, that is, the pattern
which was meant to be induced by the set of gamble choices offered to that village?
2. Next, examine the behavior of equilibrium project choices and the risk composition of the
matched pairs.
3. Then, characterize the relationship between the equilibrium matching pattern and the equi-
librium behavior of project choice in risk types across all villages. If we observe convexity
of project choice in the representative risk tolerance of matched pairs corresponding with
positive-assortative matching, and/or concavity of project choice in the representative risk
tolerance of matched pairs corresponding with negative-assortative matching, then this is
support for the theory.
To be a little more specific, first focus on data from a given village k. Suppose that village k
was offered the "positive-assortative" set of gamble choices, so we should expect positive-assortative
matching.
To glean the matching pattern from the data, set the observation level to be a dyad (i, j) of an
individual i in group one matched with an individual j in group two (recall that the experiment
participants were randomly divided into two equally-sized groups). If each group has M people in
it, then there should be M( 1) total observations.
Define a variable that describes the distance between the risk attitudes of i and j:
Ni = thi- rj
Note that this is symmetric: Aij = Aji.
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Now, define a variable mig:
1, i matched with jNi =
0, else
So, mij is also symmetric.
Then, for each village k, regress the linkage variable mij on the distance between risk attitudes,
Aig, and the pre-existing networks Xf. (e.g. kinship):
k ak A.+y
If pLk > 0, the matching pattern is closer to being negative-assortative, since large differences in
risk attitudes increase the probability that two individuals are linked, while if pk < 0, the matching
pattern is closer to being positive-assortative, since small differences in risk attitudes increase the
probability that two individuals are linked.
Confirm that the matching pattern of village k is the pattern that was meant to be induced by
the set of gamble choices offered to village k.
Now, look at matched dyads in village k only, and denote the mean of the equilibrium project
choice of a matched (i, j) by pij.
For each matched dyad (i, j), calculate the representative risk tolerance:
~1 1
Hij =-+ -
ri rj
For the matched dyads in each village k, regress:
where VA is village fixed effects. (A discussion of other methods for testing convexity may be
found in footnote 18 of section 4.1.)
It should be the case that 9 A > 0 for all k, since more risk-tolerant partnerships should choose
riskier (higher mean) gambles. A positive yA > 0 indicates that equilibrium project means are
convex in risk tolerance, while a negative -k < 0 indicates that equilibrium project means are
concave in risk tolerance.
Finally, regress:
52
to ascertain the relationship in village k between the equilibrium matching pattern and the
behavior of equilibrium projects in risk types.
Support for the model is 6 > 0: this indicates that convexity of mean income in the rep-
resentative risk tolerance of a linked pair corresponds with positive-assortative matching, while
concavity of mean income in the representative risk tolerance of a linked pair corresponds with
negative-assortative matching.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the many implications of thinking about informal insurance as the risk-
sharing achieved within an equilibrium network of partnerships, as opposed to within a single,
isolated partnership, by developing and exploring a theory of endogenous matching between het-
erogeneously risk-averse agents. I show that the equilibrium matching is driven by the trade-off
between two general forces: one, a "gains from trade" force, which favors matching between un-
like types, and the other, a "similarity of perspective" force, which favors matching between like
types. Specifically, conditional on facing a given risk, a less risk-averse agent and a more risk-averse
agent benefit from being matched with each other, because the less risk-averse agent is differen-
tially willing to sell insurance which the more risk-averse agent is differentially willing to buy. But
when choosing what risk to face, agents prefer partners with similar risk attitudes. In other words,
consumption-smoothing forces push the match to be negative-assortative, while income-smoothing
forces push the match to be positive-assortative.
Thus, the equilibrium composition of risk-sharing pairs depends critically on the differential
interaction between consumption-smoothing and income-smoothing risk management tools across
partnerships of different risk compositions. I show that this differential interaction is cleanly cap-
tured by the convexity of the marginal variance cost function in expected returns of projects, and
provide testable conditions that tie the theory to data. In particular, I describe observable differ-
ences in the environments in which negative- and positive-assortative matching patterns emerge,
and use these differences to construct a falsifiability condition based on the dependence of mean
returns of equilibrium projects on the risk tolerance of matched pairs. I find preliminary support
for the theory in existing literature.
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This paper highlights the especial importance of accounting for individual heterogeneity in
developing economies-the absence of formal institutions causes individuals to depend on their in-
teractions with each other. Thus, we see that a natural constraint on informal insurance, apart
from any imperfections in the contracting environment, or other such standard considerations, is
simply that all individuals are risk-averse. However, some individuals are more risk-averse than
others, and this enables informal insurance and determines its strength. Furthermore, this equilib-
rium network approach enables an understanding of how individuals endogenously switch between
and assmne different informal roles in the economy.
A variety of important policy implications follow from this theory. For example, despite perfect
commitment in the contracting environment, a policy which reduces the variance of every available
project, and particularly subsidizes higher mean projects, is a strict Pareto improvement when the
network of partnerships is assumed to stay fixed, but can be seen to leave many individuals worse
off, and be especially harmful for the most risk-averse agents, purely as a result of the endogenous
network response: the least risk-averse agents abandon their roles as "informal insurers" of the
most risk-averse, preferring entrepreneurial partnerships with fellow less risk-averse agents instead.
The least risk-averse agents are better able to manage risk ex post when matched with each other
instead of with the most risk-averse agents whom they have to insure, and this enables them to
take advantage of the risk-reduction policy and undertake higher mean projects (such as a new
technology). However, the ability of the most risk-averse agents to manage risk ex post worsens
when they pair with each other rather than with the less risk-averse informal insurers, and this
means they rely heavily on ex ante methods to manage risk. As a consequence, they undertake
projects with especially low mean returns.
Accounting for endogeneity would also affect the analysis of a variety of land reform policies
discussed in the literature. For example, Banerjee (2000) points out that the effects of land redistri-
bution cannot be estimated without first understanding the reasons behind the distribution of land
in the status quo. If the distribution of land served a risk-sharing purpose, or alternatively, if agents
optimized their risk-sharing activities given the land distribution (for example, large landowners
provide informal insurance to the landless), then land redistribution might have no effect, because
it is implicitly ignored, or it might actually hurt informal insurance.
Regulation of the rental contract, or the wage, is another reform which should be considered
through the lens of this model. We know that employment contracts (such as the share contract)
often balance multiple needs, such as insurance provision as well as incentive provision. The results
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of this paper show that this contract is a key consumption-smoothing tool-legislation which places
restrictions on the set of permissible rental contracts diminishes the power of ex post risk manage-
ment as an insurance tool, and pushes the equilibrium matching towards positive-assortativity.
Other reforms affect the adaptability of the network. For example, Banerjee et al. (2002) discuss
Operation Barga, a 1970s West Bengali land reform which reduced the ability of landlords to expel
their tenants. An unexplored effect of such a reform is the added matching friction: relationships
will be unable to respond optimally to changes in the environment. For example, if a bad rainfall
shock unexpectedly hit a farming village, increasing the steepness of the mean-variance trade-off
across crop choices, then in the absence of matching frictions, less risk-averse individuals would act
as informal insurers of the more risk-averse. But Barga may have locked less risk-averse individuals
into their relationships with other less risk-averse individuals.
Finally, accounting for endogeneity may substantially alter our inferences from empirical ob-
servations. For example, an observation that the strength of dependence of a sharecropper's rent
contract on realized harvest is positively correlated with the riskiness of the crop grown may tempt
us to conclude that risk is not a problem for farmers, since risk considerations do not appear to
influence contract design (Allen and Lueck (1992)). However, if more risk-averse farmers work for
less risk-averse landowners, cultivating safer crops under low-powered contracts, while less risk-
averse farmers work for more risk-averse landowners, cultivating riskier crops under high-powered
contracts, the same empirical observations would emerge, but risk concerns would be playing a sig-
nificant role in contract design, through the unaccounted-for channel of contracting partner choice.
All sorts of challenges remain. This model can clearly be enriched in many ways-by generalizing
preferences and the project space, by introducing limited commitment or incomplete information,
by allowing for more complex forms of group formation, or by adding dynamics to study the
feedback between riskiness of project choice and investment capability, to characterize a potential
"innovation trap". The main contribution of this paper is to propose a tractable model of the
endogenous formation of risk-sharing relationships, upon which further dimensions can be layered,
and to show that even this simple model can lead to substantial changes in our understanding of
numerous policy debates. The unique environments of developing economies make design problems
particularly challenging, but it is the magnitude of the stakes which makes them particularly
important.
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L.A Appendix
1.A.1 The model with general distribution of returns
Suppose all elements of the environment described in Section 3 are the same, except the returns of a
project p are now assumed to follow a more general distribution: R, ~ f (Rp ), where the support
O(R,) = (-oo, oo). Assume that f(R,|p) is a well-defined pdf whose cumulants exist (recall that
the cumulant-generating function is the log of the moment-generating function).
Given that the pair (ri, r 2) is matched, agent r 1 who must ensure her partner some level of
expected utility -e-" solves the following problem:
max -le-r1[R1sQ-8()If(Rpp)dRp s.t.
S(RP) f--oo
-er2S(R)f(R|p)dR, ; -e--
Then the optimal sharing rule is still linear:
r11 0  r1r2 v
*R,)= R,+-log e r1+r2Rf(R|p)dR+-
ri+r 2  r 2  -oo r2
where the optimal project p*(ri, r 2 ) maximizes the expected utility of r1 given equilibrium
sharing rule s*(Rp; v):
n1 oo rlir2 1+
max -e r 0 e r1+r2RPf (Rpp)dR]
Then the sum of certainty-equivalents of the pair is:
CE(ri, r 2 ) = - + r)logj e r1+r2Rf(Rpp*(ri, r2 ))dRp
Then the representative risk tolerance of the matched pair is:
1 1H(ri, r 2 ) = +
r 1  r 2
r 1 + r 2
r 1 r 2
and the representative risk aversion of the matched pair is the reciprocal:
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r1r2
ri, r2) l+rr1 + r2
We know that a sufficient condition for the unique equilibrium matching pattern to be PAM
d 2CE( 2) > 0, while we know that 2) < 0 is sufficient for NAM to be the uniqueiS -dri dr2  dr~dT-2
equilibrium matching pattern. What conditions are needed for these two inequalities to hold?
Observe that the sum of certainty-equivalents is actually just:
CE(ri, r 2 ) = - - CH,(t = -- (r1, r2))
H(ri, r2)
0 t(ri, r2)2 n
= -f(ri, r2)p + (2n)! k2n(P)
n=1
where CR,(t) is the cumulant-generating function of the random variable R,. The notation
k2n(p) denotes the 2 nth order cumulant.
At this point, I add the additional assumption of a symmetric distribution, since we know that
all higher-order odd cumulants of symmetric distributions are zero. Then it is clear that a given
risk-averse agent r evaluates a project p by balancing the benefit of the expected return with the
cost, captured by the sum of all the higher order cumulants. The sum of all higher order cumulants
can thus be thought of as a "generalized variance" for the purposes of this model, so that the
spectrum of risky projects is parameterized by a "generalized mean-variance trade-off".
Lemma 9 Under a general symmetric distribution, the optimal project choice of a pair minimizes
the cumulant-generating function evaluated at negative the representative risk aversion, -$(ri, r2).
The first-order condition characterizing optimal project choice is:
FOCp,: E f(rir2) k'(p) = H(ri, r 2 )
n=1
We need the following condition for convexity:
C H (ri, r2) 2n /ISOCr : E (2n)! ki'n(p) > 0
n=1
Then differentiate the first-order condition implicitly with respect to H:
0oo H(ri,r2 ) 2n-1 k'- n=l (2n-1)! 2kn(p)
Eoo Iutr1,r2 
)2"nk
n=1 (2n)! - 2n(P)
But the FOC tells us:
H(ri, r2)2 nk )
(2n)! In(p)
n=1
00 (ri, r2 )2n-1
(2n)! k2np)
n=1
= ft(ri, r 2 ) -
= 1
and
0 (ri, r2)2n-1 Ho 0 (ri, r2)2n-1
(2n - 1)! k(p) > - (2n)! k1n(p) = 1
Then:
dpd< 0
d$t
This proves the following lemma.
Lemma 10 The optimal project choice for a matched pair in this generalized model is decreasing
in representative risk aversion, and furthermore, p*(r1, r 2 ) is symmetric in r1 , r 2 since H(r1, r 2 )
symmetric in rl, r2.
Hence, in this generalized model, the condition on the fundamentals of the model for the
equilibrium matching is still a parameteric condition on the generalized mean-variance trade-off,
which can be calculated.
Specifically, we know:
CE(H(ri, r 2 )) = - p (H(ri,r2) + Sk2n (p (N(ri, r2)))N~ri, r2)n=1 (2n)!N(ri, r2)2
and the optimal project choice of a matched pair with risk tolerance H is:
001 
1k k H ((iri, r2) =~
n 1 (2n)!H(ri, r 2 )2 n H(ri, r 2 )
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dp
d H
Lemma 11 A sufficient condition for unique PAM is the convexity of CE() in H, while a suf-
ficient condition for unique NAM is the concavity of CE(N) in H.
1.A.2 The model nests a framework with individual project choice, pooled in-
come, and individual rationality
Suppose that, as in the benchmark model described in Section 3, a spectrum of projects p ;> 0 is
available, where Rp ~ N(p, V(p)), and V(p) > 0, V'(p) > 0, and V"(p) > 0. However, instead
of jointly choosing a project, each agent r in the population chooses a project Pr, and a matched
pair pools their realized incomes and splits it according to a pre-decided sharing rule contingent on
pooled realized returns, s(RpgI + Rp 2 ).
Assume that the income realizations of ri and r 2 follow distributions f(RPi Pr) and f (RP,, IPr2),
respectively (partners' incomes may be correlated in some way). Thus, the distribution of pooled
income, f(Rpr' + Rpr2 Pr1 , Pr2 ) can be calculated from the individual distributions and the struc-
ture of the correlation (for example, if incomes were independent, the distribution of pooled income
would simply be the convolution of the individual distributions).
Observe that IR is clearly satisfied, because the autarkic sharing rule (the sharing rule which
specifies that each person keeps her own realized income) is always an option for the pair. Hence,
all individuals prefer to match over remaining unmatched.
But now it is clear that matched individuals in this framework are essentially jointly choosing a
distribution of pooled income. Thus, since IR is always satisfied, the framework where individuals
do not remain unmatched and partnerships jointly choose projects is equivalent. Moreover, this
latter framework illustrates much more cleauly the dependence of the equilibrium matching on the
trade-off between consumption-smoothing and income-smoothing. Hence, this is the model I work
with in this paper.
1.A.3 Proof that NTU problem has TU representation in expected utility
We know from Appendix 1 (which discusses the generalized model) that the indirect utility of an
agent r1 who ensures his partner, r 2 , a level of expected utility -e- is:
#(ri, r2, v) = -er2" [j e rl+r2 '' ff(RI p)dR,
Partner r 2 receives:
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EU.2 (v) = -e r2
= -e-"
Then the certainty-equivalent of each member is:
CEr,(v) = - + log e +21f(R|*(rr 2 ))dR]r1 r2 
_0r2
CEr2 (v) = -
r2
There is clearly a one-to-one trade-off between the certainty-equivalent of r1 and the certainty-
equivalent of r2. In other words, the slope of the Pareto frontier of expected utility (modulo a
monotonic transformation) is -1. Hence, expected utility is transferable.
It is also interesting to see that the generalized increasing/decreasing differences technique from
Legros and Newman (2007) can also be used directly to prove the main matching result of this
model. (We know that generalized increasing/decreasing differences is the same as supermodular-
ity/submodularity in a transferable utility setting; it is simply of interest to see that the Legros and
Newman technique can be directly applied to this model of risk-sharing which allows for endogenous
choice of risk.)
Recall the Legros and Newman generalized differences condition for matching under nontrans-
ferable utility: the following is a sufficient condition for positive-assortative matching to be the
unique equilibrium matching pattern:
4(ri, r2, p*(ri, r2), V)= #(ri, r', p*(ri, r'), u) -
We want to show that this condition corresponds to the condition that d2CE(rir 2) > 0, wheredrl dr 2
CE(ri, r2) is the sum of certainty-equivalents in a matched pair (ri, r2).
We know from the derivation of the optimal sharing rule and the sum of certainty-equivalents
in the general case that the indirect utility of agent r1 when matched with agent r 2 and ensuring
him expected utility -e-" is:
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#(rl, r 2 , p*(r, r2), v) = -C r2 Je l+ Rp f(RIP*(rl, r 2 ))dRp
#(ri, r2, p*(ri, r 2 ), v) = #(ri, r2, p*(ri, r), u) *
-- er2 [ e r+ f(Rip*(rir2))dRp
i +
r2 \
T 
+1
r +
1
-u
r2
1
-- V
r2
_-2e r2 f (Pu~p (r1 , r'))dRpj
+ log e fr2 Rf(Rplp*(ri, r 2 ))dR,
r2epJ
+ log e1rT f(Rp p*(ri, r2))dR,
log e
log e
Then the condition #(r , r 2 , p*(r', r 2 ), v) < #(r', r, p* (r', r'), u) is equivalent to:
+log
(r1 r2 )
( + ) log
ri r/)o
e f r2f(Rpp*(ri,r2 ))dRp-
Je
> ( + I log e
+ r-)log e
r +r2 f(Rpp*(ri, r 2))dRp >~2 2
r~+2 f (Rpp*(r', r2))dRp
T'1±r2 f(RpIP*(r , r'))dR,
That is, the condition is equivalent to increasing differences in r1 and r2 of the following ex-
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So
+ 7r
r2
= + )
\r1 r2 /
(I+ Ir1 rT2
r f i2
rl +r2p (RplP*(rl,Tr2))dRp-
I'±r
1+ LL
'2
f(Ep jp* (r1, ri)) dR,
pression:
1 1 o , ri r2
- (- + -) loge r1+i2Rf(Rpp*(ri, r 2 ))dRp
r1 'r2
Now, let's find the certainty-equivalent of r1 when she is paired with r 2 and ensuring him -e-':
-e -r1CE = 0(r, r 2, p* (ri, r 2 ), v) =>
1CEri = - log [-#(ri, r 2 , p*(ri, r 2 ), v)]ri
And the certainty-equivalent of r2 is Then the sum CE(ri, r2) is:
CE(ri,r2 ) = -- log[-4(ri,r 2 ,p*(ri,r 2 ),v)] +_
ri r2
1 i Er +(I rilo f e- p,-, ] v
= --- [-v+(1+-)loge ri+r2 f(R,|p*(ri, r 2 ))dRpj + -
r1 r2 r2 T2
1i 1ri2
= -Q- + - log er2?1f(R,|p*(r, r2 ))dR,
But this is exactly the same condition we got from the generalized differences condition from
Legros-Newman.
The argument is analogous for showing that the Legros and Newman generalized decreasing dif-
ferences condition for negative-assortative matching to be the unique equilibrium matching pattern
corresponds to the condition that dCE(r,r 2 )drl dr2
1.A.4 Proof of main matching result
The cumulant-generating function for a normal distribution N(p, V(p)) has a very nice form:
f2
C (t = -HIp) = -Hp + V(p)
(See Appendix 1 for the generalized case, which illustrates the role played by the cumulant-
generating function in the optimal project choice problem of a partnership.)
Hence the sum of certainty-equivalents in a partnership with representative risk aversion H is:
62
CE(H) = p - -HV(p)
Recall that:
gri r2
r 1 +r 2
Then:
d2CE(ri, r 2 )
drir2
rir 2
(r1 + r2 )3 V 
(V,-1 (2(r1 + r2 )
yri r2 ) )
+ 2 1,
rir2 (r1 + r 2 )
2(ri + r 2 )\
Sri r 2 /
where the project chosen optimally by a pair (ri, r 2 ) is:
p (ri, r2) = V
1 2(r1 + r 2 )
rlr2 .
Therefore, dridr2 > 0 iff:
2(ri + r2)2 V,.
r 1 r
, 2(r1 + r2)
rir2 /
> V (V-1 2(r1 + r2)
ri r 2 / /
Then, define:
2
g(x) = zVI1I' (X) - V(V' 1 (x))2
Finding a sufficient condition for PAM is equivalent to finding conditions on V(-) such that
g(x) > 0 for x > 0.
Assume g(0) = 0, that is, V(0) = 0 and V'(0) = 0. Then:
x2
g'(x) = 2V'4"(z)2
So, g'(x) > 0 if V'- 1 "(x) > 0 e V"'(x) < 0 for x > 0, and g'(x) < 0 if V'~"'(x) < 0 4 V'"(x) >
0, which proves the result.
On the Corollaries: recall that optimal project choice of (ri, r2) is given by:
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p*(ri, r2) = V,1 2(r1+ r2 )
L rlr2 J
The sufficient condition for PAM to be the unique equilibrium is V'-1 "'(p) > 0 (V"'(p) < 0).
It is clear that this implies project choice will be convex in the representative risk tolerance of the
pair, 2+r2) = - + I . Similarly, if V' "(p) < 0, so that NAM is the unique equilibrium, it is
clear that project choice will be concvae in the representative risk tolerance of the pair.
How does project choice vary in individual type?
dp,, 2(ri + r2) 2
dr rir2  r
d2p ,V-1/1 2(ri + r2) 4
dr 2 dri [ rir 2  J rr
Clearly, d2 P > 0 iff V'1 "(p) > 0, and ,2r < 0 iff V'-1 "(p) < 0.Clalydr 2 drl dr2 dr1
Now, let's look more closely at the Sharpe ratio of a project p when V(p) = pN, N > 1:
SR(p) =
V(p)
= 2i
Then:
dSR(p) N N
dp 2p
Then
dSR(p)
dp
But N e (1, 2) is precisely the condition for
N > 2 is precisely the condition for NAM to be
0 if Nc (1,2)
Oif N>2
PAM to be the unique matching equilibrium, and
the unique matching equilibrium.
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1.A.5 Proof that NAM is the unique equilibrium match when income-smoothing
is shut down
Suppose that all pairs must undertake the same project, p. For instance, the government mandates
that all farmers must grow rice. This effectively shuts down the income-smoothing channel.
Differentiate CE(ri, r 2 ) with respect to rl and r 2 when there is no project choice, so that all
pairs (ri, r 2 ) face the same risky income stream f(Rjp). The cross-partial d 2CE(r,2) is:drldr2 is
r1 e r1+ 2 f(Rp\p)dR, f R_e R+p2f (RIpp)d) R,- [f Rye ;+r2 Rf(R,\ p)dR,]
(r1 + r 2 )3  1 2 er f (Rp)dR 2
But we know that:
e rl+r2p f(R,\p)dRp R e rl+r2Ip f(RPp)dRp > JR re +2 f(Rp)dR]
since we know variance is always positive. Therefore:
f(Rp|p)dRJ R f(Rp|p)dRp> Rpf(RpIp)dRp
and g(Rp) = e r1+r 2 p is a convex function.
Hence:
d2CE(ri,r2) <0
dr1 dr2
and negative-assortative matching therefore results as the unique equilibrium.
This corresponds with the result from Chiappori and Reny (2006) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2006).
1.A.6 Proof that PAM is the unique equilibrium match when consumption-
smoothing is shut down
We know from the main matching result that the optimal sharing rule is linear. Suppose the slope
of the sharing rule s(Ry) = a + bR, is fixed at b for all possible pairs of risk types. (For example,
the government mandates an equal split of the output, but partners are free to make fixed transfers
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to each other.)
This removes consumption-smoothing as an effective risk management tool, leaving only income-
smoothing (project choice). What happens to equilibrium risk-sharing relationships?
A matched pair (ri, r 2 ) chooses the relationship-specific transfer a and project p:
max E[-e-rtRp-a-bp I s.t.a,p
E[-e-r2a+bRpIIPI -v
The fixed transfer just serves to satisfy the constraint, since the division of output is fixed at b
by the government. Therefore:
v r2 2()_b
a = - + -b2V(p) -bp
r 2  2
Then, the project chosen is:
max e (i -b)2+ 2 b2)V(P)]
P
p* (ri , r2) = V,_ 1 2\ri(1 - b) 2 + r 2 b2
Then the sum of certainty-equivalents of a given pair (ri, r 2) is:
CE(ri, r2) = V, 1 2 r1(1 -, b)2 + 252) V 7,I-1 2\ ri(1 - b) 2 + r 2b2) 2 2 / ri(1 - b) 2 + r 2 b2
And:
dCE (1- b) 2  V , 1(-1 2
=- V iiVdri 2 r1(1 - b)2 + r2b2
d2CE 1b 2  2b2 (1 - b)2 >0dr2dri r1(l - b)2 + r2 b2  (ri(1 - b) 2 + r 2b2) 3
Hence, positive-assortative matching arises as the unique equilibrium.
So, if the government regulates wages by fixing the slope of the sharing rule at some b E [0, 1],
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where pairs can still make within-pair state-independent transfers, the unique equilibrium matching
pattern is always positive-assortative, verifying our intuition that, because consumption-smoothing
is held fixed, the "similarity of decisionmaking framework" dominates and people match with
people who are like them because they will agree about project choice. This can be thought of
as the counterpoint to holding income-smoothing fixed (Appendix 5), as in Chiappori and Reny
(2006) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2006)-a policy example suppressing choice of income stream might
be, say, the government specifying that only wheat can be grown.
What are some implications of this understanding? The govermnent may be motivated by
equality concerns to specify an equal division of output in every relationship, but this may actually
generate even more inequality by weakening the informal risk-management toolkit available to
individuals, which then triggers endogenous change in risk-sharing networks. Specifically, if agents
had been matched negative-assortatively in the status quo (because the "cost function" of project
mean is quite convex, say), then this imposition of wage equality leads to positive-assortative
matching, which may actually exacerbate inequality: there is a bigger spread in projects, with less
risk-averse agents on projects with much higher expected returns while more risk-averse agents are
on projects with much smaller expected returns, and less risk-averse agents abandon their roles as
informal insurers, and more risk-averse agents wind up bearing more risk.
Finally, note that although this proof is for the case of linear rules with fixed slope but flexible
transfer, the intuition is robust to more flexible ways of restricting consumption-smoothing via
regulation of the sharing rule. The linearity has nothing to do with the intuition-rather, it allows
consideration of a case where consumption-smoothing is held fixed, but transfers can still be made
so that the outside options of individuals are still endogenously-determined. (If the transfer were
held fixed as well, then utility would be completely nontransferable, and we would be able to
calculate each individual's expected utility from being partnered with another individual, without
any consideration of endogeneous vs. But this is not an interesting case to study.)
1.A.7 Differently-sized groups
We know by now (see, e.g., Appendix 4) that the sum of certainty-equivalents for a given pair
(ri, r 2 ) in the benchmark case is given by:
CE1 (rl r 2) V' 2(r1 + r 2 ) _ r1r2  [ , - [2(r1 + r2)1
rir 2 2(r1 + r2) I ri r2
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Then:
dCE _ r_2 _ l,_1 2(r1+r2)i
dr 2  2 (r1 + r 2 )2 rir 2 JJ
< 0
Hence, CE(ri, r 2 ) is decreasing in risk aversion.
Thus, if |G1| <|G21, for example, it is the most risk-averse excess agents of G2 who will remain
unmatched in equilibrium. The main matching results apply to the rest of the agents.
1.A.8 Background and empirical context
The purpose of this section is to provide further empirical context for the model. First, I will
discuss the substantial role played by informal insurance motivations in building relationships in
risky environments with missing formal insurance and credit markets. Additionally, I will show
that risk attitudes are a significant determinant of risk-sharing partner choice.
Next, I will provide evidence that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in risk aversion across
individuals in a wide range of settings.
Finally, I will provide evidence of heterogeneity in the riskiness of activities available to individu-
als, as well as heterogeneity in the relative riskiness of these activities across different environments.
To fix ideas, it may be helpful to envision an agricultural setting, which captures nicely the key
elements of the model. Much of the literature discussed in this section is drawn from an agricultural
context, where landowners and farmers are heterogeneous in the extent of their risk aversion, and
landowners must decide which farmers to work with. Different crops have different yield and profit
distributions: some crops are very robust to drought but correspondingly tend to produce low
yields on average ("safe" crops), while other crops have the potential for very high yields, but are
extremely sensitive to rainfall and other inputs, and blight easily ("risky" crops). In addition to
crop portfolio and plot locations, fertilizer and other inputs, irrigation, planting times, and general
farming methods and technologies must also be chosen.
Furthermore, the yield and profit distribution of each crop varies across agroclimactic region.
Different parts of the world experience different levels of rainfall, soil quality, irrigation, elevation,
heat, and other such ecological characteristics, and this influences the stochastic yield and profit of
each crop. It is no surprise, then, that equilibrium cropping methods, crop mixes, and contracting
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institutions vary so widely across region. A goal of this paper is to advance the understanding of
these differences.
Risk Attitude and Informal Insurance Relationships
An abundance of work discusses the considerable role of informal insurance concerns in network
formation. People rely on each other to smooth consumption risk and income risk in a wide variety
of ways (Alderman and Paxson (1992), Morduch (1995)). A very prevalent consumption-smoothing
techmique between people is transfers and remittances, and much work has been done to study the
nature of the transfers that can be sustained given a risk-sharing group, the shapes of equilibrium
networks holding fixed some transfer rule, and who is empirically observed to make transfers with
whom (Townsend (1994), Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Genicot and Ray (2003), Bramoulle and
Kranton (2007), and Ambrus et al. (2013), to name a few). A general message these papers convey
is that the need to manage risk in the absence of formal insurance institutions has huge effects on
interpersonal relationships among the poor.
In fact, risk management can affect relationship formation in very specific ways. Rosenzweig
and Stark (1989) show that daughters are often strategically married to villages located in en-
vironmentally dissimilar regions with minimally correlated farming incomes, for the purposes of
consumption-smoothing; households exposed to more income risk are more likely to invest in longer-
distance marriage arrangements. Ligon et al. [cite], Fafchamps [1999], and Kocherlakota [1996],
among many others, analyze a pure risk-sharing relationship between two heterogeneously risk-
averse households who perfectly observe each other's income. Ackerberg and Botticini [cite] study
agricultural contracting in medieval Tuscany, and find evidence that heterogeneously risk-averse
tenant farmers and landlords strategically formed sharecropping relationships based on differing
risk attitudes, motivated by risk management concerns. Hence, informal insurance motivations
play a substantial role in the formation of relationships.
But how much do individuals care about the risk attitudes of potential partners when forming
risk-sharing groups? Naturally, there are many other reasons people might match with each other,
but the point of the model is to focus on one important determinant of risk-sharing relationship
formation, and to study how equilibrium matching patterns shift along that dimension. Further-
more, there is a great deal of evidence that the risk attitudes of partners are indeed a primary
determinant of risk-sharing partner choice. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) provide empirical ev-
idence supporting the presence of endogeneity of matching along risk attitude of landowners and
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sharecroppers in medieval Tuscany. In their data, they find that share contracts were associated
with the safer crop of cereal, while fixed rent (residual claimancy) contracts were associated with
the riskier crop of vines. They argue that this is the outcome of endogenous matching-risk-neutral
tenants may have been assigned to the riskier crops, resulting in fixed rent contracts for vines,
while risk-averse tenants may have been assigned to the safer crops, resulting in share contracts on
cereals.
Additional evidence for the importance of risk attitudes as a determinant of risk-sharing re-
lationships is found in Gine et al. (2010) and Attanasio et al. (2012). Gine et al. (2010) run
an experiment on small-scale entrepreneurs in urban Peru and allow joint liability groups to form
endogenously in a microfinance setting. They find strong evidence of assortative matching along
risk attitude. Attanasio et al. (2012) run a unique experiment with 70 Colombian communities.
They gather data about risk attitudes and pre-existing kinship/friendship networks, and then allow
individuals to form risk-sharing groups of any size. Attanasio et al. find that, when members know
each other's risk types, and trust each other (family and friends are in the same group), condition-
ing on all other potential reasons for matching which they are able to account for (gender, age,
geography), there is strong evidence.of positive assortative matching along risk aversion.
To further emphasize the significant role of risk attitude in determining risk-sharing relationship
formation, I use the dataset from Attanasio et al. (2010) to calculate the proportion of formed
links that involved at least one family or one friendship tie, for each municipality. The mean of
these proportions is 0.005, or 0.5%. Since it's possible that there were very few family and friend
ties reported in the entire dataset to begin with, I also calculate the proportion of all possible links
that could have involved at least one family or friendship tie, for each municipality. The mean of
this number is 0.05. Hence, this back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that, in this setting, only
about 10% of all possible risk-sharing relationships which could have involved a family or friendship
tie, actually did involve such a tie. Hence, while one might expect kinship and friendship to be
major influences in partner choice, there is strong evidence that risk attitude is the more prominent
consideration when the partner is being chosen specifically for the purposes of informal insurance.
In particular, the family and friendship tie is likely to influence the pool of potential partners
(because individuals are less likely to know the risk attitudes of strangers, or to trust them), but
the choice of partner from this pool for the purposes of insurance is primarily determined by risk
attitudes.
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Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion
The second key piece of the model is heterogeneity in risk attitudes across individuals. There is
plenty of evidence that people are risk-averse and that they are heterogeneous in their risk-aversion.
Experiments which elicit risk attitudes by asking subjects to choose from a set of gambles differing
in riskiness find much variation in gamble choice. For example, Harrison et al. (2010) asked 531
experimental subjects drawn from India, Ethiopia, and Uganda to choose a gamble from a set of
gambles varying in riskiness (a riskier gamble has higher mean but correspondingly higher variance),
in a similar spirit as the seminal study by Binswanger (1980), and estimated the density of CRRA
risk attitudes:
-t II A j ]IA ' IA
It's clear that there is a substantial amount of variation, and ahnost every point in the [0, 1]
range is represented.
In another experiment involving over 2,000 people living in 70 Colombian commnities, where
66% live in rural areas, Attanasio et al. (2012) observes the following distribution (gamble 1 is the
safest gamble, while gamble 6 is the riskiest):
71
Distribution of gamble choices in the population
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Chiappori et al. (2010) use two distinct methods to measure heterogeneity in risk preferences
in Thai villages, where these villages are spread across several regions in Thailand. The first
method is based off the co-movement of individual consumption with aggregate consumption, and
the second is based off of optimal portfolio choice theory. Using both methods, they find substantial
heterogeneity in risk attitudes in each village. Moreover, this heterogeneity varies across villages
and regions. The following table reports the means of risk tolerance for each of 16 villages, and the
test statistic for heterogeneity:
risk aversion yj risk tolerance 1/,
village households mean x2 p-value mean x2 p-value
Chachoengsao
2 13 2.00 277.29 0.0000 1.56 3543.60 0.0000
4 21 0.79 78.44 0.0000 2.47 1646.42 0.0000
7 6 0.98 6.69 0.3509 1.28 32.21 0.0000
8 14 0.61 31.11 0.0053 5.11 7986.64 0.0000
Burin
2 18 0.62 12.54 0,8184 2.97 368.59 0.0000
10 8 0.34 5.87 0.6618 4.02 147.64 0.0000
13 10 0.41 14.27 0.1610 7.61 2255.00 0.0000
14 15 0.84 73.55 0.0000 3.55 4209.49 0.0000
Lop uNi
1 19 1.20 96.08 0,0000 1.36 1011.17 0.0000
3 8 2.12 348.07 0.0000 1.33 3981.73 0.0000
4 27 1.40 173.59 0.0000 1.29 2061.54 0.0000
6 24 1.82 485.27 0.0000 1.29 3074.97 0.0000
Sisaket
1 22 0.43 21.94 0.4633 3.78 457.10 0.0000
6 34 0.78 117.07 0.0000 1 85 2010.67 0.0000
9 22 0.76 33.96 0,0495 3.24 2141.48 0.0000
10 13 0.47 9.68 0.7199 2.90 36.03 0.0006
pooled
- 274 0.98 1358.43 0.0000 2.64 77568.89 0.0000
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Again, it is clear that there is widespread variation in the degree of risk aversion across house-
holds.
Heterogeneity in Risky Activities and Settings
Finally, agents in a given setting have a wide variety of investment options and household decisions
to make, which vary in riskiness. For example, a farmer must choose a spatial distribution of his
plots, what lumpy purchases to make (e.g. bullocks), and when and how to plant his crop. A
microentrepreneur must decide what kind of business he wants to start. Parents must decide how
to invest household resources, and whom their children will marry. Individuals face a diversity
of choices, and how much diversity, as well as the relative riskiness of one decision compared to
another, varies across settings.
For example, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) consider the equilibrium crop portfolio choices
of heterogeneously risk-averse farmers living in six ICRISAT villages located across three distinct
agroclimactic regions in India. The first region is characterized by low levels of erratically distrib-
uted rainfall and soils with limited water storage capacity (this is the riskiest environment), the
second region by similarly erratic rainfall and irrigation but better soil storage capacity, and the
third region by low levels of more reliable rainfall with reasonable soil storage capacity (this is the
safest environment). The principal crops grown are sorghum, pigeon peas, pearl millet, chickpeas,
and groundnuts, and their yield distributions vary across environment. They show that differences
in risk aversion do translate into differences in choice of risky investments. Individuals are influ-
enced by risk-reduction when choosing income streams, particularly in response to limitations on
ex post consumption-smoothing, and the degree to which they are influenced depends on their risk
aversion.
Dercon (1996) also studies the variation in riskiness of agricultural investment decisions by
heterogeneously risk-averse rural households. His data is drawn from Tanzania, a country with very
underdeveloped credit markets (in 1989, only 5% of commercial bank lending went to the private
sector, and less than 10% of this lending went to individual farmers). The UN Food and Agriculture
Organization provides an interesting look at the vast heterogeneity in crop yield distributions and
equilibrium crop mix across regions in Tanzania in 1998. The following table shows the area,
yield, and production of each of five crops across ten agroclimactically heterogeneous regions in
Tanzania3 0 :
300f course, in addition to levels and fluctuations of crop yields, farmers care about the levels and fluctuations of
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Table 2: Tanzania - 1998 Vulh Crop Production in Cereal Equivalent by Region
NMa2e Serghum Padd N'lIet Wheat
Reglan Area Yield Production Area Yield Prodctn Area Meld Production Area Yield Production Area Yield Production
('000 (kg/ha) (tannes) ('019 (kg/ba) (Innes) ('N00 (kg/ba) (twnnes) ('000 (kg/ba) (teoges) ('(10 (kg/ha) (onnes)
ha) _ ha) ha) 8ha) ha)
Mara 13.0 1 700 22.1 20.0 3 3 ( 6.0 1.0 1600 1.6 0.5 1100 0.6 0.0 0 0.0
Afusha 50.0 1 6(0) 80,0 10.0 12(m) 12.0 26 2 300 5.99 3.4 (00 34 14,0 1 700 23.A
Kilimqano 30.0 1500 45.0 1.5 1300 2.0 3,2 2 500 8 - 1.2 1400 1.7
Tonga 20.0 1500 30.0 - - - 21 1 90 3.9 - - 07 1 000 07
Morogoro 40,0 1400 560 8.0 1200 96 0.0 00 00 00 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mbeya 20.0 1 600 32.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1 800 1.8 0.0 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 0.0
COastDSM 1.0 1010W 12.1 - - - -
Kagera 51.0 1500 76.5 2.7 1300 3-5 0.1 2000 0.2 - - -
Kigona 40.0 1 800 72.0 3.0 1 500 4.5 3.0 2 00 6 (LI 1000 (.I - -
MnUM 100.0 1200 120.0 110.0 1100 121.0 10.0 1800 18 1.0 1000 LO
Total 375 545.7 155.2 178.6 23A 456 5.0 5.1 15.9 262
Unfortunately, this table excludes estimates of the variance of yield of each of these crops across
regions. Dercon (1996) provides a discussion of this in his paper. He describes a multiplicity of soils
and irrigation systems in Tanzania, which support different crops. Paddy, a crop which can yield a
high return, is restricted only to specific soils and areas close to a river, and is the least drought and
locust resistant. Despite the potential for high returns, only 11% of the total cultivation sample
grew paddy. On the other hand, sorghum yields only a low-moderate return, but all soils can
sustain it, and it is more resistant to drought and pests. Even though it had a lower mean return,
it was grown by all but two households in the sample.
Uganda and Ethiopia are similar to Tanzania in the set of crops grown, though the actual
crop mix grown differs due to differences in environmental conditions. An IFPRI report from 2011
estimating crop yields in Uganda provides a useful illustration of how the variance of crop yields
differs across crops, and the typical relationship of the variance with the mean:
crop prices, as they care ultimately about the distribution of profits.
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Figure A.1-Average yield and yield range of selected unfertilized crops observed in on-farm
surveys (farmer recall) in Uganda, by variety. type, and average of annual national yield estimates
(1970-2000)
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Again, we get a general sense that higher mean yield crops have a higher variance of yield, while
lower mean yield crops have a smaller variance of yield. Comparing across Uganda and Ethiopia,
we see that maize is a safer crop relative to sweet potato in Uganda, but the opposite is true in
Ethiopia. Thus, the same set of crops have very different yield distributions in different settings,
and furthermore, each crop's relative riskiness with the other crops also varies across setting.
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Chapter 2
Risk, Incentives, and Contracting
Relationships
2.1 Introduction
Risk is an unavoidable feature of life, but its pervasiveness and the methods which exist to manage
it differ in developed and in developing countries. People in developing countries face high levels
of risk: disease is widespread, the climate is punishing, and occupations are hazardous (Dercon
(2005), Fafchamps (2008)). Instead of steady salaries, incomes are typically highly variable and
depend on factors beyond individual control. For example, a fanner's livelihood is bound to the
whims of nature, the vagaries of health, and the caprice of crop prices.
In addition, people in developing countries are more vulnerable to the risks they face. They live
close to or at subsistence levels, and thus have no buffer with which to cushion negative shocks.
Moreover, the formal insurance and credit institutions, credibly backed and enforced by stable
governance and legal systems, which are available to people in developed countries, are notably
absent in developing environments (Dercon (2005), Fafchamps (2008)).
Consequently, the poor must depend on creative ways of incorporating risk protection into
their interactions with each other (Alderman and Paxson (1992), Morduch (1995), Dercon (2005),
Fafchamps (2008)). For example, two farmers working together in a cropping group to grow a risky
harvest could smooth each other's consumption by agreeing to a sharing rule of the income from
the realized harvest. These farmers could also try to establish sharing rules with outsiders, but
committing to a division of pooled income becomes prohibitively difficult if the contracting parties
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do not jointly observe or cannot easily verify income. As a result, the two farmers have compelling
reasons to adapt their working partnership with each other to accommodate risk concerns. This
"costly state verification" (Townsend (1979)) often causes subsets of people ostensibly matched for
other purposes to incorporate risk management into their existing relationships. (See Townsend
and Mueller (1998) for examples of costly state verification and informal insurance in the Indian
village of Aurepalle.) Hence, the absence of formal institutions not only induces individuals to rely
on their relationships with each other, it also causes these relationships to address layers of needs.
These relationships and the arrangements within them operate outside of formal insurance and
credit channels and can therefore be thought of as "informal institutions". Indeed, Bardhan relates
in his 1980 paper on interlocking agrarian factor markets: "Generalizing from his experience with
the hill peasants of Orissa, Bailey (1966) notes: 'The watershed between traditional and modern
society is exactly this distinction between single-interest and multiplex relationships."
In this paper, I study the implications of this multidimensionality of interpersonal relationships
arising from the absence of formal institutions by focusing specifically on the influence of missing
formal insurance institutions on the equilibrium formation of productive partnerships between risk-
averse people and subject to one-sided moral hazard. A classic example is sharecropping: a farmer
lives on and crops a plot belonging to a landowner and pays rent as a share of the realized harvest.
Sharecropping has thrived in different parts of the world for centuries, and continues to be prevalent
in parts of the world today, for example in rice farms in Bangladesh (Akanda et. al. (2008)) and
in Madagascar (Bellemare (2009)). If inputs (including effort) are difficult to monitor and are
noncontractible, however, the contract that provides first-best incentives for the farmer should be
the contract that makes the farmer the residual claimant (the farmer should pay a fixed rent).
So why the share contract? Stiglitz (1974) suggested that the share contract emerged because
employment relationships also provided protection from risk, in the absence of formal insurance:
while a fixed rent contract would induce the right incentives, it would force the agent to bear the
full risk of the stochastic harvest. A fixed wage contract would fully insure the agent, but the agent
would have no incentive to exert costly effort.
However, while the effect of the tradeoff between incentive and insurance provision on a contract
between a given pair of principals and agents has been studied extensively, the effect of this tradeoff
on the formation of employment relationships has received far less attention. This latter analysis
is essential for rigorously understanding the true strength of informal insurance-that is, the level of
risk-sharing achieved within the network of equilibrium employment relationships which emerges
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in the absence of formal insurance and credit institutions, and not merely the risk-sharing achieved
with a single, isolated group of individuals.
To perform this analysis rigorously, I build a model of endogenous one-to-one matching between
heterogeneously risk-averse principals and agents who face a classic moral hazard problem. Prin-
cipals each own a unit of physical capital, but have infinite marginal cost of effort, while agents
own zero units of physical capital, but have the same finite marginal cost of effort. Physical capital
must be combined with human capital in order to produce output. For example, in a sharecropping
setting, landowners would be principals, farmers would be agents, and land and farming expertise
would need to be combined to produce any sort of harvest.
The distribution of output depends additively on the unobservable and noncontractible effort
exerted by the agent, as well as on the level of riskiness of the environment. More specifically,
an increase in effort exerted by the agent leads to an increase in mean output but has no impact
on the variance, while the level of riskiness of the environment determines the variance of output.
A matched principal and agent can commit ex ante to a return-contingent sharing rule of their
jointly-produced output.
The difficulty of characterizing the equilibrium wage schedule in moral hazard models in which
both the principal and the agent are risk-averse (and have differing risk attitudes) is well-known.
Instead of using a Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) type story where the principal observes some
coarser aggregate of output than the agent does to justify linear contracts in a CARA-Normal
framework, I develop a model of one-sided moral hazard in which principals and agents have
CARA utility and returns are distributed Laplace. The Laplace distribution has two key features:
first, it resembles the normal distribution (for example, it is symmetric about the mean), but
has fatter tails, and second, its likelihood ratio is a piecewise constant with discontinuity at the
mean. (Please see Appendix 1 for further details of the Laplace distribution.) This framework
is optimally suited to analyzing the formation of equilibrium networks of relationships subject to
one-sided moral hazard and risk-sharing, since the equilibrium wage cleanly separates incentive
and insurance provision. The equilibrium wage schedule is piecewise linear with discontinuity at
the mean, where the linearity at output levels away from the mean captures efficient risk-sharing
between the risk-averse principal and agent, and the discontinuity at the mean captures incentive
provision. (Please see Appendix 1 for a detailed proof and discussion of this result.)
I characterize sufficient conditions for the unique equilibrium matching between principals and
agents to be negative-assortative in risk attitude (the ith least risk-averse principal works with the
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ith most risk-averse agent, and so on), and for the unique equilibrium matching to be positive-
assortative in risk attitude (the ith least risk-averse principal works with the ith least risk-averse
agent). Intuitively, the equilibrium risk composition of partnerships is determined by the tradeoff
between incentive and insurance provision in the following way: a less risk-averse principal who hires
a more risk-averse agent can charge that agent a risk premium for insurance, but the more that the
principal insures the agent, the less effort that agent will exert. Moreover, a more risk-averse agent
has a higher effective marginal cost of effort in the first place (because a more risk-averse agent is
"more concerned" about the possibility of exerting high effort but being unlucky and realizing a
low output draw).
I show that the key determinants of equilibrium group composition are: the curvature of the
cost of effort function, the riskiness of the environment, and the distribution of risk types in the
economy. The curvature of the cost of effort function influences the equilibrium match because it
characterizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentive provision across partnerships of different
risk attitudes. Consideration of an extreme example provides the intuition. Suppose the cost of
effort function were "infinitely convex". Then, regardless of risk attitude, any agent would exert
near zero effort. But this means that no agent is cheaper to incentivize than any other agent-that
is, all agents are equally expensive to incentivize. Hence, from the principals' perspective, incentive
provision is effectively held fixed across agents of different risk attitudes, and the matching becomes
driven purely by insurance provision. So, the equilibrium match will be negative-assortative in risk
attitudes, since the less risk-averse principals are differentially more willing to provide insurance
to the more risk-averse agents, who are differentially more willing to purchase it. As the cost of
effort function becomes less extreme, however, the less risk-averse agents become notably cheaper
to incentivize than the more risk-averse agents, and positive-assortative matching may arise.
The riskiness of the environment is a particularly interesting determinant of the equilibrium
match. It influences the matching in two important ways: first, the safer the environment is, the
lower the premium for insurance. Second, the safer the environment, the more informative output
is as a signal of agent effort. In other words, insurance provision becomes less differentiated across
agents of different risk attitudes when the environment is safer, because even the more risk-averse
agents don't need so much insurance, while incentive provision more sharply differentiates across
agents of different risk attitudes when the environment is safer, because there is less room for hidden
action.
Finally, the distributions of risk types in the group of principals and in the group of agents
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affect the equilibrium match'. This is because effort is supplied only by the agent, and not by the
principal-hence, the risk attitude of a principal has a different effect on equilibrium effort than does
the risk attitude of an agent. The one-sidedness of moral hazard generates an asymmetry in the
model which makes the distribution of risk types important for matching: equilibrium partnerships
depend both on "within group heterogeneity", that is, how much risk attitudes vary among prin-
cipals, and how much risk attitudes vary among agents, as well as "across group heterogeneity",
that is, how different the risk attitudes of principals are form the risk attitudes of agents.
Loosely, the features of the environment in which negative-assortative matching emerges as the
unique equilibrium are: a cost of effort function which is either close to linearity or is extremely
convex, a highly risky environment (output is a very noisy signal of effort, and the premium paid
for insurance is high), and a group of principals who are distinctly more risk-averse than the agents.
By contrast, the features of the environment where positive-assortative matching emerges as the
unique equilibrium are: a "moderately convex" cost of effort function, a safe environment (output is
a quite precise signal of effort, and the premium paid for insurance is low), and a group of principals
who are distinctly less risk-averse than the agents. To be slightly more specific, the distribution
of risk types influences the equilibrium match by affecting the bounds which delineate these "close
to linear", "moderatey convex", and "extremely convex" descriptors of the curvature of the cost of
effort function.
After establishing the main theoretical results, I work through a numeric example which demon-
strates the policymaking importance of understanding the risk composition of the equilibrium net-
work of partnerships: evaluating policy requires understanding how people will re-optimize upon
its introduction, and understanding how people will re-optimize in response to the introduction
of a policy requires understanding how people optimize in the status quo. That is, in order to
predict what effect the introduction of a formal institution would have, it is necessary first to have
a complete picture of the operations of the equilibrium informal institutions. For example, I discuss
the impact of introducing formal insurance. I show that such a policy leads to a "crowding out"
of informal insurance, and in particular may leave the providers of informal insurance worse off.
This framework of endogenous matching is exactly suited to analyzing concretely and rigorously
the "crowding out" effect, which is often discussed in the literature.
'This is in contrast with the distribution-free result from Wang (2012a) which studied the impact of the trade-
off between two informal insurance techniques (income-smoothing and consumption-smoothing) on the equilibrium
formation of relationships.
81
A small body of existing literature examines the relationship between the insurance and incen-
tive provision tradeoff and the endogenous formation of contracting relationships under one-sided
moral hazard. Legros and Newman (2007) studied more generally the problem of endogenous
matching under nontransferable utility. They present techniques to characterize stable matchings
in nontransferable utility settings by generalizing the Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Becker (1974)
supermodularity and submodularity conditions for matching under transferable utility. Under non-
transferable utility, the indirect utility of each member of the first group given a partnership with
each member of the second group can be calculated, fixing the second member's level of expected
utility at some level v. Then, this indirect utility expression, which depends on both members'
types and v, is analyzed for supermodularity and submodularity in risk types.
Franco et. al. (2011) consider a risk-neutral principal who requires two (risk-neutral) agents
to operate her machinery, where agents differ in their marginal cost of effort (high or low). The
principal must decide what teams of agents to form-low marginal cost with low marginal cost
(positive-assortative), or low with high (negative-assortative). Moral hazard is double-sided-the key
new force behind the matching decision is the principal's inability to condition compensation on an
individual agent's contribution. The main result is that the super/submodularity of the production
technology in workers' inputs no longer drives assortative matching in the presence of this double-
sided moral hazard. When the production technology is modular, so that in the absence of moral
hazard there is no matching prediction, Franco et. al. show that the presence of moral hazard
can still lead to positive- or negative-assortative matching, depending on the optimal compensation
scheme, which depends on the types and output of the team. For example, if types exerting higher
input are rewarded more according to the scheme, then negative matching is optimal, to reduce
the likelihood of "accidental payment", that is, paying an individual who exerts low effort for the
high effort exerted by his partner. When the technology exhibits complementarities, a scenario is
described where increasing complementarity does not lead to positive-assortative matching because
of the double-sided moral hazard.
Serfes (2008) studies a setting where risk-neutral principals owning exogenously-assigned projects
match with risk-averse agents, where the projects of principals vary in riskiness (riskier projects
have higher mean and higher variance), and the risk aversion of agents also varies. A principal and
an agent jointly produce output, where output depends additively on unobservable and noncon-
tractible effort exerted by the agent. Serfes shows that the equilibrium match is often not globally
assortative in risk attitude, and that the relationship between the riskiness of the environment and
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the power of the contract can be ambiguous, due to the endogeneity of matching.
Importantly, the approach to studying the tradeoff between incentive and insurance provision
in this paper is markedly different from approaches in papers such as the one by Serfes, where
principals are assumed to be risk-neutral, but own projects which vary in riskiness. While such
a model generates a tractable equilibrium wage (because risk-neutrality ensures linearity), the
endogenous assignment problem of heterogeneously risk-averse agents to risk-neutral principals
with heterogeneously risky projects is really answering the question, "What risky project is a risk-
averse agent assigned to when the output of the project depends on the noncontractible effort of
the agent, and a risk-neutral insurer is available who sells insurance?" That is, this approach can
be thought of as focusing on the impact of a formal institution on equilibrium activities undertaken
in a village, when there is some sort of monitoring problem. By contrast, my paper builds a
model of endogenous matching between heterogeneously risk-averse principals and heterogenously
risk-averse agents, where only one project is available (for example, wheat is the only crop that
can be grown). This approach focuses on the emergence, structure, and performance of informal
insurane institutions in the status quo. Hence, the first question that this paper answers is, "How
well-insured are heterogenously risk-averse individuals when a lack of formal institutions pushes
their interpersonal relationships to address multiple needs, including the need for risk protection?"
Chiappori and Reny (2006) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) both study a model of endogenous
matching between heterogeneously risk-averse individuals under pure consmnption-smoothing, with-
out moral hazard. Any matched pair faces the same exogenous risk, but a matched pair is able to
commit to a return-contingent sharing rule given that risk, where output does not depend on any
actions of the individuals.
Schulhofer-Wohl and Chiappori and Reny find that negative-assortative matching arises as the
unique equilibrium. Instead of using the approach of Legros and Newman, which is elegant but
may be intractably algebraic, Schulhofer-Wohl identifies a transferable utility representation of his
model, and applies the standard Shapley and Shubik supermodularity conditions. (I take this
approach as well.) The key insight is that a less risk-averse man is differentially happier than a
more risk-averse man to provide insurance for the most risk-averse woman, who is differentially
happier than a less risk-averse woman to pay for it.
A number of papers have attempted to empirically detect the inverse relationship between the
riskiness of the environment and the power of the contract predicted by the basic principal-agent
model with risk and moral hazard. For example, Allen and Lueck (1992) study sharecropping
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relationships in the American Midwest in 1986, and observe that the strength of dependence of
a sharecropper's rent contract on realized harvest is positively correlated with the riskiness of the
crop grown. From this, they conclude that risk is not a problem for farmers, since risk consider-
ations do not appear to influence contract design. However, if more risk-averse farmers work for
less risk-averse landowners, cultivating safer crops under low-powered contracts, while less risk-
averse farmers work for more risk-averse landowners, cultivating riskier crops under high-powered
contracts, the same empirical observations would emerge, but risk concerns would be playing a sig-
nificant role in contract design, through the unaccounted-for channel of contracting partner choice.
Alternatively, we expect formal institutions to be stronger in the United States-hence landowner-
farmer relationships may not be as multidimensional as they are in developing countries. This
would imply that this is not the right dataset to test for the theoretically-predicted relationship
between risk and incentives.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next two sections present the model and
the results. Section 4 works through a hypothetical policy example and shows that the evaluation
of policy may change drastically if it accounts for the endogenous network response. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 The Model
In this section, I introduce a framework designed to analyze the formation of equilibrium contracting
relationships under one-sided moral hazard when the contract balances insurance provision with
incentive provision.
The framework consists of the following elements:
The population of agents: the economy is populated by two groups of agents, G1 and G2,
where |G1| = |G21 = Z, Z a finite, positive integer. Call members of G1 "principals" and members
of G2, "agents". All principals own one unit of physical capital, but have infinite marginal cost of
effort; all agents lack physical capital but have finite and identical marginal costs of effort. The
cost of effort for all agents is c(a), c(a) > 0, c'(a) > 0, c"(a) > 0.
Principals and agents both have CARA utility, u(x; r) = -e-x, where individuals differ in
their degree of risk aversion. Let r1 represent a principal, and r 2 represent an agent. Principals and
agents are identical in all other aspects. There are no assumptions on distributions of risk types. 2
2 0f course, in reality, types are multidimensional, and matching decisions are not exclusively based on risk atti-
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The risky environment: A principal-agent partnership can only produce positive output if
one unit of physical capital is combined with human capital. For example, a landowner owns land,
and a farmer has agricultural experience and skill, and a successful harvest requires the landowner
and farmer to combine their capital. Output is given by Ria = -ya + s, where the riskiness of the
enviromnent is captured by - ~ fe, an exogenously-given, well-defined, differentiable probability
distribution function with support on (-o, oo). The effort of an agent, a, increases the mean but
doesn't affect the variance of returns.
Information and commitment: All agents know each other's risk types. In the first-best
environment, an agent's effort is both observable and contractible. In the second-best enviromnent,
the agent's effort is neither observable nor contractible.
A given matched pair (ri, r2 ) observes the realized output of their partnership, and is able to
commit ex ante to a return-contingent sharing rule s(RP12 ), where RP12 is the realized return of
(ri, r 2 )'s joint project P12. More precisely, s(R 1 2 ) specifies the wage paid to the agent r 2 when the
realized return is R, 12, where s : R -* R (there are no limited liability assumptions). In order to
be feasible, the income the principal r1 receives must be less than or equal to R 12 - s(R, 2 ). Since
all individuals have monotonically increasing utility, ri's share will be equal to R 12 - s(Ryl).
The equilibrium: An equilibrium is:
1. A match function p(ri) = '2, where t(-) assigns each r1 to at most one agent r 2 , and distinct
people have distinct partners.
Moreover, the matching pattern described by t(-) must be stable. That is, it must satisfy
two properties:
(a) No blocks: no unmatched principal and agent should be able to write a feasible wage
contract such that both of them are happier with each other than they are with the
partners assigned to them by pt.
tudes. It is worth noting that the model can account for this. For example, kinship and friendship ties are important,
in large part because of information (they know each other's risk types), and commitment (they trust each other, or
can discipline each other). Kinship and friendship ties would enter into this theory in the following way: an individual
would first identify a pool of feasible risk-sharing partners. This pool would be determined by kinship and friendship
ties, because of good information and commitment. Following this, individuals would choose risk-sharing partners
from these pools. This choice would be driven by risk attitudes, as addressed in this benchmark with full information
and commitment.
Thus, this theory can be thought of as addressing the stage of matching that occurs after pools of feasible partners
have been identified.
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(b) Individual rationality: each agent must receive a higher expected utility from being in
the match p(-) than from remaining unmatched.
2. A set of sharing rules and effort choices by the agents, one sharing rule and one effort choice
for each matched pair. The agent chooses an effort level which is optimal for her-she should
not be able to choose a different effort level and become better off. Furthermore, no pair
should be able to choose a different sharing rule which leaves both partners weakly better off,
and at least one partner strictly better off (the agent chooses effort optimally in response to
the sharing rule).
Matching patterns: It will be helpful to introduce some matching terminology. Suppose the
people in G1 and in G2 are ordered from least to most risk-averse: {r, r, ... , r}, j E {1, 2}. Then
"positive-assortative matching" (PAM) refers to the case where the ith least risk-averse person in
G1 is matched with the ith least risk-averse person in G2: t(r ) = r, i {, ... , Z}. On the other
hand, "negative-assortative matching" (NAM) refers to the case where the ith least risk-averse
person in Gl is matched with the ith most risk-averse person in G2: [p(r ) = r, i E {1, ... , Z}.
To say that the unique equilibrium matching pattern is PAM, for example, is to mean that the only
p which can be stable under optimal within-pair sharing rules and projects is the match function
which assigns agents to each other positive-assortatively in risk attitudes.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 The First-Best
It will be useful to begin by solving the first-best problem, when the agent's effort is observable
and contractible.
The first step to characterizing the equilibrium network of relationships is to characterize what
happens in a given relationship. Suppose principal r1 is matched with agent r 2 , and that the returns
of the risky project R are distributed according to some general density function f:
Rja =-ya+ E, e~f (6)
Assume the random variable R has a well-defined cumulant generating function 3.
3 Recall that the cumulant-generating function is the log of the moment-generating function.
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Denote the agent's share of realized output R by s(R). Then, the pair's equilibrium sharing
rule, given that r2 receives expected utility at least -e-V for some fixed level v, solves the following
problem:
max - e-'iIR~"(R)If(R - ya)dR s.t.
a,s(R)_J
0o
(IR) -e r 2fs(R)-c(a)f(R - ya)dR > -e~"
The equilibrium sharing rule and effort are described in the following lemma.
Lemma 12 The optimal first-best contract of a principal-agent pair (r1, r 2 ), where s(R) denotes
the agent's share, is:
SFB(R) = R + K Bh(r1, r2,v)
ri + r 2
1 rr2 R
K*B (ri, r2, v) = v+ c(c' -()) + -llog e-1+r2 f(R - yc' 1 (y))dR
aFB = c
(The proof is in Appendix 2.)
The first-best contract has several notable features. First, equilibrium effort level is the same in
any possible pair-this is because effort is contractible. Hence, any principal-agent pair chooses the
effort which "maximizes the pie", and then efficiently shares the risk of that pie. The effort which
"maximizes the pie" is the effort level which equates the marginal benefit of effort (the marginal
impact on mean output, y) with the marginal cost of effort exertion, c'(-).
Second, the equilibrium wage is linear. This is unsurprising-again, effort is contractible, so the
sharing rule needs only to provide insurance, and not incentives. Moreover, the less risk-averse
individual receives a share that is more heavily dependent on output realization.
Now that we have characterized the optimal sharing rule and equilibrium effort within a matched
pair r1 and r2, we can solve for the equilibrium network of relationships. Intuitively, since we know
that any possible matched pair chooses the same effort level, we expect negative-assortative match-
ing to arise as the unique equilibrium. This is because we know from Schulhofer-Wohl and Chiappori
and Reny that endogenous matching under pure ex post risk management results in unique negative-
assortative matching (there is no moral hazard, and no scope for ex ante risk management-matched
87
pairs are not able to choose what risk they face). Negative-assortative matching arises because the
least risk-averse individuals are differentially willing to provide insurance, while the most risk-averse
individuals are differentially willing to pay for it.
To formalize this intuition, we need to identify a method for characterizing the equilibrium
match. A challenge is posed by the heterogeneity of risk-aversion in agents, which makes this a
model of matching under nontransferable utility. That is, the amount of utility experienced by an
agent with risk aversion r1 from consuming one unit of output differs from the amount of utility an
agent with risk aversion r2 experiences from one unit of output. Thus, we cannot directly apply the
Shapley and Shubik (1962) result on sufficient conditions for assortative matching in transferable
utility games.
It will be helpful to review briefly that environment and result. Consider a population consisting
of two groups of risk-neutral workers, where all workers have utility u(c) = c. Let al denote
the ability of workers in one group, and a 2 denote the ability of workers in the other group.
The production function is given by f(ai, a 2 ), which can be thought of as: "the size of the pie
generated by matched workers ai and a 2 ". Then, dS > 0 is a sufficient condition for uniqueIdalda2
positive-assortative matching, and d2f <0 is a sufficient condition for unique negative-assortativedal da2
matching.
My approach here will be to identify the function in this model of nontransferable utility which
is analogous to the Shapley and Shubik production function f(ai, a 2 ). In Proposition 2 below, I
prove that expected utility is transferable in this model-instead of thinking about moving " ex post"
units of output between agents, we should instead think about moving "ex ante" units of expected
utility. I show that the sum of the certainty-equivalents CE(ri, r 2 ) of a given matched pair (ri, r 2 )
is the analogy to the joint output production function in the transferable utility problem. The sum
of the certainty-equivalents of a matched pair is "the size of the expected utility pie generated by
matched agents r 1 and r 2 ", and sufficient conditions for positive-assortative and negative-assortative
matching correspond to conditions for the supermodularity and submodularity of CE(ri, r 2 ) in
r 1 , r2-
More technically, expected utility is transferable in this model because the expected utility
Pareto possibility frontier for a pair (ri, r 2 ) is a line with slope -1 under some monotonic transfor-
mation.
Proposition 13 Expected utility is transferable in this model.
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Proof. Using the optimal sharing rule and equilibrium effort from Lemma 1, we can write the
expressions for the certainty-equivalent of a principal ri and of an agent r2 who are matched with
each other:
v ' 1'\ lF 2 R 1
CEr1=- -- - +± logE e 2rl+2 Ia C __,1Q) _c(c' 1-))
r2 r1 r2
CEr2 - V
Hence, it is clear the cost to the principal r1 of increasing the certainty-equivalent of her agent
r 2 by one unit is exactly one unit (and vice versa). That is, expected utility is transferable in the
model. m
This tells us that the sum of certainty-equivalents for a matched principal and agent in this
model can be thought of as the function which is analogous to the joint output function in the
Shapley and Shubik transferable utility setting:
CE(ri, r 2)= - + log E [e Ia+2 * - c'~Y)] f - ' ))
(r1 r2
It will be helpful to make two observations at this point. First, we can define the representative
risk aversion of a matched pair (ri, r2 ):
r1r2
Hrl, r2) i+rr1 + r2
Importantly, we can see that the sum of certainty-equivalents of a matched pair depends only
on representative risk aversion. In other words, a matched pair (ri, r2) acts as a single individual
with CARA utility and absolute risk aversion H(ri, r2 ).
And correspondingly, we can define the reciprocal of representative risk aversion, the represen-
tative risk tolerance:
H(rl, r 2 ) = 1ft(ri, r 2 )
1 1
r1 r 2
Thus, the sum of certainty-equivalents written as a function of representative risk tolerance is:
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CE(H) = -Nlog E le~HR a* =cI1 - '~1 6)
Intuitively, the joint expected utility pie of a matched pair is some transformation of the repre-
sentative individual's expected utility from facing the stream of returns R, minus the cost of effort,
where effort in the first-best is independent of any risk types.
Furthermore, the transformation of the representative individual's expected utility is a special
transformation:
KiRa. (t = -- = log E [e~ Ra* = c-1(-y)
where KRIa. (t =- is the cumulant-generating function (log of the moment-generating func-
tion) of the random variable R~a* evaluated at the negative of the representative risk tolerance.
How does this contribute to our understanding of equilibrium matching in the economy? We
know from the Shapley and Shubik assortative matching conditions that a sufficient condition for
unique PAM in this setting is supermodularity of CE(ri, r2) in ri, r 2 , and a sufficient condition for
unique NAM in this setting is submodularity of CE(ri, r 2 ) in ri, r 2 .
Moreover, we know that:
d2CE(ri, r 2 ) dCE d2 N d2CE dN dNi
dr 1 dr 2  d H dr 1 dr 2  dfH 2 dr 1 dr 2
1 )2d2CE
rir2 dgI2
Hence, a sufficient condition for unique PAM is convexity of CE(H) in H, while concavity of
CE(H) in H ensures unique NAM.
Checking the second derivative of CE(H) in H yields the first-best matching result.
Proposition 14 In the first-best model, when effort is observable and contractible, the unique
equilibrium matching pattern in risk atittude of principals and agents is negative-assortative.
Proof. The second derivative of CE(H) in H is straightforward to find.
CE(H) = -HKRla* (t = ~ c(c'~ y
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dCE(Nt) 1 )=-KRIa (t -- ~I ~K a, (t - )
dH H H H
d2CE(N) 1  ,, 1
= ~ , , = ~ <0
dH 2  H3 Rja* - H)
since the cumulant-generating function is convex in t.
Hence, the unique equlibrium match in the first-best is negative-assortative. *
Now that we understand what happens in the first-best, we can investigate the second-best.
2.3.2 The Second-Best
Now, suppose that effort is not observable and not contractible. In this case, the sharing rule of a
given principal-agent pair must provide incentives as well as insurance.
To gain traction on this problem, I impose a specific functional form assumption on the distri-
bution of output.
Recall that output given effort a is described by Ria = ya + e. In the previous subsection, it
was assumed that s - fe, a general density function with support on the real line and well-defined
cumulant-generating function.
In this subsection, assume that f, is a Laplace distribution with mean 0 and exogenously-given
variance V > 0, where V captures the riskiness of the environment.4 (See Appendix 1 for more
details on the Laplace distribution.)
The key features of this distribution for the setting of this paper are symmetry. The distribution
resembles the normal distribution, but has fatter tails, and the density function is non-differentiable
at the mean. Loosely, the fatter tails allow us to avoid the Mirrlees critique of linear contracts-a
realized return in the tail of a Laplace distribution is not infinitely precise about effort exerted.
Then, the equilibrium sharing rule of a principal-agent pair (ri, r2), where the agent r 2 is ensured
expected utility at least -e-", solves:
1^a 1 0r 
r(-() R
ma 7 _e-r1(R-s(R))e [R--jladR+ -e-ri(R-s(R)) 1 -[R-yadR
s(R) J-_o 2V Ya 2V
such that:
(IR) : -e-r2[s(R)-c(a)1 e?[R-,yaldR+/74 2V
4Assume V < m + , for the problem to be well-defined.
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--r2[s(R)-c(a)] $[R-ya~dR> -e-
'a 2V
(IC) : a E arg max -e-r2[s(R)-c(a)] ie'[R-&ya]dR±
aE(O,oo) oo 2V
+ -e--r2[s(R)-c(a) [R-yaJ dR
JYa 2V
The complete equilibrium analysis of this problem can be found in Appendix 1, but I will
provide a sketch of the solution here, to provide an understanding of the equilibrium behavior of a
matched partnership.
First, we need to address the constraints. The IR constraint clearly binds in equilibrium. The
IC constraint presents more of a challenge. It would be useful to be able to replace the global
IC constraint with its first-order condition, but none of the existing sufficient conditions for the
validity of the first-order approach apply to this model. Rogerson (1985) shows that sufficient
conditions for a standard moral hazard model in which the principal may also be risk-averse are:
(a) monotone likelihood ratio, and (b) convexity of the distribution function. Condition (a) holds
in my model (the likelihood ratio here is a piecewise constant, -c below the mean and c above
the mean), but (b) fails-very few standard distribution functions satisfy CDFC. Jewitt (1988)
identifies sufficient conditions that weaken CDFC, but for a model with a risk-neutral principal.
Additionally, utility is assumed to be additively separable in consumption and effort, whereas it is
multiplicatively separable here. A variety of more recent contributions identify sets of conditions
that weaken CDFC slightly, at the cost of strenghtening other conditions, but none weakens CDFC
enough for the Laplace distribution.
So, the validity of the first-order approach must be proved from first principles5 . Since effort a
is chosen from an open set, the optimum will be interior, if it exists. Hence, the first-order condition
of the global IC constraint is a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, condition for the optimum.
This means that the first-order problem (the problem with the global IC condition replaced by
its first-order condition) is a relaxed problem, so that the actual optimum must be a solution of
the first-order problem, if it exists, but a solution of the first-order problem is not necessarily the
optimum.
Solving the first-order problem yields the following wage schedule:
5 Again, a rigorous proof can be found in Wang (2012b).
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r1 r1' 1 1 rir2 r2c'(a) V ~
s (R, < -y-)= r 2R - 2+ c(-) +r2---log 1(I- _ V) 1I+
r1+r 2  r 1 +r 2  r 2  r2 k r1+r2 7 .
r11 1 rirf112 -_r2C'()V
s(R, > #2)= R,- +(+---ya  C(-l) + -v -
ri + r2 ri + r2 r2 'r2 ri + r2 7Y
where r1 is the risk attitude of the principal, r2 is the risk attitude of the agent, and a is the
level of effort "anticipated" by the principal. In equilibrium, the optimal effort chosen by the agent
in response to the wage schedule s(R,|a) should be a* = a: the principal has no incentive to pay
for a higher level of effort than she knows will actually be exerted, and the agent has no incentive
to exert more effort than he is compensated for.
What is equilibrium effort given this compensation scheme? It can be shown that a = a is a
stationary point of agent r 2 's expected utility from exerting effort a given wage schedule s(R|a), for
every possible a. However, for a > at, where at is some threshold, there will be a second stationary
point at a < a-because the wage schedule is discontinuous for a c'-1 ( ), if the principal
tries to induce a "too-high" level of effort, the agent will profitably deviate to a discretely lower
level of effort.
More concisely, for 'a ; -t, the unique maximizing level of effort exerted by the agent is a* = a;
for a > at, the unique maximizing level of effort exerted by the agent is a < a.
Therefore, the equilibrium ' set by the principal is '* = at, where this threshold is characterized
by:
tc( -c )- + r2 +) = c1"(at) >0
r1 r2r2V r2
Because the agent's expected utility from exerting effort a given wage s(RIa*) is strictly concave
in a, it must be that s(RIa*) is in fact the optimum.
Observe that setting at = c'-1 y) causes the left-hand side of the equation to be 0, while
the right-hand side is positive. Since the left-hand side is strictly increasing in at (the cost function
c(a) is strictly convex), it must be that at > c'- r
Therefore, the wage schedule within a principal-agent pair (ri, r 2 ) is piecewise linear: at the
anticipated mean level of output, ya, there is a jump in the wage-realized output levels greater
than the mean -/a* are rewarded at a discretely higher level than output levels that are below the
mean. At output levels away from the anticipated mean, the wage is linear with slope rr . Hence,
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the equilibrium wage can be cleanly decomposed into insurance provision and incentive provision.
The jump in the wage at the mean provides incentives (since the likelihood ratio is a piecewise
constant, in some sense knowing whether output is above or below the mean is differentially more
informative about effort exertion), and the linearity away from the mean captures risk-sharing.
Using this characterization of equilibrium sharing rule and effort in a given principal-agent
pair (ri, r 2 ), we can solve for conditions for unique assortative matching, under a functional form
assumption on cost of effort: c(a) = ?la", M > 1 for convexity.
We use the same trick as in the first-best: expected utility is transferable in the second-best as
well.
Proposition 15 Expected utility is transferable in the second-best.
Proof. Using the equilibrium sharing rule of a given pair and the characterization of equilibrium
effort, we can write the certainty-equivalent of principal r1 and agent r 2 when matched:
CEr = 74 12 - c(a 12 ) -
r 2
1F 1 1
log -Vfr1 + 
r1 1 r2cL'(1)V r2 [' rir2 V r2C'(al2 _2_r
V
CEr2 = -
r2
Hence, it is clear that there is a one-to-one tradeoff in the certainty-equivalents of rl and r2.
Thus, expected utility is transferable in this model. m
Therefore, a sufficient condition for unique positive-assortative matching is supermodularity of
the pairwise sum of certainty-equivalents, and a sufficient condition for unique negative-assortative
matching is submodularity of the pairwise sum:
CE(ri, r 2 ) = -712 - c(a12)
1 1 1 1
-_log - +
1 [1 + r2c'(aE1)Vl a2 I _ rp V]r r2c'(a-1)Vl r21+r2y r2
. Ly J r1+r2 J ly Jl r+r2 I J
The first two terms of this sum can be thought of as the part of the expected utility pie coming
from productivity (effort exertion and corresponding expected output), while the third term can
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be thought of as the part of the expected utility pie coming from risk-sharing.
The challenge of identifying conditions for assortative matching in this model is the one-sided
moral hazard. Although expected utility is transferable, r1 and r 2 do not enter symmetrically into
the sum of certainty-equivalents of the matched pair. Consequently, the matching conditions will
not be distribution-free as they are in the absence of moral hazard (for example, in the first-best,
or in the case of endogenous matching under the trade-off of ex ante and ex post risk management,
as in Wang (2012c)).
Finding conditions for the supermodularity and submodularity of CE(ri, r2) in ri, r2 yields the
following matching results.
Proposition 16 Let c(a) = lam, M > 1.
1. NAM is the unique eqm matching pattern for M G [1, M 1 ] U [M4,oo), where M 1  M 4 .
a. M 1 is increasing in r1 (the least risk-averse principal's risk aversion) and in f1 (the
most risk-averse principal's risk aversion), and decreasing in r2, f 2 . Furthermore, M 1 is increasing
in V, and decreasing in -y.
b. M 4 is decreasing in r1 and f1 , and increasing in r2 and r 2 . Furthermore, M 4 is decreasing
in V, and increasing in y.
2. PAM is the unique eqm matching pattern for M G [M2 , M 3 ], where M 1  M 2 and M 3  ! M 4 .
(It may be that the interval [M2 , M3 is empty.)
a. A 2 is increasing in r1 and f1, and decreasing in r 2 and f 2 . Furthermore, M 2 is increasing
in V., and decreasing in '.
b. MA3 is decreasing in r1 and f1, and increasing in r2 and f2. Furthermore, MA3 is decreasing
in V, and increasing in y.
(The proof is relegated to the Appendix.)
This result highlights the key determinants of the equilibrium matching pattern: the riskiness
of the environment V, the across-group and within-group heterogeneity in risk attitude, captured
by the endpoints of the supports of the risk type distributions of principals and agents, and the
marginal impact of effort on mean output, /.
In words, the takeaways from the main matching result are the following. First, positive-
assortative matching (PAM) is more likely for moderately convex cost of effort functions, while
negative-assortative matching (NAM) is more likely for cost of effort functions which are close to
linear or extremely convex.
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What delineates the boundaries of "close to linear", "moderately" convex, and "extremely"
convex? The comparative statics on the bounds tell us the following:
1. Negative-assortative matching (NAM) is more likely to arise when principals are distinctly
more risk-averse than agents, while positive-assortative matching (PAM) is more likely to
arise when principals are distinctly less risk-averse than agents.
2. NAM is more likely to arise when the environment is very risky (V is large), while PAM is
more likely to arise when the environment is very safe (V is low).
3. NAM is more likely to arise when the marginal benefit of effort (for mean ouptut) is low (-Y
is small), while PAM is more likely to arise when the margnal benefit of effort is high (y is
large).
What is the intuition behind these comparative statics? Consider a relatively safe environment
where the cost of effort function is moderately convex and the marginal benefit of effort is large.
Effort exertion across different risk attitudes is most heterogeneous when the cost of effort function
is moderately convex. Moreover, when the environment is relatively safe (that is, V is relatively
low), the "need" for insurance is small and output is a fairly precise signal of effort. Hence,
rewarding effort based on realized output is effective, less risk-averse agents are substantially cheaper
to incentivize than more risk-averse agents, and more risk-averse agents are not willing to pay
particularly high risk premia. All of these forces push the incentive provision effect to outwiegh the
insurance provision effect, which favors PAM over NAM. If in addition principals are less risk-averse
than agents, then the tradeoff between incentive provision and insurance provision is particularly
stark (since if a principal were more risk-averse than the agent, the principal would be happy to
provide incentives for the agent, as this would be a method of self-insurance).
Hence, in this environment, the least risk-averse principal experiences the biggest difference in
utility between being paired with the least risk-averse agent versus a more risk-averse agent. Thus,
the least risk-averse principal will outbid the other principals for the least risk-averse agent, and
once the least risk-averse principal and the least risk-averse agent are removed from the pool of
candidates, the least risk-averse principal of those remaining will outbid the other principals for
the least risk-averse agent remaining, and so on, and the equilibrium matching pattern will be
positive-assortative.
On the other hand, when agents have close to linear or extremely convex cost of effort, the
difference between effort exertion across agents of different risk types is small-either all the agents
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exert very high effort, or all the agents exert very low effort. If the environment is also risky,
that is, V is high, then individuals, especially more risk-averse individuals, will be willing to pay
a high price for insurance. Moreover, output is a noisy signal of actual effort exertion. Hence,
the insurance provision effect will tend to outweigh the incentive provision effect. If in addition
principals are more risk-averse than agents, then the incentive provision is aligned with insurance
provision: a more risk-averse principal prefers a less risk-averse agent, because the principal desires
insurance for herself, and this will naturally provide incentives to the agent. This means that the
most risk-averse principal experiences the biggest difference in utility between being paired with the
least risk-averse agent versus a more risk-averse agent. Thus, the most risk-averse principal will
outbid the other principals for the least risk-averse agent, and once they are matched, the most
risk-averse principal remaining will outbid the others for the most risk-averse agent remaining, and
so forth, and the equilibrium matching pattern will be negative-assortative.
An interesting but informal insight that emerges from the analysis in this framework is that, in
contrast with the standard view, there is a strong case for the more risk-averse individuals to be
principals, and the less risk-averse individuals to be agents: a more risk-averse principal is happy
to incentivize a less risk-averse agent, because she wants insurance, and the less risk-averse agent
doesn't mind the riskiness of the incentives.
Finally, a word on efficiency.
Proposition 17 The equilibrium maximizes the sum of certainty-equivalents, and is Pareto effi-
cient.
The equilibrium maximizes the sum of certainty-equivalents, since the conditions for PAM and
NAM were derived by finding conditions for the supermodularity and submodularity of the pairwise
sum of certainty-equivalents. Since the sum of certainty-equivalents is a social welfare function,
and the equilibrium maximizes this sum, it must be Pareto efficient.
While the natural measure of welfare for a partnership and the individuals within that partner-
ship is the pairwise certainty-equivalent, the unweighted sum of certainty-equivalents across pairs
is not the right way of thinking about economy-wide welfare. A more risk-averse individual needs
to be guaranteed a smaller amount than a less risk-averse individual to be made indifferent between
accepting that amount with certainty and partaking in her risky equilibrium, but there is no reason
society should value her less because of that. Hence, policy in this framework will be considered
to improve aggregate welfare if it is Pareto-improving. (Alternatively, using a Rawlsian social wel-
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fare function which weights the utility of more risk-averse individuals would also be a reasonable
approach.)
2.4 The Policy Example
There are a variety of natural policies a govermnent might wish to implement in this setting.
In this hypothetical policy example, I will discuss a very simple approach to thinking about the
welfare impacts of introducing formal insurance using this framework, and show how accounting
for endogeneity is essential to the evaluation and design of this policy.
In particular, suppose that the status quo environment is very risky, that is, V is very large, and
a government wishes to reduce the risk burden shouldered by risk-averse citizens. The government
takes steps to reduce V by introducing formal insurance (modeling the introduction of formal
insurance as a risk-reduction measure has precedent in the literature, for example in Attanasio
and Rios-Rull (2000). The matching results from Proposition 5 tell us that such a decrease in
V may trigger an endogenous network response-in a very risky environment, the least risk-averse
principals hire the most risk-averse agents, since a high V means that the the gains from trade
from risk-sharing are high, and moreover that output is a very noisy signal of effort. However, a
decrease in V means that there is less risk that needs to be shared, and additionally that output
is a much more precise signal of effort. Hence, the least risk-averse principals may switch to hiring
the least risk-averse agents instead.
It will be helpful to work through a specific numeric example6 . Let the parameters of the status
quo be: y = 11.5, r/ = 0.5,and M = 4, so that:
R = 11.5a + e, s - Laplace(0, V)
_14
c(a) = --2
2
Suppose there are three principals and three agents: the principals are {ri = 0.3, ri = 0.8, ri=
1.5}, while the agents are {r? = 2, r2 = 2.6, r2 = 3}. That is, principals are distinctly less risk-
averse than agents, and there is more heterogeneity in risk type amongst principals than amongst
agents.
6 The specific numbers are not important, as the results from Proposition 5 are comparative statics, and thus it is
the relative comparisons that matter.
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Suppose that initially, the level of risk in the economy is high. Specifically, the variance of
returns of the project undertaken by all pairs is V = 0.9 (e.g., the terrain is such that rice paddy is
the crop that all landlord-farmer pairs grow, and the standard deviation of profits from rice paddy
is determined by V). Then the equilibrium match is negative-assortative, and the agent in each
matched pair exerts the following effort:
(r = 1.5, r = 2) : a, = 1.34
(r = 0.8,4r2 = 2.6) : ar _6 = 1.15
(r = 0.3, r2 = 3) : a,- 3 = 0.87
The least risk-averse agent exerts the highest level of effort, because she has an effectively lower
marginal cost of effort, and, more importantly, works for the most risk-averse principal. Hence,
the least risk-averse principal has very sharp incentives: she essentially insures the most risk-averse
principal, and works hard herself, and this is a mutually-satisfying agreement.
The most risk-averse agent exerts the lowest level of effort, because she works for the least
risk-averse principal, who provides her with informal insurance. The least risk-averse principal's
land plot is therefore the least productive, but he is paid a risk premium by his agent.
The certainty-equivalents in each negatively-assorted partnership are:
CE(r1 - 1.5 r 2 - 2) = 13.08
CE(r = 0.8, r = 2.6) = 11.79
CE(r - 0.3, r 2 - 3) = 9.53
The happiest partnership is between the most risk-averse principal and the least risk-averse
agent, because of the alignment between the principal's desire for insurance, and the agent's incen-
tivization from a scheme which insures the principal. The unhappiest partnership is between the
least risk-averse principal and the most risk-averse agent-even though there are gains from trade
from risk-sharing, the loss of productivity resulting from the agent being insured reduces the joint
expected utility pie.
Now suppose that the introduction of formal insurance reduces the riskiness of the environment,
so that effectively the variance of the returns of the risky project falls to V = 0.07 (and the
other parameters remain unchanged). This causes the principals and agents to re-sort: in this
environment, the unique equilibrium match is positive-assortative in risk types.
Then, the agent in each positively-assorted couple exerts effort:
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(ri = 0.3, r, = 2) : a2 = 0.914
(r = 0.8, r2 = 2.6) : ar2= 1.11
(r = 1.5, r = 3) : a,2. = 1.25
And the certainty-equivalent of each positively-assorted couple is:
CE(rl = 0.3, r2 = 2) = 10.16
CE(rl = 0.8, r2 = 2.6) = 12.04
CE(r = 1.5, r2 = 3) = 13.15
The certainty-equivalents of each partnership pre- and post-policy are plotted below. The agents
are arranged along the x-axis in increasing risk aversion.
Ceitainty-equivalents pre- and post-policy
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We can see a stark difference in the distribution of welfare pre- and post-policy. Pre-policy,
in the risky environment, the least risk-averse agents are the best off, while they are the worst off
following the introduction of formal insurance. Why is this?
Analysis of the impact of the introduction of formal insurance within this endogenous matching
framework enables us to see precisely and quite concretely the often-discussed "crowding-out"
effect. Following a decrease in V, insurance provision plays much less of a role in matching than
does incentive provision, leading principals to hire agents with similar risk attitudes rather than
different risk attitudes. This means that less insurance is provided informally in equilibrium.
Moreover, when V was high, the least risk-averse agents essentially insured the most risk-averse
principals: the most risk-averse principals would offer their agents a wage scheme with high-powered
incentives. This meant that the principal's income depended very little on the realized return of
output, while the agent's income depended highly on realized return. But the agent, being less
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risk-averse, was happy under this wage scheme and worked hard. This benefited both the principal
and the agent: the principal was well-insured and expected return was high, while the agent was
close to being a residual claimant to her effort exertion.
Following the introduction of formal insurance, however, the most risk-averse principal's desire
for informal insurance is heavily dampened. She now prefers to take more risk, in the sense that she
wants her own income stream to depend more on realized return of output. She therefore prefers
to hire an agent who is also quite risk-averse.
Thus, the less risk-averse agent's role in providing informal insurance is "crowded out" by the
introduction of formal insurance, and he is worse off, despite the drastic decrease in riskiness of the
environment.
Although the approach to modeling the introduction of formal insurance is certainly over-
simplistic in this example, the results are striking and capture the much-discussed "crowding out
effect" concretely and rigorously. This analysis provides a strong argument for rigorously accounting
for the impact on informal insurance relationships when introducing formal insurance.
2.5 Conclusion
A large literature has explored the consequences of balancing incentive provision with insurance
provision for the contractual arrangement between a given principal and agent who work together
to produce some output, where otuput depends on unobservable and noncontractible inputs put in
by the agent. In this paper, I focus on the formation of the contracting relationships themselves.
I argue that individuals in developing economies are typically forced to use their interpersonal
relationships, which may already be serving several purposes, to address in addition the needs
typically met by formal institutions in developed economies, such as risk management. I think of
the equilibrium network of contracting relationships arising in this way as informal insurance.
I find conditions on the environment for assortative matching, in particular, on the level of
riskiness in the environment, the marginal benefit of effort for mean output, the convexity of
the cost of effort function, and the risk type distributions of principals and agents. I show that
environments where principals are distinctly more risk-averse than agents, with high levels of risk,
with low marginal benefit of effort, and with cost of effort functions which are close to linear or
extremely convex are amenable to unique negative-assortative matching, while environments where
principals are distinctly less risk-averse than agents, with low levels of risk, with high marginal
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benefit of effort, and with cost of effort functions which are moderately convex are more conducive
to positive-assortative matching. Loosely, the tradeoff that drives the equilibrium matching pattern
is the costs and benefits of insurance provision versus the costs and benefits of insurance provision,
for each possible pairing of risk types.
I then discuss applications of this analysis for policymaking. First, proper evaluation of policies
which affect the parameters of this environment-for example, a policy which subsidizes inputs
through an innovative technology and reduces the convexity of the cost of effort function, or a
policy which introduces formal insurance and reduces the aggregate risk of the envirounent-requires
accounting for the endogenous network response. A key point is that the multidimensionality of the
relationships in the network is a consequence of missing formal institution, and hence partnerships
between principals and agents, which are ostensibly formed for productivity purposes, may respond
to changes in the risk environment, because embedded implicitly into these relationships is informal
insurance. In particular, I showed that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal
insurance, and may leave those individuals who acted as informal insurers worse off.
Second, this analysis is important for making accurate inferences about the environment from
observations of equilibrium contracts. In particular, this analysis highlights the importance of
collecting data about contracting partners, not just the sharing rules.
Much work remains to be done. A natural next step would be to allow principal-agent pairs
to choose the riskiness of the income stream they face, instead of keeping the riskiness of the
environment exogenous and the same for all possible pairs. It would also be interesting to allow
for richer patterns of group formation. For example, tenant farmers working for different landlords
might agree to share risk as a group. How would this affect the equilibrium network of relationships
and contracts?
This analysis also yielded an insight into why more risk-averse individuals may be better suited
as principals, while less risk-averse individuals may be better suited as agents, contrary to the
standard perspective. A more risk-averse principal and a less risk-averse agent can be seen to work
well together in a model of endogenous matching under risk and moral hazard, because the more
risk-averse principal insures herself by providing incentives to her less risk-averse employee. Hence,
in these relationships, insurance provision seems aligned with incentive provision. This suggests a
closer study of risk attitudes and principal-agent roles in developing economies.
Thinking about informal institutions as the interpersonal relationships which emerge in equi-
librium to address the needs usually served by formal institutions in developed economies gives us
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a deeper understanding of the operation of informal institutions in the status quo, and how they
would be affected by changes in the formal institutional structure. Furthering this understanding
is essential for the design of effective development policies.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 The one-sided CARA-Laplace moral hazard model
In this Appendix, I construct a model of one-sided moral hazard where both the principal and the
agent are risk-averse (and may differ in the degree of their risk aversion). The principal and the agent
have CARA utility, and the productive output of the pair depends noisiliy on the effort exerted by
the agent, which is costly for the agent. The novelty is that the noise follows a Laplace distribution. I
show that the unique equilibrium wage scheme in this model is piecewise linear. This is in contrast
to the typical usage of a CARA-Normal framework with a linear wage justified by Hohnstrom
and Milgrom (1987) reasoning to counter the difficulty of characterizing the equilibrium of one-
sided moral hazard models with risk-averse principals and agents, and a cumulative distribution
function of returns which isn't globally convex. (Recall the standard monotone likelihood ratio and
convexity of distribution function conditions, and slight variants, from Mirrlees (1979), Rogerson
(1983), and Jewitt (1988). Convexity of the cumulative distribution function is usually the most
difficult condition to satisfy to justify the first-order approach.)
In addition to the value of constructing a model in which the unique equilibrium can be char-
acterized, and in particular has the convenient form of piecewise linearity, this model is well-suited
to answering the specific question posed by this paper. I show that the equilibrium wage scheme is
linear away from the mean, with the optimal risk-sharing slope-this captures insurance provision.
And, the jump at the mean captures incentive provision: the agent is compensated linearly in out-
put, and gets a bonus if output exceeds a threshold, where that threshold is the expected output
given (correctly) anticipated effort.
The Model
The framework consists of the following elements:
The principal and the agent: both the principal r1 and the agent r 2 are risk-averse with CARA
utility u(x) = -e--', r > 0. The principal owns one unit of physical capital but has infinite
marginal cost of effort, while the agent owns no physical capital, but has a finite marginal cost of
effort. The cost of effort for all agents is c(a), c(a) > 0, c'(a) > 0, c"(a) > 0. The agent has an
exogenously-given outside option denoted by -e-.
The risky environment: A principal-agent partnership can only produce positive output if one
unit of physical capital is combined with human capital. Output is given by Rja = ya + E, where
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the riskiness of the environment is captured by E ~ Laplace(O, V), which has support (-oo, oo).
Hence, the effort of an agent, a, increases the mean but doesn't affect the variance of returns.
The Laplace distribution is a continuous probability distribution with location and scale para-
meters j E R and b C R+, respectively. The pdf of a random variable X ~ Laplace(p, b) is:
f(xjp, b) =
1 - )b
b
X < y
X > p
Pictorially, the pdf is:
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0-
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Note that this resembles two back-to-back exponential distributions. In fact, if Y ~ Laplace(O, V),
then IYI ~ exp( ).
Information and commitment: The principal and the agent know each other's risk types. How-
ever, the agent's effort is not observable and not contractible.
A given principal and agent pair (ri, r 2 ) observes the realized output of their partnership, and
is able to commit to a return-contingent sharing rule s(R), where R is realized output.
The equilibrium: An equilibrium consists of a wage s(R) set by the principal satisfying the
constraints of the problem, such that any other choice of feasible sharing rule by the principal
would leave her worse off, as well as an effort level a chosen by the agent such that any other choice
of effort would leave the agent worse off.
The Solution
The principal r1 chooses wage s(R) for the agent r2 by solving the following problem:
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maX -e-r1(R-s(R))__ 7 [R-yaldR+ 0 -r1(R-s(R))I --e R-yalds(R) ___ 2V ha 2V
such that:
(IR)1 -e-r 2 [s(R)-c(a)] -[R-a]dR+2V
+ -e-r2[s(R)-c(a) e-?[R-taldR ;> -e-v
Ja 2V
(IC) : a E arg max j-er2ls(R)-c(a)] [R--ya]dR+
aE(0,)-o 2V
+ -er2[s(R)-c(a)] [R-yaldR
+Jf-a _2Ve
It is clear that the IR constraint binds in equilibrium.
Since effort a is chosen from an open interval, all global maxima are stationary points, if they
exist. Hence, the first-order problem (the problem wherein the global IC constraint is replaced
by its first-order condition) is a relaxed problem: an optimum must be a stationary point, but a
stationary point is not necessarily an optimum.
Differentiating the global IC constraint with respect to a yields the first-order condition of the
global IC constraint:
[r2 c'(a) -]j -e-r2s(R)-c(a)I e R-yaldR+ [r 2 c'(a) + - j -er2[s(R)-c(a) - [R-Va] -/]Va_ 2V V ,a 2V
Note that the compensation schedule s(R) specifically does not depend on a, so differentiating
the agent's expected utility from exerting effort a given s(R) with respect to a does not require any
assumptions about s(R).
Solving the first-order problem yields the following wage schedule:
s(R < ya)= R- _ _ Ta+c()+-v--log 1- r Vr2  1+ r2 '(a)V ]
r1 + r 2  r1 + r2  r 2  r 2  r1 + r 2  7
s(R > -ya)- R 
-ya+C(a)+ 1 1 grir 2  _r2c'()Vr1 + r2 ri + r2 r2 r2 ri + r2 7y
where a is the effort level "anticipated" by the principal.
Observe that if a = c'- ( 7Ir -y), then this compensation schedule is fully linear with slope
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2 - if a > c' - yl), then this compensation schedule is piecewise linear with a discreteT1 +r2 7 r1 +r2}
jump at 7'a, and slope r everywhere else, that is, at output levels R -ya.
What a does the principal choose in equilibrium? Note that in equilibrium it must be that
a= a: that is, the principal would never pay for a level of effort higher than the one she anticipates,
and an agent would never exert more effort than she is compensated for.
Now observe that for all a < at, for some threshold a > 0, the unique stationary point of
the agent r2's expected utility given effort exertion a and compensation scheme s(RIa) is a = a.
Moreover, r2's expected utility given a and s(R|ja) is strictly concave in a, when a <at.
However, once a > at, where again, this a is a threshold which will be rigorously characterized
shortly, there are two stationary points of r2's expected utility given effort exertion a and compen-
sation scheme s(R|a): ai = a continues to be a stationary point, but a 2 < a is also a stationary
point, and it can be seen that a2 is the unique maximizer. The intuition is that, if the principal
tries to induce "too much" effort, the agent will find it profitable to discretely deviate downwards.
Therefore, the equilibrium a is a = at, where a is the value of a such that the second derivative
of r 2 's expected utility given effort exertion a and compensation scheme s(R|a) at a = a is precisely
0.
This yields the following expression characterizing a* = at:
c' (at) - (Cf y ') + I = , c"(- ) > 0
r1i+ r 2  r 2 V r 2
where it can clearly be seen that at > c'-- ), since c(a) is increasing and convex, and
the left-hand side is increasing in a.
But we know the agent's expected utility from exerting effort a given compensation schedule
s(RIa*) is strictly concave in a.
Therefore, the unique solution we found to the first-order problem is indeed the unique optimum.
This characerizes the equilibrium.
Incentive Provision and Insurance Provision
The piecewise linearity of the equilibrium wage schedule which emerges in this framework is a nice
property for two key reasons. First, it's both tractable and realistic. Second, it neatly separates
incentive provision from insurance provision: the linearity with slope j at output levels above
and below the mean captures efficient risk-sharing, while the discrete jump at the mean captures
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incentive provision. Because the likelihood ratio is a piecewise constant with discontinuity at the
mean output level, the key information about effort contained in output realization is whether the
realized output is above or below R = ya. Conditional on knowing that realized output is below
(above) mean output, however, no output level below (above) the mean is more informative about
effort than another output level below (above) the mean. Furthermore, because the likelihood ratio
assumes two "symmetric" values, -Q and Q, the slope is the same for output levels above and
below the mean.
To see more clearly how the piecewise linear wage scheme of the second-best solution cleanly
separates incentive and insurance provision, it will be helpful to solve two cases: (a) the contracting
principal between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, where effort is not contractible,
and (b) the contracting problem between a risk-averse principal and a risk-averse agent, where
effort is contractible. The solution to the first case will be a step function, with one fixed wage for
low output and a discretely higher fixed wage for high output, and the solution to the second case
will be a perfectly linear wage with slope ,1 , to capture efficient risk-sharing.
Case (a): the contracting problem between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse
agent; effort not contractible The principal has utility u(x) = x, while the agent has utility
u(X) = -e-r2x. Effort is not contractible. Hence, the principal chooses wage s(R) for the agent r 2
by solving the following problem:
max (R-s(R)) e '-[,a'dR + (R- s(R))--e- [R--aIdR
s(R) _ ya 2V
such that:
(IR) : -er2[s(R)-c(a) '[R--yaldR+
_, 2V
+ 
-er2 [s( R)-c(a)] 
__ [ lR-,adR>_--/* 1
ya 2V
f(4 1
(IC) : a E arg max -e-r2[s(R)-c(a)] ei R-YavdR+
aE(0,oo) - o 2V
-r2ls(R)-c(a)J _ [R-ya g
-ya -e 2 V ev
Replacing the global IC constraint with the first-order condition and writing the Lagrangean
(letting A be the multiplier on the binding IR constraint, and pt be the multiplier on the binding
first-order condition):
108
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(R s(1) e 1d 1 R-s()-
+ A [ -e-r2s(R)-c(a)I i [R-,a] dR+ - R-,adR + e
_ 2V Ja 2V
yr )- -er2[s(R)-c(a)] [R-,a r2 c -e-r2[s(Ry,)-c(a)] - [R--ya]dR*t [[r2 en(a) ] p t w v ha
Then differentiating pointwise with respect to s(R) for R < -ya yields:
-1 + Ar2 e- r2[s(R)-c(a)] + p Er2 c'(a) - r2 e r 2 [s(RF4)L V J
r2 (A + I r2c(a) - ) -r2[s(Rp)
log (r2 A + y r2c'(a) - +
c(a)]
c(a)J
c(a)
= 0z-
= <
= s(RIR <ya)
Hence, s(R) for R < ya is:
s(R!R < ya) = Ilog (r 2
And, differentiating pointwise with respect
s(RIR > ya) = log (r 2
(A+ t r2c(a) - #1))+ c(a)
to s(R) for R > ya yields:
(A + y r2c(a) + + c(a)
Hence, the equilibrium wage contract for the agent r2 is a wage fixed at a certain level for
R < -y2, and a wage fixed at a discretely higher level for R > -y-, where a is the effort level
anticipated by the principal. So, the wage looks like, "flat, jump at the anticipated mean level of
output, and flat again".
Case (b): the contracting problem between a risk-averse principal and a risk-avesre
agent; effort contractible Now, both the principal and the agent are risk-averse with CARA
utility, but effort is contractible. The principal r 1 solves the following problem:
ma ,a _-r1(R-s(R)) 1 i[-al dR [0 -e e(,ajdR
axs(Rri(R)1 J Ia~dRa,s(R) _02V fa2V
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such that:
(IR) : -er2[s(R)-c(a)] }[R--yadR
2V
+ -~e-r2[s(R)-c(a)] R-,aldR> -e-
ya 2V
Letting A denote the Lagrange multiplier on the IR constraint, differentiating pointwise with
respect to s(R) for R < ya yields:
-rier1(R-s(R)) + Ar 2 e-r2[s(R)-c(a)] = 0
And differentiating pointwise with respect to s(R) for R > ya yields:
-rie-ri(R-s(R)) + Ar 2 e-r2[s(R)-c(a)] = o
the same condition.
Hence:
+_ r2  1- /r 2 \
s(Rja) R+ r c() log A -
ri + r 2  r 1 + r 2  r 1 + r 2  r1 /
a linear wage schedule with slope r.
The key takeaway from both of these cases is that, in this model, it is possible to see the effect
of both the principal and the agent being risk-averse on the equilibrium wage, and the effect of
effort not being observable or contractible. The equilibrium wage schedule that emerges when both
of these components are combined is the wage schedule which is linear at output levels away from
the mean (as in Case (b)), and where there is a discontinuous jump at the mean (as in Case (a)).
2.A.2 The equilibrium for a given pair in the first-best
First, suppose principals have a more general increasing, strictly concave utility function given
by. U(x; p), and agents have a more general increasing, strictly concave utility function given by
V(x; q).
Then, observe that the constraint set is convex. That is, for a given a, if si(R) satisfies IR,
and s 2 (R) satisfies IR, then asi(R) + (1 - a)s 2 (R) also satisfies IR.
If si(R) satisfies IR, and s 2 (R) satisfies IR, then:
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/ V(s(R) - c(a))f(R - -ya)dR > v
-00
00
J V(s52(R) - c(a))f (R - ,ya)dR > v
-00
Then: use the concavity of V(-):
00
J V( - (aR) + (1 - a)s2 (R) - c(a))f(R - ya)dR >
-00
J vIQ(si(R) -c(a)) +(1- a)(s2 (R) -c(a))]f(R -- ya)dR >
-00
JaV(si(R) - c(a))f(R - -ya)dR + J(I - a)V(s2(R) - c(a))f(R - ya)dR >
-00 -00
av+(1-a)v v
And, the objective function is strictly quasiconcave: the objective function is:
00J U(R - s(R))f(R - ya)dR
-00
Fix a. Then, pointwise differentiate twice wrt s(R) for each R:
f'/ : -U'(R - s(R))f(R - ya)
f"f : U"(R - s(R))f(R - ya) < 0
since U(-) is concave.
So, there should be a unique global constrained maximizer.
Now, let's solve for the first-best equilibrium when principals and agents explicitly have CARA
utility, and differ in their Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion, r.
The first-order conditions of the optimization problem are:
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c'(a) ff r 2 e-r21s(R)-c(a)f(R - ya)dR, f_ e-r2fs(R)c(a)If'(R - ia)dR i
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We know that in the first-best, under the general U(x; p), V(x; q) utility functions, the slope of
the equilibrium wage will be:
I1
SFB(R) = 1U'(R-s(R)) _ V"(s(R)-c(a))
± jU"(R-s(R))) v(()-~)
When the utility functions are CARA, this expression is equal to r, . So, under CARA utility,
the equilibrium wage of the agent is linear with slope '2: this means that s*B(P = R+K,
where K is some constant depending on parameters. This is intuitive: effort is contractible, so
there is no need to provide incentives. Hence the sharing rule efficiently shares risk; this means
the schedule is linear. Moreover, the less risk-averse individual will have the share that is more
dependent on output realization.
Thus, our conditions are:
Z!e(r1+r2)K-r 2c(a) A
r2
II\-(1±2)r 00a 1lr
c'(a)r2e-(r1+r2)Ker2c(a) 0 e r1+2 f(R - ya)dR 
_ -(r1+r2)Ker2c(a)
rl r 2 A
7 f-700e - Tri+r2 ' f(R --a) dR
er2(K-c(a)) -e r+12 f(R - ya)dR = -e-'
Observe that we can integrate by parts:
e r + 2 f'(R - ya)dR = e rl+r2 f(R -ya) - r r2 e rl+r2 f(R-ya)dR
r1r2 rjr2 R
rl+r2 -e r+r2 f(R - ya)dR
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Hence:
r1r2 
.
e rl+r2 f (R - ya)dR r1 r 2
Then the first two conditions imply:
*2e (rl+r2)K+r2c(a)
i'
cI(a)r 2e-('+r2)K er2c(a) r 1 + r 2  -(r1+r2)K er2c(a)
rir2 /
aFB C )
Hence, first-best effort is independent of risk type. Any employer r1 who hires an employee r2
will require her to exert effort a*B = c 1(y). That is, first-best effort equates marginal benefit of
effort (marginal impact of effort on mean output) with marginal cost.
Finally, use K to satisfy r2's IR constraint:
e-r2(K c(c'-e))) JR _ -
1 1 (7
K*B (ri, r2, v) = -v + c(c()) + - log e
r 2  r2 J
00
Hence, the optimal first-best contract is:
r 1
sFB (R) = R + KF B (r1,r2, V)
r1 + r'2
K*B(ri, r 2 , v)
-1(y))dR= -e _V
rir2 R
r1 +r2 f (R - yc'~1(-y)) dR
r1 $'2 R
- v +c(c'1(+)) log e rl+r2 f(R -- yc' 1 ())dR
oo0
aFB C 0
2.A.3 Proof of the main result in the second-best
We know that the sum of certainty-equivalents in a pair (rl, r2) is:
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where at is characterized by:
(c'( t) + -- )
r 2V
= ± c"(at) > 0
r 2
We can easily see that a > c-1 r? _.
Replacing the functional form for cost of effort into the expressions:
c(a)
c'(a)
= 7a", M > 1
= TMaM~1
c"(a) = ?M(M -1)aM -2
Then the expressions characterizing the pairwise sum and the threshold a become:
CE(ri, r2 )
[1+ r2?7.Ma]1 r2
1 + r. / a ^ 1 V I [11 ±1+ [11
1
_ r 2 )Mat"-'V]r [1 + rr+Ir21
- + 7 r Mitviar1 + r2 '
+ = IM(M -,1)2M-2
r2V) r2
Finding the conditions for supermodularity and submodularity produces the comparative stat-
ics.
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(rM-a- 1
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Chapter 3
Interdependent Utility and
Truthtelling in Two-Sided Matching
3.1 Introduction
Results from the economic study of market design have been used quite successfully in a variety of
"real-world" markets in which price mechanisms fail or are not available. Stability was established
early on as a natural equilibrium concept-in a world where agents belong to one of two groups, and
gain by working together across groups, a one-to-one matching is stable if it satisfies two properties:
first, each matched agent must prefer being with its partner to remaining single, and second, no
two agents who are unmatched in the assignment can match with each other instead and both
become better off. Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the simple but powerful deferred acceptance
algorithm (DAA), which arrives at a stable matching given the ordinal preferences reported by
each agent, and is used to faciliate a number of real-life two-sided matching markets, including the
assignment of students to charter schools, and the assignment of medical students to residencies.
Since it implements a stable matching, we call the DAA a stable mechanism. According to the
DAA, one side is chosen to "propose". For example, suppose that in a standard marriage problem,
the men are chosen to propose to the women. Then, each man proposes to his first choice. If a
woman receives a single proposal, she holds it. If a woman receives multiple proposals, she holds
her most preferred one and rejects the others. Men who were rejected then propose to their next
favorite choice, and so on. A man never re-proposes to a woman who rejected him. The stable
matching selected is called the man-optimal stable matching; when women propose, that stable
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matching is woman-optimal. The widespread usage of the DAA is due not only to its simplicity,
but also to the fact that it is observed to work quite well in practice. Kojima and Pathak (1996)
remark, "In real-world applications, empirical studies have shown that stable mechanisms often
succeed, whereas unstable ones often fail." Roth (1989) provides a large body of evidence.
Yet the theoretical manipulability of stable mechanisms is well-known. For example, Roth
(1982) shows that there is no stable mechanism where truthfully reporting preferences is a dominant
strategy for every agent. In addition, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) show that, when any stable
mechanism is applied to a marriage market in which preferences are strict and there is more than
one stable matching, then at least one agent can misreport her preferences and become matched to
a partner more desirable than the one she would have been assigned had she reported the truth,
assuming all the other agents are telling the truth. Thus, in situations where there are multiple
stable matchings with respect to the set of genuine preferences, at least one person always has an
incentive to lie. Moreover, loosely speaking, there are often multiple stable matchings-the core
is always nonempty, and the stable matching arrived at by the DAA when men propose generally
differs from the matching arrived at when the women propose. Importantly, there are some limits to
manipulability: Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) showed that under the man-optimal
DAA, it is a dominant strategy for every man to report preferences truthfully, and similarly for the
woman-optimal DAA and women. However, women still have incentives to misreport under the
man-optimal DAA, and vice versa.
What might reconcile this apparent paradox of manipulation in theory but not in practice? The
aim of this paper is to offer one explanation not yet explored in the literature for why agents do not
seem to take advantage of opportunities to misreport profitably. The intuition is that an agent's
utility from a partnership may depend not only on her own views about her partner, but also on her
partner's views of her. For example, in the student-school matching problem, a student considers
the public profile of characteristics for each of the schools: student-teacher ratio, extracurriculars,
financial aid, facilities, and so on. Based on these public profiles, the students rank the schools.
However, the students may very well care about how those schools rank them. If the student
thinks a school is great because it has small classes and well-known teachers, but discovers that
the school doesn't think very highly of the student, the student might re-think ranking that school
highly. After all, if she ends up at the school, she may not receive any attention or resources,
making it not such a great option after all.
This interdependence of utility is a realistic feature of many other matching scenarios, including
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employment and dating/marriage. Working at one's dream firm is not enjoyable if one feels over-
looked or undervalued; dating a dream person is not pleasant if that person is dissatisfied. Hence,
an agent may care about her desires as well as her desirability in a given match.
I formalize this notion of interdependent utility and explore stable matchings in this framework.
Suppose that each market participant has a publicly observable profile of characteristics. The
participants care about these characteristics, because once matched, a partnership can produce
valued output, and production depends positively on the effort exerted by each partner. The
amount of effort a partner exerts depends on her happiness with the partnership. After observing
the public profiles of potential partners, an agent is able to determine how satisfied she would be in
a relationship with each of the potential partners, and therefore how much effort she would exert in
each relationship-she exerts more effort in relationships with people who have characteristics she
likes. Thus, she forms "first-round" ordinal preferences over her potential partners. However, she
doesn't know how much effort a potential partner would exert in the relationship without knowing
something about how satisfied that person is with being her partner. An indicator of the level of
satisfaction is that partner's ranking of her. Hence, in this formulation, an agent's "final" utility
from a partnership depends on her "first-round" ranking of her partner as well as her partner's
"first-round" ranking of her, because the output the partnership ultimately produces depends on
both partners' contributions, and an agent's contribution is increasing in her satisfaction.
I show that, for sets of preferences where, in the standard model, there are multiple stable
matchings and at least one person has an incentive to misreport, in this framework, there is either
a unique stable matching and no agent has an incentive to lie given that everybody else is telling
the truth, or there are multiple stable matchings, but still no agent has an incentive to lie given that
everybody else is telling the truth. (By "the standard model", I mean the traditional one-to-one,
two-sided matching model where each agent submits ordinal preferences, and the utility an agent i
gets from being matched with j is higher the more highly she ranks j.) The intuition for this is the
following: in the standard model, an agent might misreport her preferences (e.g. declare truncated
preferences) in the hopes of getting partnered with someone she has ranked more highly than the
person she would be assigned if she reported her preferences truthfully. However, the reason she
isn't assigned to the higher-ranked person if she reports truthfully is because that person isn't as
enthusiastic about being partnered with her. In the standard, "independent utility" model, she
doesn't care if her partner is enthusiastic about her or not-she just wants to end up with someone
as high up her list as possible. But in the interdependent utility model of this paper, our agent cares
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how enthusiastic her partner is about her. She doesn't find it worthwhile to lie about preferences
in order to be partnered with someone whom she ranks very highly, but who ranks her very poorly.
Put another way, in the standard model, multiple stable matchings are associated with across-
group disagreement. If, for each school, a school's most preferred student also ranks that school
as most preferred, then there will be a unique stable matching. Multiplicity arises if, for instance,
the school's most preferred student ranks a different school as her favorite. Interdependent utility
"smooths" this across-group disagreement by reducing the distance, so to speak, between two
agents' feelings about each other. In the standard model, an agent i in one group could despise
agent j in the other group (rank him last), while agent j could adore agent i (rank her first). Hence,
the stable match that the DAA selects when one group proposes may differ drastically from the
stable match that the DAA selects when the other group proposes. Under interdependent utility,
agent i's disapproval of j is tempered by the knowledge that j is devoted to i, and j's adoration of i is
tempered by the knowledge that he is i's last choice. This diminished disparity in preferences across
groups pushes the market participants towards a sort of agreement on a unique stable matching.
In the limiting case where each agent equally weights her desires and her desirability, there is
in fact a unique stable matching in almost every instance of ordinal preferences. Moreover, this
unique stable matching is either the man-optimal or the woman-optimal matching in the standard
framework. In addition, I identify a set of ordinal preferences which I call "perfectly antagonistic"-
given these preferences, even under interdependent utility, there is not a unique stable matching
(disagreement is irreconcilable, in some sense), but nevertheless it continues to be the case no agent
has an incentive to misreport preferences.
Having shown that, in contrast with the standard model, the stable match is generally unique
in a framework with interdependent utility where desires and desirability are equally weighted,
and hence agents do not have an incentive to misreport their preferences, I then construct an
appropriately-modified DAA, based off the sum of the ranks in each potential parternship between
agent i in group one and agent j in group two, which selects the unique stable match. To be a
bit more specific, a matrix is constructed, where the (i, j)th entry is the sum of the ith member of
group one's ranking of the jth member of group two, and the jth member of group two's ranking
of the ith member of group one. Since the stable match is unique, it doesn't matter which side
proposes. Suppose WLOG that group one proposes. Then, each member of group one proposes to
the member of group two with whom she has the minimal rank-sum. Ties can be broken randomly,
or by using the initial ordinal rankings of the proposer. If a member of group two receives a single
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proposal, she holds it; if she receives multiple proposals, she keeps the one with minimal rank-sum
and rejects the others. Any member of group one who was rejected then proposes to the member of
group two with whom she has the next smallest rank-sum, and so on. No member ever re-reproposes
to someone who already rejected her. 1
Other explanations exist in the literature for why misreporting does not seem to occur under
stable mechanisms. One branch studies the computational complexity of calculating the optimal
lie. Some researchers have used methods from computer science to show that the problem of
profitable manipulation may be NP hard (Pini et al. 2009). On a related note, Roth and Rothblum
(2002) argue that part of the difficulty of constructing the optimal lie may stem from incomplete
information. Perhaps one needs to know the preferences of one's fellow group members, or the
preferences of the members of the other group. In fact, Roth and Rothblum show that, even when
information is highly incomplete, reporting truncated preferences (that is, declaring one's least
preferred options to be unacceptable when they are actually acceptable, just heavily disliked) is
still profitable. Truncation strategies are also not particularly computationally complex.
Another set of papers argues that there is little to gain from manipulation in large markets.
Kojima and Pathak (2009) show that in many-to-one matching markets, such as students to schools,
as the number of participants goes to infinity but the length of preference lists stays fixed, the
fraction of participants with an incentive to misreport their preferences, given that everyone else
is telling the truth, goes to 0. More specifically, under the student-optimal stable mechanism in
the schools-students matching problem, we know that it is a dominant strategy for students to
report their preferences truthfully, but that schools have an incentive to misreport their quotas.
Kojima and Pathak show that the benefit to schools from manipulating their quotas diminishes as
the market grows large.
The key distinction between the existing explanations for the absence of manipulation of stable
mechanisms in practice and the explanation advanced by this paper is that in existing frameworks,
market participants do have an incentive to misreport their preferences, only it is difficult to figure
out how, or the gain from it is small. By contrast, the results of this paper suggest that if an agent
simply cares not only about being matched with a partner she likes, but also about being matched
with a partner who likes her, then in fact there will be a unique stable matching and no agent will
'The model, the algorithm (including how to deal with declaring unacceptable agents), and the results will be
presented much more precisely in the coming sections. This is merely meant to serve as an overview of the main idea
of the paper.
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have an incentive to lie if the others are telling the truth.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I work through a simple example
to demonstrate how an agent may gain in the standard framework by misreporting her preferences.
I then set up the model of interdependent utility, and present the results. I revisit the example
to demonstrate that agents no longer have the incentive to lie in a framework with interdependent
utility. Finally, I conclude.
3.2 An Example
Consider a standard marriage market with four women and four men. Suppose nobody prefers
being single to being matched, and ordinal preferences are:
Mi
M2
M3
M4
W1
W2
W3
W4
: W2
: W1
: W4
W3
W2
W3
: W1>W3
> W1> W4
>W4 >W3
>W2 >W1
>W2>W4
: M1>M3>M2>M4
: M1>M3>M4>M2
: M2>M1>
: M4>M2>
M3 > M4
M3 > M1
Then, in the first round of the man-proposing DAA, the men propose as follows:
Mi
M2
M3
M4
-- W2
- W1
-+ W4
-+ W1
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Since WI receives two proposals, she holds the one she prefers, which is M2's proposal. Thus,
M4 must propose to his next favorite woman, W3, who has no competing proposals. The DAA
ends at this point, and the man-optimal stable matching is:
MI M2 M3 M4
W2 WI W4 W3
The woman-proposing DAA runs in a similar fashion, except the women propose. This produces
the woman-optimal stable matching:
M1 M2 M3 M4
PW
W2 W3 WI W4
Note that pM 5 I'w, so there are multiple stable matchings. We know from Dubins and
Freedman [4] and Roth [10] that given these preferences, under any stable mechanism, at least one
person has an incentive to misreport preferences given the others are telling the truth.
For example, suppose the man-proposing DAA is being run, and W4 "misreports" her prefer-
ences by truncating them. That is, W4 reports that the only man acceptable to her is M4 (but
her true preferences are as described above).
Then, in the first round of the man-proposing DAA, the men propose as follows:
MI -> W2
M2 -+ W1
M3 -> W4
M4 -> W1
W1 again receives multiple proposals from M2 and M4, and holds the one she prefers, M2's, but
in addition W4 rejects M3's proposal, because she has declared him to be unacceptable. Hence,
M4 and M3 have to propose again. M4 proposes to his next favorite woman, W3, while M3
proposes to W3 as well.
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M1 -+ W2
M2 -> W1
M3 - W3
M4 -+ W3
W3 holds the proposal she prefers, M3's, so M4 proposes to W2.
Mi -+ W2
M2 -+ WI
M3 -+ W3
M4 -+ W2
But W2 already has a proposal from M1, who is her top choice, so she rejects M4, who finally
proposes to W4, and she accepts. This leads to the matching:
M1 M2 M3 M4
W2 W1 W3 W4
So, by lying and truncating her preferences, W4 ends up with her top choice of partner, M4,
under the man-proposing DAA, whereas she would have ended up with M3 if she had told the
truth. In this model, an agent is strictly happier to be paired with a partner she ranks more highly.
Now, let's turn to the model of this paper.
3.3 The Model
The economy is composed of two disjoint groups of rational, utility-maximizing agents, who have
utility functions u(x) = x. Denote the groups by M and W, where MI = |W| {2, 3, ..., N}
N < oo. Suppose that members of M and W have to build partnerships one-to-one across groups
in order to produce some kind of valuable output. For example, these two groups could be men
and women, or students and schools, or employees and employers.
122
Suppose that each agent i has a public profile of characteristics, Xi E Rk, k E N, which is known
to herself and observable to others. For example, for a school, this public profile might consist of
the average student-teacher ratio, the number of classrooms, the extracurriculars available, the
facilities, teacher quality, and so forth. For a student, this public profile might consist of past
grades and past exam scores.
Suppose that the output produced by a matched partnership (i, j) depends on the characteristics
of the partners, Xi and Xj, in the following way. Any matched partnership (i, j) has the possibility
of capturing a pie of size y. However, once matched, i and j must contribute to the relationship
in order to capture some fraction of the pie. The level of an agent's contribution depends on her
compatibility and satisfaction with her partner. Since a contribution is personally costly, an agent
will contribute highly only if she is satisfied with the relationship. The joint contributions of the
agents determine the output produced; output is increasing in the level of contribution.
In particular, an agent i E M matched with an agent j E W chooses a contribution:
c': Xi x Xj -+ R
(There is no restriction or assumption on the form of this mapping, or on the profiles of char-
acteristics.)
So, {ci, ... , cv} is the vector whose jtL element describes the contribution i would make in a
relationship with the jth member of W. Let p(c ) denote the ranking of the size of the contribution
c relative to the other elements in the vector, from largest to smallest. For example, if c? is
the largest number in the vector, then p(c ) = 1, indicating that i perceives j to be her most
compatible partner, and is most willing to make contributions in a relationship with him. Assume
that no elements of the vector are the same, so that each i has strict preferences over possible
partners j, based on her evaluation of the compatibility of their characteristics.
Suppose that the fraction of the pie of size y captured by a partnership (i, j) is 0(i, j), where
O(i, j) = f(p(c )) + f(p(c ))
and
1 N - x
f(x) = -2 N - 1
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So, the output produced by a partnership (i, j) is:
N2
O(ij)Y N-1
where p(-) E {1, ... , N} since it is a ranking.
For instance, suppose that a student i has the characteristic that she wants to become a math-
ematician, and so wishes to match with a school which prioritizes the sciences and excels at math
competitions. Suppose school j prioritizes the sciences, while school k prioritizes theater. Then,
student i recognizes she is much more compatible with school j than with school k-this matters
because she knows that at school j, she will work very hard and become involved with the math
competitions, while at the same time receiving the support and the resources that she needs from
school j, which is excited to have her as a student. By contrast, if she were to attend school k, the
student knows she would not exert very much effort in theater, and would likely also be ignored by
the school, as they prefer to devote their resources to those with talent in theater.
Hence, student i ranks school j above school k-not only does i prefer j to k because she prefers
science to theater, she also knows that school j will give her time and resources. Hence, both i and
j will contribute highly to a relationship with each other, and this will lead to high productivity.
In particular, if i and j rank each other first, that is, ci = c) = 1, then f(c ) = f(c) = j, so that
0(i, j) = 1, and a partnership between student i and school j captures the entire pie y.
Note that in this model, an agent always prefers being matched to somebody rather than
remaining single. However, when I discuss a mechanism to implement stable matches in this
setting, I will assume that the "central computer" which is running the mechanism does not know
that nobody prefers being single, and so agents are able to misreport partners as being unacceptable
if they wish.
A match function y assigns distinct members of M to distinct members of W, where each person
is assigned at most one partner. A matching is an equilibrium if it is stable-that is, it must satisfy
two properties:
1. Individual rationality: every agent prefers being matched with her partner to remaining single
(this is satisfied for every agent in this model)
2. No blocking: no two agents who are unmatched under y can make themselves both better off
by matching with each other instead of obeying the assignment p
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This is the set up of the model. The natural questions to ask now are: does at least one stable
matching always exist? When is there a unique stable matching? Can we construct an algorithm
to select a stable matching? What are the strategic properties of this algorithm? These questions
are addressed in the next section.
3.4 Results
Because this is a model of transferable utility (all agents are risk-neutral with utility functions
u(x) = x), we know that an equilibrium matching maximizes aggregate output2 . That is, we
know that each partnership produces a joint output. An equilibrium matching is one in which any
switching of partners results in a decrease in the sum of output across all pairs.
Recall that the joint output of a partnership (i, j) is:
N - (c)+P(c))
(ij)Y = N i Y
N - 1
where p(c ) is i's ranking of j based on i's evaluation of the compatibility between i's char-
acteristics and j's public profile, Xj, and p(c,) is j's ranking of i based on j's evaluation of the
compatibility between j's characteristics and i's public profile, Xi.
Thus, it is clear that the matching which maximizes the sum of output across all pairs is also
the matching which minimizes the sum of within-partnership rank-sums across all pairs. That is,
if i ranks j mt" (p(c ) = m), and j ranks i n'h (p(cj) = n), then the within-partnership rank-sum
is (m + n).
This suggests the following approach. The model can be mapped into an alternative model
where the utility of an agent i from being matched with an agent j directly depends on i's ranking
of j and j's ranking of i (where the rankings are based on each agent's evaluation of the public
profile of characteristics of potential partners). In particular, let uij = -(p + pj). A profitable
block in this model would be if an agent i could instead match with an agent k such that the sum of
i's rank of k and k's rank of i is smaller than the sum of agent i's rank of j and j's rank of i. Then,
we look for the matching which minimizes the total sum of ranks across all matched pairs. This
matching will be the same matching that maximizes aggregate output in the underlying model.
The intuition is that in the underlying model, an agent i wants to work with an agent j whom she
2 Becker (1973) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) both noted this.
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views as compatible, because she knows she will contribute more to a relationship in which she feels
satisfied, but she wants agent j to view her as compatible, too-if j doesn't have a high opinion of
her, than j will not contribute to the relationship, and the output produced will be low. Hence, i
cares about j's ranking of her as well as her ranking of j.
So, this model can be analyzed by studying the alternative model where each agent forms
ordinal preferences over potential partners based off their characteristics, but additionally cares
about how those potential partners rank her, so that her utility from a partnership depends equally
and directly on her characteristics-based ranking of her partner and on her partner's characteristics-
based ranking of her.
To think about existence of equilibrium, and other properties of the equilibrium, it will be
helpful to develop several definitions.
Definition 18 The M matrix is the N x N matrix where the 1 x N row vector M(i,:) represents
man i's rankings of women {W1,..., WN}. That is, the (i, j) element of the M matrix is the rank
that man i assigns to woman j. The W matrix is the N x N matrix where the N x 1 column
vector W(:, j) represents woman j's rankings of men {M1,..., MN}. That is, the (i, j) element of
the W matrix is the rank that woman j assigns to man i.
Note that if no man finds any woman unacceptable, each row of M will be some permutation
of [1 ... N]. Similarly, if no woman finds any man unacceptable, each column of W will be some
permutation of [1 ...N].
While it is the case that in this model, an agent always prefers being matched to somebody
rather than remaining single, I suppose that the entity which runs the stable mechanism and to
which the ordinal preferences are reported does not know this. Hence an agent is able to misreport
a potential partner as being unacceptable by ranking her 2N.
Definition 19 The ranks matrix is the N x N matrix ranks = M + W.
In the previous example, the M matrix and the W matrix would be as follows:
3 1 2 4 1 1 2 4
1 2 4 3 3 4 1 2
M: ,W:
4 3 2 1 2 2 3 3
1 3 2 4 4 3 4 1
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Since members of M are along the rows and members of W are along the columns, this tells us
that W2 is M3's 3 rd choice, while M3 is W2's 2 d choice.
So, the ranks matrix is:
4 2 4 8
4 6 5 5
ranks :
6 5 5 4
5 6 6 5
The first result establishes both existence of a stable matching (nonemptiness of the core),
and in so doing demonstrates how the DAA can be modified to find a stable matching for this
interdependent utility framework.
(A member of M will be referred to as a "man", and a member of W as a "woman", for ease
of exposition.)
Proposition 20 (Existence) A stable match with respect to any given set of strict preferences un-
der interdependent utility always exists.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Consider a modified deferred acceptance algorithm where,
in the men-proposing version, men propose first to the woman with whom he would have lowest
rank-sum, out of the pool of women he finds acceptable. (If a man finds no women acceptable, he
makes no proposals and remains single.) If more than one woman yields the same minimal rank-
sum, the man chooses the woman whom he also privately prefers ("selfish tiebreak"). If a woman
receives multiple acceptable proposals, she "holds" the man with whom she would have minimal
rank-sum, and rejects the other proposals. If two men yield the same minimal rank-sum, she picks
the man she also privately prefers. If a woman receives one acceptable proposal, she "holds" that
man. If a woman receives only unacceptable proposals, she rejects them. If a woman receives no
proposals, she remains single.
In the next round, men who were rejected in the directly previous round propose again, to the
woman with whom he would have lowest rank-sum, out of the pool of women who have not rejected
him yet and whom he finds acceptable. Women who receive proposals re-evaluate all their options,
including men they might have "held" at earlier stages, and keep only the man with whom their
rank-sum is smallest (breaking ties selfishly).
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This algorithm repeats until no man has been rejected in the directly previous round.
The match this algorithm produces must be stable. Consider a match generated by the algo-
rithm, and suppose that man m has a lower rank-sum with woman w' than with woman w, who is
his current partner. Since man m is matched to woman w, he must have found w acceptable (be-
cause otherwise he would not have proposed to her), and by transitivity (rationality of preferences)
woman w' must also be acceptable to man m. Thus, man m must have proposed to woman '
before proposing to woman w. Since man m is not matched to w' at the end of the algorithm, w'
must have rejected man m for a man with whom she has lower rank-sum, or with whom she has the
same rank-sum but privately prefers. Thus, woman w' is matched, at the end of the algorithm, to
a man she likes more than man m, since preferences are transitive and women cannot do worse as
the algorithm progresses, because men propose to them and they hold acceptances. Thus, (in, w')
cannot be a blocking pair. (The same logic applies if man m is single at the end of the algorithm,
and there exists an acceptable woman w' for him. It must have been that he proposed to w', but
that she rejected him in favor of a man she likes more. Thus, (m, w') cannot be a blocking pair.)
Now suppose that man m has the same rank-sum with woman w' than with woman w, who is
his current partner, but m privately prefers w' to w. Since man m is matched to woman w, he must
have found w acceptable (because otherwise he would not have proposed to her), and by transitivity
(rationality of preferences) woman w' must also be acceptable to man m. Thus, man m must have
proposed to woman w' before proposing to woman w, by the selfish tiebreak rule. Since man n is
not matched to w' at the end of the algorithm, w' must have rejected man m for a man with whom
she has lower rank-sum, or for a man with whom she has the same rank-sum but privately prefers.
Thus, woman w' is matched, at the end of the algorithm, to a man she likes more than man m,
since preferences are transitive and women cannot do worse as the algorithm progresses, because
men propose to them and they hold acceptances. So, (m, w') cannot be a blocking pair.
Since there are no blocking pairs, the match must be stable. *
This establishes that the core is nonempty in this model, and describes a method for finding a
stable matching, given the reported ordinal preferences.
What more can we say about stable matchings in this setting? To think about this, we must
partition the set of possible preference profiles.
Definition 21 Given a TxT matrix A, a matrix B is the vertical reflection of A if bij = a(T_ .)
for every row i and column j, ij E {, ..., T}.
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Definition 22 A preference profile [M W] is perfectly antagonistic iff M is symmetric (M =
M'), W is symmetric (W = W'), and W is the vertical reflection of M. In other words, for
every agent i, [agent i's mth choice ranks agent i nth] -> [agent i's nth choice ranks agent i mth,
m,n E {1, ..., N}, m+n = (N+ 1). Note that in this case, every element of the ranks matrix is equal
to (N + 1). A preference profile is imperfectly antagonistic iff it is not perfectly antagonistic.
Definition 23 A special case of imperfectly antagonistic preferences is mutual x preferences,
where, given some x G {1, ..., N}, every agent's xth choice ranks him/her xth. An agent's pref-
erences are mutual first if his/her first choice ranks him/her first.
(The case where every agent has mutual first preferences is not interesting, since there is no
within-side or between-side conflict of any kind, and the optimal matching is obvious-everybody
gets his or her first choice.)
There exist also preference profiles where a subset of agents have perfectly antagonistic prefer-
ences, over all agents in that subset.
Definition 24 A preference profile is essentially perfectly antagonistic if players' preferences
can be partitioned into mutual first preferences and perfectly antagonistic preferences. That is, Mf
C M, W5 C W, IMf5 = IMw| = K G {1,2,..., N}, where Mf, W5 have mutual first preferences
for each other, while M\Mf and W\Wf, both of cardinality (N - K), have perfectly antagonistic
preferences for each other. A preference profile is essentially imperfectly antagonistic iff it is
not essentially perfectly antagonistic.
This partition of preference profiles is specific to the structure of interdependence in this model.
Because the model maps into a framework where an agent's utility from a match depends directly
and equally on each partner's rank of the other, and in particular the dependence is linear, we must
treat specially sets of preference profiles where the rank-sum for all possible partnerships within a
weak subset of agents in M and W is exactly the same.
For example, the classic case of perfect antagonism is the following:
Mi : W1 > W2
M2 : W2 > W1
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W1 : M2 > MI
W2 : M1 > M2
MI's favorite woman is WI, but her favorite man is M2, whose favorite woman is W2, whose
favorite man is M1. Thus, the ranks matrix is:
3 3
ranks :
3 3
and both of the possible matches are stable.
Note that the antagonism is "perfect", because not only does everyone's first choice prefer some-
one else, but if the match were (MI, Wi) and (M2, W2), then making Mi happier by partnering
him with W2 decreases W2's happiness by exactly the amount that MI's happiness was increased.
That is, no one's happiness can be increased via a change of partner without decreasing someone
else's happiness by an exactly-offsetting amount.
The next result shows that there is a unique stable matching given essentially imperfectly
antagonistic preference profiles, while there are multiple stable matchings given essentially perfectly
antagonistic preference profiles.
Proposition 25 (a) (Essentially imperfectly antagonistic preferences) The deferred acceptance al-
gorithm generates the same match when men propose as when women propose. Further, the gener-
ated match is the unique stable match with respect to the preference profile, under interdependent
utility.
(b) (Essentially perfectly antagonistic preferences) There are multiple stable matchings: the
K men and K women who mutually prefer each other first are always matched with each other,
and the (N - K) men and women with perfectly antagonistic preferences are matched with each
other such that all men receive their mth choice, and all women receive their nth choice, where
mE {1, ... , N - K},n E f{,...,N - K}, m+ n = N - K + 1.
Proof. (a) Consider any given imperfectly antagonistic preference profile. Let a stable matching
with respect to this preference profile be denoted p. By definition of stability, we know that every
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agent is matched to an acceptable partner, and there are no blocking pairs: that is, there is
no pair (i,j), i E M, j E W, such that -(ranki(p(i)) + rankL(i)(i)) < -(ranki(j) + rankj(i))
and -(rankj(p(j)) + rank,(j)(j)) < -(ranki(j) + rankg(i)). Now consider a different matching,
obtained by switching the partners of two men, i and i', so that i is now matched with p(i') and i'
is matched with p(i). But then it must be that both (i, p(i')) and (i', t(i)) are worse off-if (i, p(i'))
became better off, they would have blocked the original match, and if (i', (1 i)) became better off,
they would have blocked the original match. But then this new match cannot be stable, since
(i, [t(i)) and (i', l(i')) are blocking pairs. Since any possible matching can be achieved by switching
two partners in the original match, it follows the the original stable matching p must be the unique
stable match.
Since it was proven in the previous proposition that the deferred acceptance algorithm (regard-
less of which side proposes) generates a stable matching, it must be that the deferred acceptance
algorithm generates the same match when men propose as when women propose.
(b) It is clear that in any stable matching, mutual firsts are matched to each other. Consider
the remaining (N - K) agents, who have perfectly antagonistic preferences over each other, and
let their section of the M, W, and ranks matrices be denoted MT, WT, and ranksT, respectively.
Then, by definition, MT = M+, WT = W}, MT is the vertical reflection of WT, and every element
of ranksT is the same, and equal to (N - K + 1). Hence, every agent gets the same base utility
-u(x, y) = (N - K +1) from being matched with any partner. Moreover, in any possible matching,
all men are matched to their mth choice, while all women are matched to their (N - K + 1 - m) t
choice. The selfish tiebreak rule means that man i and woman j can be a blocking pair iff man
i ranks j more highly than his given partner, and woman j ranks man i more highly than her
given partner. But, by definition of perfectly antagonistic preferences, every agent on one side's
gain comes at their partner on the other side's loss. Thus, there can be no blocking pairs from
matches where mutual first agents are matched to each other, and among the remaining perfectly
antagonistic agents, each man is matched to his mth choice, and each woman is matched to her
(N - K + 1 - 7 )th choice.E
Hence, many preference profiles which yield multiple stable matchings in the standard frame-
work (some of which are better for M and some of which are better for W), and which therefore
seem characterized by a seemingly irreconcilable level of conflict, may not be so irreconcilable after
all, if we account for interdependence of utility. Except in cases of perfect antagonism (where an
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increase in anybody's happiness is exactly offset by a decrease in someone else's happiness), there
is a unique stable matching, and therefore it is irrelevant which side proposes. Moreover, although
there are multiple stable matchings in cases of perfect antagonism, market participants are indif-
ferent over those matchings-it isn't the case that some of the matchings are better for one set of
people, while others are better for another set of people.
Not only is the stable matching unique given essentially imperfectly antagonistic preference
profiles, but it has a special property-it is either the man- or the woman-optimal stable matching
from the standard framework.
Proposition 26 The unique stable match with respect to a given (essentially) imperfectly antago-
nistic preference profile under interdependent utility is either the man- or the woman-optimal stable
match with respect to preferences under standard utility.
Proof. We know that, in the standard model, the woman-optimal match gives every woman
her best achievable mate and the man his worst achievable mate; the man-optimal match gives
every man his best achievable mate and every woman her worst achievable mate. "Achievable"
here is in the standard sense of "most preferred mate among the complete set of stable matches"
(where stability is based purely on independent utility, so that a man and woman block iff they each
rank each other higher than their original partners). Clearly, in the independent utility framework,
every woman's weakly favorite match is the woman-optimal match, and every man's weakly favorite
match is the man-optimal match, where these two matches generally differ. However, if agents
have linearly interdependent utility, the woman-optimal match is the match where each woman
is matched to her best "achievable" mate, and the man is matched to a woman who likes him to
the degree that he is her best "achievable" mate. Similarly, in the man-optimal match, the man
is matched to his best "achievable" mate, and the woman is matched to a man who likes her to
the degree that she is his best "achievable" mate. Thus, all other matches that are not the man-
or the woman-optimal match must do strictly worse under interdependent utility, since men and
women not being matched to their best achievable mates implies that men and women are also
not matched to someone who desires them to the degree that they are their best achievable mate.
And, as long as preferences are not (essentially) perfectly antagonistic, either the man- or the
woman-optimal must do strictly better. Therefore, the unique stable match with respect to a given
imperfectly antagonistic preference profile under interdependent utility must be either the man- or
woman-optimal stable match with respect to the same preferences, under independent utility. m
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Finally, what can we say about strategic properties of the stable mechanism? We know in
the standard case that the core is nonempty, and that the set of stable matchings is generally
not unique-in particular, the man-optimal stable matching differs from the woman-optimal stable
matching. We know that under a stable mechanism, truthtelling is never a dominant strategy,
and moreover, if there are multiple stable matchings, then at least one person has an incentive to
misreport preferences, assuming the other are telling the truth.
By contrast, we know that if agents' utilities are interdependent, in the sense that they care
about the contributions made by each partner to the relationship, where a partner's contributions
are increasing in satisfaction with the relationship, then the core is nonempty, and the stable
matching is generally unique. Multiple stable matchings arise only in cases of perfectly antagonistic
preference profiles, and in that case, all agents are simply indifferent over those matchings.
The natural question to ask is, will at least one agent have an incentive to misreport preferences
under a stable mechanism in this model, assuming all other participants are telling the truth? The
answer turns out to be no.
Proposition 27 In the basic model with interdependent utility and (essentially) imperfectly an-
tagonistic preferences, as long as no agent is pivotally antagonistic, no individual agent has an
incentive to misreport preferences if all other agents are telling the truth. Therefore, given a stable
rule, it is always an equilibrium for an agent to state his or her true preferences.
Proof. Suppose that the preference profile is imperfectly antagonistic. Suppose an agent
misreports his preferences while all other agents report the truth. The principal uses a stable
matching mechanism, so the resulting match will be the unique stable match with respect to the
false preferences, where the agent is matched to a different partner than he would have been had
he reported truthfully (else, there would have been no reason to lie). But by Proposition 9(a), we
know that this agent and the partner he would have had had he reported truthfully must be a
blocking pair in the unique stable match with respect to the false preferences. That is, the agent
is better off with his truthful partner than the partner he gets by lying. Hence, truthtelling is an
equilibrium strategy.
Now, suppose the full preference profile is essentially perfectly antagonistic. Then all agents are
indifferent over the multiple stable matchings, so no agent has an incentive to lie. *
Hence, if agents' utilities are interdependent in the sense of this model, then truthful reporting
of preferences is a best response under a stable mechanism such as a modified DAA, if everyone else
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is reporting truthfully. The across-group disagreement that resulted in multiple stable matchings in
the standard framework is resolved by interdependence-an agent no longer cares only about being
matched with someone as high up her list as possible. She also values her partner's opinion of her,
since that is her only indication of the contribution her partner would make to a joint relationship,
and if her partner is dissatisfied, the contribution, and subsequently the output, will be low.
Thus, our observation that stable mechanisms work well in practice despite the seemingly various
ways to manipulate profitably in theory might be due to the fact that agents care about their
desirability as well as their desires. If this is the case, then I've shown that there are no ways to gain
by miresporting preferences under a stable mechanism, including reporting truncated preferences.
So, one interpretation of these results is that unaccounted-for interdependence explains the smooth
functioning of stable mechanisms.
Another interpretation is that, if we think there is interdependence of agents' utilities, (or we
know there is interdependence based on empirical or experimental work), then we should implement
the stable mechanism described in the existence proof. That is, we should ask both sides to report
their ordinal preferences, and then run the modified DAA on the ranks matrix to find the unique
stable matching (which side proposes is irrelevant). We can honestly assure market participants
that truthtelling is an optimal strategy.
3.5 An Example: Followup
Recall the ordinal preferences from the first example:
Mi : W2>W3>W1>W4
M2 : W1>W2>W4>W3
M3 : W4>W3>W2>Wl
M4 : W1>W3>W2>W4
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W1 : M1>M3>M2>M4
W2 : M1>M3>M4>M2
W3 : M2>M1>M3>M4
W4 : M4>M2>M3>Ml
I showed that the man-optimal and the woman-optimal stable matching differed:
MI M2 M3 M4
AM
W2 WI W4 W3
MI M2 M3 M4
W2 W3 W1 W4_
Thus, at least one person has an incentive to misreport preferences under a stable mechanism.
For example, if the man-optimal DAA is the stable mechanism, then W4 can gain by reporting
only M4 to be acceptable to her.
Now suppose that agents have interdependent utility as described by this model. Then the
ranks matrix is:
4 2 4 8
4 6 5 5
ranks:
6 5 5 4
L5 6 6 51
Suppose men propose. Then the first round is:
MI -+ W2
M2 -+ WI
M3 -+ W4
M4 -+ WI
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W1 holds M2's proposal and rejects M4's, so he proposes to his next choice, W4, and the next
round is:
M1 -+ W2
M2 -+ WI
M3 -+ W4
M4 -+ W4
W4 holds M3's proposal and rejects M4's, so he proposes to W3, and the stable matching is:
Mi M2 M3 M4
W2 WI W4 W3
And when women propose, the algorithm finds the same stable match. This is the unique stable
matching.
Note that this match is the man-optimal stable match from the standard framework.
Now, let's explore strategic aspects. For example, does W4 still have an incentive to report M4
as being her only acceptable partner?
Suppose she ranks M4, 1, and the other three men, 8 (recall that the protocol for declaring
someone unacceptable is to rank him 2N).
Then the ranks matrix is:
4 2 4 12
4 6 5 11
ranks :
6 5 5 9
5 6 65
and the match found by the modified DAA is:
MI M2 M3 M4
W2 W1 W3 W4J
But this lie is not profitable for W4, precisely because of interdependent utility-while W44 does
rank M4 more highly than M3, her previous partner, M4 ranks her last. By contrast, M3 ranks
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her first, and she ranks him third. If W4 were to partner with M4, the output they would produce
would be !Y, while if W4 partnered with M3, the output they would produce would be 2Y. Hence,
W4 actually prefers M3 as a partner over M4-M3 would contribute highly to their relationship,
while M4 wouldn't contribute at all.
3.6 Conclusion
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) showed that it's impossible to design a stable mech-
anism under which truthtelling is a dominant strategy for every agent, or even a best response for
every agent, assuming the others are telling the truth. Hence, if we wish to continue using stable
mechanisms, research must focus on understanding why market participants do not misreport their
preferences, even when they have opportunities to gain by doing so.
In this paper, I offer an explanation which departs from the existing work on computational
complexity, incomplete information, and large markets. I show that the utility of makret partic-
ipants may in fact be interdependent-an agent may care about a potential partner's ranking of
her, in addition to her ranking of her partner. I show that when the interdependence is linear and
desires and desirability are equally-weighted, there is either a unique stable matching, or multiple
stable matchings across which all agents are indifferent. Thus, no agent has an incentive to lie
under a stable mechanism, if the other participants are telling the truth.
There are several important caveats to these results, and some important directions for future
research. In this paper, interdependence is modeled in a very specific way, and this leads to a
partition of preference profiles which is specific to the structure of interdependence (that is, perfect
antagonism is a concept which seems specific to this model). However, the intuition for uniqueness
does not seem to be bound by the functional form. It would be of great interest to generalize the
concept of interdependent utility.
Experimental work would benefit this research greatly. There is no stable mechanism under
which truthtelling is a best response to others telling the truth in the standard model, but I've
shown that there is such a truth-inducing stable mechanism if agents care sufficiently about their
partners' perceptions. It would therefore be of interest to run the following simple one-to-one,
two-sided matching experiment: in the first round, each participant in the experiment is shown the
profiles of characteristics of all the members in the other group, and asked to submit their rankings
of the members in the other group. Then, it is revealed to each participant i how she was ranked
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by each member of the other group. Agents would then be allowed to re-submit their preference
lists. Are there differences between the original and the updated preference lists? Do the differences
appear to have a special structure?
Currently, our way of dealing with the possibility of strategic manipulation is to push two-sided
problems to be somewhat one-sided. In the NRMP, ony residents submit rankings over hospitals,
while in student-school matching problems, only students are allowed to rank schools. (Hospitals
and schools are still allowed to set quotas.) This somewhat supresses the two-sidedness of the
problem, and induces residents and students to report truthfully. However, if our hope is for
market design to expand and find new applications, then we need to have a better understanding
of strategic manipulation, and better ways of dealing with it. This paper suggests that, contrary
to existing explanations where agents have an incentive to misreport but cannot bear the cost of
calculating the optimal lie, or do not have enough information, or gain little from it, it may be the
case that agents do not have an incentive to misreport after all. Agents know that the partners they
could get by lying are precisely those that they desire but who do not desire them, and they may
recognize that such a partnership might not be so satisfying. This paper identifies one structure of
interdependence in which the stable matching is unique, and constructs a mechanism to find that
stable matching. Given how powerful interdependence can be, a fruitful next step would be to try
and experimentally identify the structure of interdependence in real-life matching problems, and
then to incorporate these observations into further theoretical research.
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